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ABSTRACT
Diffusion processes in networks can be used to model many real-world processes, such
as the propagation of a rumor on social networks and cascading failures on power
networks. Analysis of diffusion processes in networks can help us answer important
questions such as the role and the importance of each node in the network for spread-
ing the diffusion and how to top or contain a cascading failure in the network. This
dissertation consists of three parts.
In the first part, we study the problem of locating multiple diffusion sources in
networks under the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model. Given a complete
snapshot of the network, we developed a sample-path-based algorithm, named clus-
tering and localization, and proved that for regular trees, the estimators produced by
the proposed algorithm are within a constant distance from the real sources with a
high probability. Then, we considered the case in which only a partial snapshot is
observed and proposed a new algorithm, named Optimal-Jordan-Cover (OJC). The
algorithm first extracts a subgraph using a candidate selection algorithm that selects
source candidates based on the number of observed infected nodes in their neighbor-
hoods. Then, in the extracted subgraph, OJC finds a set of nodes that “cover” all
observed infected nodes with the minimum radius. The set of nodes is called the
Jordan cover, and is regarded as the set of diffusion sources. We proved that OJC
can locate all sources with probability one asymptotically with partial observations
in the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) random graph. Multiple experiments on different networks
were done, which show our algorithms outperform others.
In the second part, we tackle the problem of reconstructing the diffusion history
from partial observations. We formulated the diffusion history reconstruction problem
as a maximum a posteriori (MAP) problem and proved the problem is NP hard. Then
we proposed a step-by- step reconstruction algorithm, which can always produce a
i
diffusion history that is consistent with the partial observations. Our experimental
results based on synthetic and real networks show that the algorithm significantly
outperforms some existing methods.
In the third part, we consider the problem of improving the robustness of an
interdependent network by rewiring a small number of links during a cascading attack.
We formulated the problem as a Markov decision process (MDP) problem. While the
problem is NP-hard, we developed an effective and efficient algorithm, REALW IRE,
to robustify the network and to mitigate the damage during the attack. Extensive
experimental results show that our algorithm outperforms other algorithms on most
of the robustness metrics.
ii
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Diffusion processes in networks can be used to model many real-world phenomena
including the spread of an infectious disease, the propagation of a computer virus, the
gradual adoption of a new product, etc. Loosely speaking, the research on diffusion
processes in networks can be categorized into two groups: prospective analysis which
focuses on the structural properties of diffusion processes and networks that lead to
epidemic-type outbreaks and algorithms to minimize or maximize network diffusion,
and retrospective analysis which focuses on network inference such as identifying the
source or underlying network of diffusion.
1.1 Overview
In this dissertation, we first tackle the information source detection problem, which
is to infer the source(s) of an epidemic diffusion process in a network based on some
observations of the diffusion. Possible observed information includes node states (e.g.,
infected or susceptible) and the timestamps at which nodes changed their states. The
solution to this problem has a wide range of applications. In epidemiology, identifying
patient zero helps diagnose the cause and the origin of the disease. For cybersecurity,
tracing the source of malware is an important step in the investigation of a cyber
attack. On online social networks, the trustworthiness of news/information heavily
depends on its source. Given a complete snapshot of the network and motivated by
the sample-path-based estimator proposed in Zhu and Ying (2013), we first present
a clustering and localization algorithm for tree networks, where the number of real
sources is assumed to be known. We then prove that on regular trees, the distances
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between the estimators given by the algorithm and the real sources are upper bounded
by a constant with a high probability. We further present a heuristic algorithm for
general networks and an algorithm for estimating the number of sources when the
number of sources is unknown. However, when the observation of a complete snapshot
is not possible (each node can only report its state with some probability), we propose
another novel algorithm, named Optimal-Jordan-Cover (OJC), for locating multiple
sources for this case and prove theoretical guarantees on the detection rate for non-tree
networks. We further develop a heuristic based on theK−means, called Approximate-
Jordan-Cover (AJC), to reduce the complexity and generate a similar performance.
Then we go beyond identifying the source of diffusion and study the problem of
reconstructing the entire history of a diffusion process, named as diffusion history
reconstruction, which has been studied only very recently in Sefer and Kingsford
(2014). In large-scale networks, due to the cost and privacy concerns, it is almost
impossible to monitor the entire network and collect the complete diffusion trace,
which makes reconstructing the diffusion history not trivial. For example, when a
computer virus propagates among different computer through the network, we cannot
track the infection of each computer because of the privacy limitation. And when
some fake news goes viral on the Internet, which means thousands of individuals or
websites are involved in the diffusion process, it is difficult to obtain the time when
each individual or website that propagates the news. We assume that the diffusion
process follows the Susceptible-Infected (SI) model, a variant of the popular SIR
model first proposed in Kermack and McKendrick (1927), and a single snapshot of
the network is given, which includes the set of “infected” nodes, and the corresponding
infection time. The nodes with known “infection” time can be thought as monitor
nodes that were placed in the network. Each monitor node can record the time at
which the node is “infected” and report the infection time. We formulate the diffusion
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history reconstruction problem as a maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimate problem,
and prove that the problem is NP-hard by reducing an arbitrary set cover problem
to a diffusion history reconstruction problem. We propose a greedy and step-by-
step reconstruction algorithm to reconstruct the most likely network state at time
slot τ based on the network state at time slot τ − 1 while guaranteeing the state
is consistent with partial observation, and further develop a greedy algorithm for a
single-step construction.
Finally, we consider the problem of improving the robustness of an interdepen-
dent network under a localized attack. Interdependent networks are widely used to
model and analyze many real-world complex systems, such as the Internet, social
networks, transportation systems, biochemical reactions, etc Albert and Baraba´si
(2002); Di Muro et al. (2016). Interdependent networks consist of nodes and links
where nodes represent different components of a complex system and links char-
acterize the interaction between the components. Many researchers have studied
interdependent networks to gain insights about features and properties of complex
systems, such as their robustness, stability, connectivity and structure Yuan et al.
(2015); Vespignani (2010); Buldyrev et al. (2010); Gao et al. (2012); Di Muro et al.
(2016); Watts and Strogatz (1998); Albert et al. (2000); Albert and Baraba´si (2002);
Callaway et al. (2000); Albert et al. (1999); Newman (2010); Schneider et al. (2011);
Zeng and Liu (2012). An important topic in this area is to preserve the robustness
of interdependent networks under site or link attacks. This problem is important
to many real-world networks, such as power networks, transportation networks, fuel
distribution networks and communication networks. Many of these networks may
have low tolerance to damages on their structures (e.g. the diameter doubled after
only 5% of the most connected nodes are removed on the scale-free network Albert
et al. (2000)). We focus on the development of algorithms that rewire the links of the
3
interdependent networks in real-time to minimize the impact of the localized attack.
In particular, we assume an interdependent network consists of two subnetworks A
and B, in which the functioning of each node can depend on a set of nodes from the
other layer. We study a localized attack model such that the nodes around attacked
nodes are removed hop by hop inspired by Shao et al. (2015). We formulate the
interdependent network link rewiring problem as a Markov decision process (MDP)
problem, which is NP-hard. Then, we propose a greedy algorithm to rewire the links
during the attack.
1.2 Summary of Contributions
In Chapter 2, we consider the information source detection problem under SIR
model with a complete snapshot observed. We propose an algorithm, named clus-
tering and localization (CL), for tree networks. Then we are able to prove for a
(g+ 1)−regular tree, where g+ 1 is the degree of each node on the tree, with infinite
number of levels, if gq > 1 (q is the infection probability) and the distance between
any two original sources is greater than some constant, the distance between any
estimator and its closest real source is bounded by constant with a high probability.
Based the CL algorithm, we develop an algorithm, called clustering and reverse in-
fection (CRI), for general networks. Multiple experiments are done on tree networks
and general networks, which shows our algorithm outperforms others.
In Chapter 3, we study the information source detection problem under a more
general heterogeneous SIR model, where links have different infection probabilities
and nodes have different recovery probabilities, with a partial observation. We pro-
pose a novel algorithm for locating multiple sources for such a general model and
prove theoretical guarantees on the detection rate for non-tree networks. Firstly,
we introduce the concept of Jordan cover, which is an extension of Jordan center.
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Loosely speaking, a Jordan cover with size m is a set of m nodes that can reach
all observed infected nodes with the minimum hop-distance. We propose Optimal-
Jordan-Cover (OJC), which consists of two steps: OJC first selects a subset of nodes
as the set of the candidates of the diffusion sources; and then it finds a Jordan cover
in the subgraph induced by the candidate nodes and the observed infected nodes.
We emphasize that only the hop-distance to the observed infected nodes is consid-
ered in computing a Jordan cover. Then we analyze the performance of OJC on the
ER random graph, and establish the following performance guarantees. When the
infection duration is shorter than 2
3
logn
µ
, where µ is the average node degree and n is
the number of nodes in the network, OJC identifies the sources with probability one
asymptotically as n increases. When the infection duration is at least
⌈
logn
log µ+log q
⌉
+ 2
where q is the minimum infection probability, under any source location algorithm,
the detection rate diminishes to zero as n increases under the Susceptible-Infected
(SI) and Independent-Cascade (IC) models, which are special cases of the SIR model.
The computational complexity of OJC is polynomial in n, but exponential in m.
We further propose a heuristic based on the K-Means for approximating the Jordan
cover, named Approximate-Jordan-Cover (AJC), to reduce the complexity. Our sim-
ulations on random graphs and real networks demonstrate that both AJC and OJC
significantly outperform other heuristic algorithms.
In Chapter 4, we investigate the problem of reconstructing the entire history
of a diffusion process, named as diffusion history reconstruction. We assume that
the diffusion process starting from one or mulitple sources follows the Susceptible-
Infected (SI) model, a variant of the popular SIR model first proposed in Kermack
and McKendrick (1927), and a single partial snapshot of the network is given, which
includes the set of “infected” nodes, and the corresponding infection time of a subset of
“infected” nodes. The nodes with known “infection” time can be thought as monitor
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nodes that were placed in the network. Each monitor node can record the time at
which the node is “infected” and report the infection time. We formulate the diffusion
history reconstruction problem as a maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimate problem,
and prove that the problem is NP-hard by reducing an arbitrary set cover problem to a
diffusion history reconstruction problem. Then we propose a greedy and step-by-step
reconstruction algorithm to reconstruct the most likely network state at time slot τ
based on the network state at time slot τ−1 while guaranteeing the state is consistent
with partial observation, and further develop a greedy algorithm for a single-step
construction. The key idea of the single-step construction algorithm is to convert the
problem to the weighted set cover problem, for which a well-known greedy algorithm
provides a guarantee on the approximation ratio. In this dissertation, we study multi-
source diffusion processes, which include single-source diffusion as a special case. The
problem is more difficult because the number of initial states is proportional to V NI ,
where VI is the number of infected nodes and N is the number of sources. It is almost
impossible to use the single-source algorithm to reconstruct the diffusion history for
multi-source diffusion processes because of the high complexity. Assuming the number
of sources, N(N ≥ 1), is known, we propose an algorithm to find all possible initial
states of the diffusion to reduce the complexity. It is shown that the initial states
found by our algorithm are always consistent with the partial observation. We prove
that the diffusion history obtained by the step-by-step reconstruction algorithm is
always consistent with the partial observation, and the computational complexity of
the algorithm is O(V N+1I EI), where VI is the number of infected nodes observed in
the snapshot, EI is the number of edges between the observed infected nodes and N is
the number of sources. We evaluate the performance of the algorithm on the Western
States Power Grid of the United States Watts and Strogatz (1998) and Internet
autonomous systems (IAS) network Leskovec et al. (2005), with simulated diffusion
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processes following the SI model. We also test our algorithm on the Weibo dataset
(Weibo is a famous Chinese microblogging website). In all scenarios, we observe
significant improvements of the proposed algorithm compared with other heuristic
and existing algorithms.
In Chapter 5, we consider the problem of improving the robustness of an interde-
pendent network under a localized attack. We focus on the development of algorithms
that rewire the links of the interdependent networks in real-time to minimize the im-
pact of the localized attack. In particular, we assume an interdependent network
consists of two subnetworks A and B, in which the functioning of each node can
depend on a set of nodes from the other layer. We study a localized attack model
such that the nodes around attacked nodes are removed hop by hop inspired by Shao
et al. (2015). We formulate the interdependent network link rewiring problem as a
Markov decision process (MDP) problem, and prove that the problem is NP-hard by
reducing the maximum coverage problem to our MDP problem. Then we propose
a greedy algorithm to rewire the links during the attack. The key idea of the algo-
rithm is to maximize the objective of the MDP problem in a greedy manner. We
compare the performance of our algorithm with the exact solution of the MDP prob-
lem on a small network. The results show that the performance is close in terms of
the objective of the MDP problem. And finally, we evaluate the performance of the
algorithm on interdependent networks formed by the real networks including the air
traffic network, the IAS network and the power grid network with simulated localized
attacks. In most cases, when a large fraction of nodes in the networks are attacked,
our algorithm outperforms others.
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1.3 Related Work
1.3.1 Diffusion on Networks
In this section, we review the related work in diffusion process on networks, which
can be categorized into two parts: prospective analysis and retrospective analysis.
Prospective Analysis. Many research works in diffusion process Bikhchandani
et al. (1992); Goldenberg et al. (2001a); Kempe et al. (2003); Leskovec et al. (2007);
Gruhl et al. (2004); Richardson and Domingos (2002) have been devoted to studying
the so-called epidemic threshold, that is, to determine the condition under which an
epidemic will break out. While earlier works Hethcote (2000) focus on some spe-
cific types of graph structure (e.g., random graphs, power-law graphs, etc), Wang et
al. Wang et al. (2003) and its follow-up paper by Ganesh et al. Ganesh et al. (2005)
found that, for the flu-like SIS model, the epidemic threshold for any arbitrary, real
graph is determined by the leading eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of the graph.
Prakash et. al. Prakash et al. (2011) further discovered that the leading eigenvalue
(and a model-dependent constant) is the only parameter that determines the epi-
demic threshold for other virus propagation models. On the algorithmic side, Hayashi
et al. Hayashi et al. (2003) derived the extinction conditions under random and tar-
geted immunization for the SHIR model (Susceptible, Hidden, Infectious, Recovered).
Tong et al. Tong et al. (2010) proposed an effective node immunization strategy for
the SIS model by approximately minimizing the leading eigenvalue. Briesemeister
et al. Briesemeister et al. (2003) studied the defending policy in power-law graphs.
Prakash et. al. Prakash et al. (2010); Valler et al. (2011) proposed effective algorithms
to perform node immunization on time-varying graphs.
Retrospective Analysis. Earlier work along this line focuses on identifying the
source of diffusion Zhu and Ying (2015a); Shah and Zaman (2011, 2012); Zhu et al.
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(2015); Zhu and Ying (2016); Zhu et al. (2017) and inferring the underlying network of
diffusion Gomez Rodriguez et al. (2010); Myers and Leskovec (2010); Abrahao et al.
(2013). An even more challenging problem is to reconstruct the diffusion history,
which has been received sparse attention so far. Paper Sefer and Kingsford (2014)
tried to reconstruct the history by using multiple snapshots of the network at different
time under the discrete time SEIRS model and it proposed an algorithm based on
submodularity with some provable performance guarantee. The information used to
reconstruct the diffusion history in Sefer and Kingsford (2014) is multiple snapshots of
the whole network at different time slots, which can be considered as a time domain
partial information. In contrast, in this paper, we use a single snapshot with the
infection time of partial infected nodes, which is a space domain partial information.
A method of finding the most possible diffusion path by using the infection time
information of all infected nodes is proposed in Gardner et al. (2014), in which the
authors considered the diffusion path as a tree. In Fajardo and Gardner (2013), the
authors tried to estimate the diffusion path and infection time of some nodes by using
the infection time of partial infected nodes. A heuristic algorithm was proposed in
Fajardo and Gardner (2013) based on the integer programming problem formulated
by the authors. Besides the high complexity, the heuristic algorithm in Fajardo and
Gardner (2013) involves iterations between finding the infection path and estimating
infection time, while the convergence is not guaranteed. In Zong et al. (2012), the
authors focused on inferring the diffusion path of the diffusion process based on
the independent cascade model by using partial observations. A heuristic algorithm
derived from minimum Steiner tree was proposed in Zong et al. (2012). Compared
with independent cascade model, the Susceptible-Infected model used in this paper
goes beyond the assumption that each infected node only has one chance to infect its
neighbors. In Rozenshtein et al. (2016), with the assumption that shorter paths of
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infection are more likely, the authors formulated the problem as a temporal Steiner
tree problem, in which they developed a method to recover the diffusion flow by
finding a temporal Steiner tree with minimum cost. Song et al. (2016) combined the
topic detection with the diffusion path reconstruction for reconstructing the diffusion
path for different topics on Sina Weibo. Sun et al. Sun et al. (2017) proposed a
method called Collaborative Inference Model to infer multiple coexisting diffusion
processes by using sparse observations.
1.3.2 Network Robustification
Robustness of networks has been studied in previous work. A number of papers
investigated the impact of network structure on network robustness Schneider et al.
(2011); Zeng and Liu (2012); Chan et al. (2014). For example, Schneider et al.
Schneider et al. (2011) proposed a metric called node-robustness and developed a
greedy algorithm to switch links to improve the node-robustness. Zeng and Liu Zeng
and Liu (2012) later defined a related metric called link-robustness and proposed
a similar greedy algorithm to improve the link-robustness. Chan et al. Chan et al.
(2014) used the natural connectivity as the robustness metric and proposed algorithms
to modify the network structure to maximize the natural connectivity. Another line
of research is on minimizing or maximzing information diffusion process in networks
Tong et al. (2012); Zhang et al. (2016). Tong et al. Tong et al. (2012) proposed
algorithms to modify the leading eigenvalue by adding or removing edges to limit or
facilitate the information diffusion. Zhang et al. Zhang et al. (2016) proposed to limit
propagation by removing some nodes or edges at a group scale. Chan et al. Chan
et al. (2015) studied the problem of identifying a robust subgraph. There is literature
focusing on the analysis of the critical threshold: a threshold such that when the
fraction of attacked nodes exceeds it, a gaint component does not exist Cohen et al.
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(2000); Callaway et al. (2000); Yuan et al. (2015); Shao et al. (2015). Cohen et al.
Cohen et al. (2000) used the percolation theory to calculate the critical threshold
of scale-free networks after a random attack. Yuan et al. Yuan et al. (2015) used
theoretical analysis and experimental studies to show the relation between the breadth
of the degree distribution and the critical threshold. The robustness of interdependent
networks has also been studied. Chen et al. Chen et al. (2017) developed a near-
optimal aglorithm to identify the subset of nodes at the control layer, whose failures
would lead to the maximum damage to the target layers. Buldyrev et al. Buldyrev
et al. (2010) proposed a cascading failure model on interdependent networks and
developed a framework on analyzing the critical threshold. There is little work on
preserving the robustness of interdependent networks during the attack. Di Muro
et al. Di Muro et al. (2016) proposed a method to recover a fraction of attacked
nodes during the cascading attacks on interdependent networks to improve network
robustness. When nodes in physical infrastructure networks are attacked, it may not
be recoverable. In this paper, we focus on modifying edges of healthy nodes to limit
cascading attacks and to preserve network robustness.
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Chapter 2
MULTIPLE SOURCE DETECTION WITH A COMPLETE SNAPSHOT
Recently, there have been a lot of interests in the problem of detecting information
sources in networks. The solutions to this problem have important applications in
practice, such as identifying the sources of infectious diseases and finding the sources
of leaked confidential information. Shah and Zaman analytically studied this problem
under the SI model and developed the rumor centrality estimator Shah and Zaman
(2010, 2011, 2012). Detecting multiple information sources using the rumor central-
ity estimator has been investigated in Luo and Tay (2012); Luo et al. (2013), and
detecting a single information source with partial observations by using the rumor
centrality estimator has been considered in Karamchandani and Franceschetti (2013).
In Dong et al. (2013), the detection rate of the rumor centrality estimator when a
priori distribution of the source node is given has been evaluated.
Besides the SI model, information source detection under the SIR model, in which
“susceptible” nodes and “recovered” nodes cannot be distinguished, has also been
studied. There are a number of scenarios where it is useful to model “recovered” nodes
and assume “susceptible” nodes and “recovered” nodes are indistinguishable. For
example, in a blog-network, a user may post a rumor and then subsequently remove
the rumor after realizing that it is not the truth. After the post was deleted, from the
data crawled from the web, which has been a common methods to collect online social
network datasets, it is difficult to distinguish whether the user has never posted the
rumor or posted/deleted it. Similarly, classified information may spread in a social
network, but people who spread the information may refuse to admit that they know
the information and have spread it. This scenario again can be modeled as ”recovered”
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but indistinguishable from “susceptible”. Zhu and Ying developed a sample-path-
based estimator in Zhu and Ying (2013) for detecting a single information source
under the SIR model. They later proved that the sample path estimator remains to
be an effective estimator even with sparse observations Zhu and Ying (2014). The
effectiveness of the sample path estimator for the SI model with partial observations
and for the SIS model have been investigated in Luo and Tay (2013b) and Luo and
Tay (2013a), respectively.
In this chapter, we consider the problem of detecting multiple information sources
under the SIR model. It is not uncommon to have multiple information sources. For
example, confidential information can be leaked from different sources and an infec-
tious disease can start from multiple locations. We study this multi-source detection
problem under the SIR model. Motivated by the sample-path-based estimator pro-
posed in Zhu and Ying (2013), we first present a clustering and localization algorithm
for tree networks, where the number of real sources is assumed to be known. We then
prove that on g-regular trees, the distances between the estimators given by the algo-
rithm and the real sources are upper bounded by a constant with a high probability.
We further present a heuristic algorithm for general networks and an algorithm for
estimating the number of sources when the number of sources is unknown.
2.1 Basic Model
In this section, we introduce the SIR model and the multi-source detection prob-
lem.
2.1.1 SIR Model
The network is defined to be an undirected graph G(V , E), where V is the set of
nodes and E is the set of edges. Each node in graph G may represent a person, a
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computer or a mobile device. An edge represents a communication channel such that
information can be transmitted from one node to another if there is an edge between
these two nodes.
Define s(t) (i(t), r(t)) to be the fraction of nodes that are susceptible (infected,
recovered) at time t. In the classical SIR model, with the uniform contact assumption
and fully mixed approximation, the dynamic of the SIR system can be expressed by
the following set of differential equations:
ds
dt
= −βsi, di
dt
= βsi− γi, dr
dt
= γi, (2.1)
where β is the infection rate and γ is the recovery rate.
Since the network structure is ignored in those equations, these differential equa-
tions can only be used for a rough approximation of the state of the network. There-
fore, in this chapter, we consider the following multi-source Susceptible-Infected-
Recovered (SIR) model for information diffusion in networks. In the SIR model,
every node has three states: susceptible (S), infected (I) and recovered (R) such that:
• a susceptible node may be infected by his/her infected neighbors,
• an infected node may recover, and
• a recovered node cannot be infected again.
We consider a time slotted system. At the beginning of each time slot, a suscep-
tible node is infected by each of its infected neighbors with probability q, and each
infected node recovers with probability p. Assuming the number of infected neighbors
of a susceptible node is n, the probability the node becomes infected is 1− (1− q)n.
Initially, at t = 0, all nodes are in the susceptible state except a set of source nodes,
denoted by S.
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2.1.2 Problem Description
The objective of this chapter is to locate the set of sources S given a snapshot of
the network in which we can distinguish infected nodes from other nodes, but cannot
distinguish susceptible nodes and recovered nodes. We say a node is healthy if the
node is in either the susceptible state or recovered state.
Define Xv to be the state of node v in the given snapshot and X = {Xv; v ∈ V},
where
Xv =

1, if v is in the infected state;
0, otherwise.
(2.2)
Denote by VI the set of observed infected nodes in the snapshot. We further assume
the number of sources (S = |S|) is known.
Consider Figure 2.1 as an example. Figure 2.1a is the snapshot at t = 0, in which
there are three information sources, node 1, node 2 and node 3. When we take a
snapshot at some time, the network state may look like Figure 2.1b. Define the set
of nodes to be V and VI = {3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12}. Since we cannot distinguish
recovered nodes and susceptible nodes, the information we have is
X = {∀i ∈ VI , Xi = 1, and ∀j ∈ V \ VI , Xj = 0}.
Then we need to use X to identify three nodes in the network as our estimators for
the sources.
2.2 Main Results
We summarize the main results in this section and the notations in this chapter
is in Table 2.1.
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(a) Network state when time t =
0.
(b) Network state when the snap-
shot is taken.
Figure 2.1: An example of multi-source detection.
2.2.1 Multi-Source Detection on Tree Neworks
In this section, we present a multi-source detection algorithm for tree networks,
named clustering and localization (CL). The algorithm is presented in Algorithm 2.1.
In the first step of Algorithm 2.1, we select a pair of infected nodes with the max-
imum distance because most likely these two nodes are associated with two different
information sources, where we say an infected node a is “associated” with source s
if node a is on the information spreading tree starting from node s. The second step
of the algorithm is to select S infected nodes in a greedy fashion to maximize the
pairwise distances of these S nodes. These S infected nodes are likely to be associ-
ated with different sources, and are likely to be the leaf nodes of the corresponding
information spreading trees. The third step divides the set of infected nodes into S
sets according to their distances to the selected S nodes. The purpose is to cluster the
infected nodes according to their associated sources. The fourth step estimates the
maximum distance rmax from a source to any observed infected node associated with
the source, which can be used to approximate the depth of the information spreading
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Algorithm 2.1 Clustering and Localization (CL)
1: Select two infected nodes e1 and e2 with the maximum distance, i.e.,
d(e1, e2) = max
a,b∈VI
d(a, b),
and let B = {e1, e2}.
2: Let i = |B| and select an infected node ei+1 ∈ VI \ B such that
d(ei+1,B) = max
a∈VI\B
d(a,B),
i.e., selecting an infected node from VI \ B that is furthest away from set B. Here
d(a,B) = minu∈B d(a, u), where d(a, v) is the distance between node a and v on
graph G(V , E). Repeat this step until |B| = min{S, |VI |}.
3: Without loss of generality, assume |B| = S. Partition the set of infected nodes
into S sets: V(s)I for s = 1, · · · , S. An infected node a is assigned to set V(s)I if
d(a, es) = min
j=1,··· ,S
d(a, ej).
Ties are broken arbitrarily.
4: For each V(s)I , compute the infection radius
rs =
⌊
max
a,b∈V(s)I
d(a, b)
2
⌋
.
Furthermore, compute the maximum infection radius
rmax = max
s=1,...,S
rs.
5: Consider the tree T formed by the set of nodes in B and paths between each two
nodes in B on graph G. For each ei ∈ B, find a node γi on tree T such that
d(ei, γi) = rmax, and add node γi into S˜.
6: S˜ is the set of source estimators.
trees. In the final step, a tree T with nodes in B as the leaf nodes is constructed;
and for each ei ∈ B, we select a node γi ∈ T that is rmax hops away from ei as the
corresponding source estimator. Note that γi is close to the real source associated
with infected node ei when ei is close to a leaf node on the corresponding information
spreading tree and rmax is close to the depth of the tree.
Next, we present an example to illustrate how our algorithm works. Assuming
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G(V , E) the tree that our detection problem is based on.
VG the set of vertices of G.
VS the set of actual sources.
S |VS|, the number of original sources.
VI
the set of infected nodes when we take the snap-
shot.
d(a, b) the distance between node a and b on tree G.
(a, b)
the path between node a and b, and also it repre-
sents the set of nodes on that path.
ζi (i = 1, ..., S) The actual information sources.
γi (i = 1, ..., S) The estimators we find.
Vγ the set of estimators.
di,j di,j = d(ζi, ζj).
d d = min
1≤i,j≤S
di,j.
Kab,c Node satisfies (a, c) ∩ (a, b) = (a,Kab,c).
(a, b) ⊂ (c, d) path (a, b) is contained in path (c, d).
a ∈ (c, d) node a is on path (c, d).
d(a,N ) N is a set of nodes and min
b∈N
d(a, b)
tIa The time that node a got infected
tRa The time node a recovered
Table 2.1: Notations
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Figure 2.2: An simple example of our algorithm.
the probability of infection q = 1 and the probability of recovery p = 1, which means
each infected node, right after it is infected, will infect all of its susceptible neighbors
and then become recovered at the end of the time slot. Given a simple tree structure
as in Figure 2.2, we use the dotted lines to represent the paths. There are two
original sources, ζ1 and ζ2. The snapshot includes four infected nodes, v1, v2, u1 and
u2, and we have d(ζ1, v1) = d(ζ1, v2) = t and d(ζ2, u1) = d(ζ2, u2) = t. Under our
algorithm, a pair of infected nodes that are farthest away from each other are selected,
which could be {v1, u1}, {v1, u2}, {v2, u1} and {v2, u2}. Without loss of generality,
assume the two nodes are v1 and u1. Then after step 3, we have V(1)I = {v1, v2} and
V(2)I = {u1, u2}. Then, we have the maximum infection radius rmax is exactly equal to
t and the tree T formed by the infected nodes and paths between them is the original
tree G(V , E). Therefore, in step 5, the two estimators, say γ1 and γ2, on tree T that
satisfy d(v1, γ1) = t and d(u1, γ2) = t are the sources ζ1 and ζ2.
2.2.2 Performance Analysis
The following theorem shows that for a g-regular tree, the distance between a
detected source produced by Algorithm 2.1 and its closest real source is bounded by
a constant with a high probability, where the constant is independent of the size of
the infected subnetwork.
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Theorem 2.1. Consider a (g + 1)-regular tree with infinite number of levels where
g > 2. Assume that gq > 1 and the distance between any two sources is larger than
C for some large enough constant C. Then given any  > 0, there exists a constant
d such that the distance between each estimator and its closest real source is upper
bounded by d with a probability at least 1− , where d is independent of the size of
the infected subnetwork. 
The detailed proof is presented in Section A, which consists of the following key
steps:
1) We define one-time-slot branching process to be an infection spreading tree such
that each infected node on the tree was infected in the immediate next time slot
after the infection of the node’s parent. A one-time-slot branching process is a
subsequence of the infection process where an infected node is included in the
one-time-slot branching process if and only if it was infected at the immediate
next time slot after her parent was infected. Because of that, the radius of
the one-time-slot branching process increases by one in every time step until
it terminates. Then for each source ζi, we define event Aζi which includes two
cases: Case 1: the source has at least (S+ 1) one-time-slot branching processes
survived after time t0. This means there exist (S + 1) survived one-time-slot
branching processes whose roots are nodes that were infected before or at time
slot t0, where a one-time-slot branching process starting from an infected node
is said to survive if it never dies out, which occurs with a non-zero probability.
Case 2, the infection process from the source terminates at time t0. We will
prove that event A = ⋂
i
Aζi occurs with a high probability.
2) The next step is to show that under event A, each estimator produced by
the algorithm is within a constant distance to its closest original source. The
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analysis includes the following three cases:
(a) Infection processes from all original sources die out at time t0.
(b) At least two sources have survived (S + 1) one-time-slot branching pro-
cesses.
(c) Only one source have survived (S + 1) one-time-slot branching processes
after time t0.
In case (a), since infection processes from all original sources die out at time
t0, the maximum distance between a source and its associated infected nodes is
t0. Since any two sources are sufficiently far away from each other, the infected
nodes in each set V(i)I are associated with the same source. Then in step 4,
rmax ≤ t0, which means the distance between each estimator found in step 5
and its closest original source is no larger than 2t0, which further means the
distance between each estimator and its closest source is bounded by a constant.
For case (b) and case (c), the idea is to study the leaf-nodes of the survived
one-time-slot branching processes. The distance between the leaf-nodes of two
one-time-slot branching processes from the same source is at least 2t−2t0. Note
that each survived source has at least (S+1) one-time-slot branching processes.
For simplicity, assume the nodes in set B after step 2 are the leaf-nodes of one-
time-slot branching processes (This may not be true in general and we will
discuss the general case in the proof). Then after step 3, there are at least two
leaf-nodes of one-time-slot branching processes from the same source in V(i)I ,
which implies t− t0 ≤ rmax ≤ t. Then the distance between the estimator and
its closest survived source is equal to or smaller than rmax− (t− t0) + t0, which
is smaller than 2t0.
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We can finally conclude that under eventA, the distance between each estimator
and its closest original source is bounded by a constant, so Theorem 2.1 holds.
2.2.3 Heuristic for General Network Topologies
Locating multiple information sources in general networks is a much more compli-
cated problem. Algorithm 2.1 is not directly applicable to a general network because
after obtaining set B, multiple trees can be constructed with the nodes in B as leaf
nodes. Therefore, we propose the following heuristic algorithm, which use the Jordan
infection center defined by V(s)I as the estimator associated with es.
Algorithm 2.2 Clustering and Reverse Infection (CRI)
1: Step 1 to 3 of Algorithm 2.1.
2: For V(s)I , use the reverse infection algorithm in Zhu and Ying (2013) to find a
Jordan infection center for V(s)I , named γs, and then add γs to S˜. A Jordan
infection center γs for V(s)I is defined to be
γs ∈ arg min
b∈V
(
max
a∈V(s)I
d(b, a)
)
.
In Algorithm 2.2, if the distance between any two original sources is sufficiently
large, it is likely that the infected nodes in each set V(s)I are associated with the
same source. The reverse infection algorithm was proposed in Zhu and Ying (2013)
to localize the source in the single-source SIR model. If the infected nodes in V(s)I
are associated with the same source, we can expect the reserve infection algorithm
restricted to V(s)I to output a good estimator. Therefore, in Algorithm 2.2, we use the
reverse infection algorithm in each set V(s)I to get our estimators.
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2.2.4 Heuristic for Estimating S
Both Algorithms 2.1 and 2.2 require the knowledge of the number of real sources,
which may be difficult to know in practice. We further propose the following heuristic
for estimating the number of real sources when the number of real sources is unknown.
Algorithm 2.3 An Algorithm for Approximating S
1: Choose a large number S¯. For each k such that 1 ≤ k ≤ S¯, use the steps 1-4 in
Algorithm 2.1 to compute wk = rmax by assuming the number of real sources is
k.
2: Set
S˜ = arg max
k:1≤k≤S¯−2
wk − wk+1 − (wk+1 − wk+2),
and claim S˜ to be the number of real sources.
Assume the information spreading trees never die out. Consider the case where k
is smaller than the number of real sources. Then after the clustering step of Algorithm
2.1, there exists a set V(s)I which contains infected nodes from at least two different real
sources. In such a set, the maximum distance between two nodes will be significantly
larger than the distance of two infected nodes that are associated with the same
source, assuming the real sources are not close to each other. Then under Algorithm
2.2, we will observe a significant decrease in wk when the value of k changes from
S − 1 to S. Based on this observation, we use k that maximizes
wk − wk+1 − (wk+1 − wk+2)
as the estimator of S.
Theorem 2.1 was established assuming an infinite regular tree network, in which
case, the diameter of the network is infinite and the infection process can never
reach the “edge” of the network. Therefore, if the time when the snapshot is taken
is large enough, we can utilize the survived one-time-slot branching processes to
identify the sources. However, in reality, networks are of finite size, which means the
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infection processes from different sources may hit the “edge” of the network and get
completely “mixed” when the spreading time is large enough. Therefore, in practice,
the algorithm may not perform well when the infection time is close to the diameter of
the network. In fact, from Table 2.3 and Figure 2.6, the normalized average distance
becomes larger as the decrease of the diameter of the small-world network.
2.3 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our algorithm using simulations.
2.3.1 Tree Networks
In this set of simulations, we assumed the number of real sources is known. We
evaluated Algorithm 2.1 on g-regular trees and binomial random trees, in which the
number of children of each node follows a binomial distribution with number of tri-
als, D′, and success probability β. In this simulation, we choose 4 original sources
randomly and set β = 0.6, the probability of infection, q, is uniformly chosen from
(0, 0.3) and the probability of recovery, p, is uniformly chosen from (0, 0.2).
In Figure 2.3a and 2.3b, we plotted the average distance between real sources
and the estimators versus the degree of the trees. To calculate the distance between
an estimator and its related source, we maintain an estimator list, which contains
all estimators, and a source list, which contains all sources. Then, we select the
(estimator, source) pair with the smallest distance between them among all possible
pairs formed by nodes from these two lists. Then we assign the estimator to the
source in the pair we have selected. Next, we remove the source and the corresponding
estimator from the source list and estimator list. The previous three steps are repeated
until the estimator list or the source list is empty. After that, we can use the distance
between the two nodes in each selected pair to calculate the average distance.
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Figure 2.3: The average distance from sources to the estimators with 25 and 75
percentile on tree networks.
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Figure 2.4: True detection rate on binomial trees and regular trees.
From Figure 2.3a and Figure 2.3b, we can see that as the degree of the tree
becomes larger, the performance of our algorithm improves. For regular trees, the
average distance is smaller than 3 when the degree is 5 or larger; and for binomial
random trees, the average distance is smaller than 4 when D′ is 5 or larger.
In Figure 2.4, we plotted the detection rate of Algorithm 2.1, which is the fraction
of estimators being real sources. As the degree becomes bigger, detection rates of
both regular trees and binomial trees improves.
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2.3.2 General Networks
In this set of simulations, we tested the performance of our algorithm on the
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) model Re´nyi and Erdo˝s (1959) and the small-world network model
proposed in Kleinberg (2000). We compared our algorithm with random guessing
and a heuristic algorithm based on k-means clustering. In k-means clustering, the
initial centroids are randomly chosen. During the clustering step of each iteration
in the k-means heuristic, we used distance centrality to select the centroid of each
cluster. We assumed that the number of sources is unknown so we used Algorithm
2.3 to estimate the number of sources.
The ER random graph
The ER random graphs generated in this section contains 2000 nodes with wiring
probability p, i.e., every pair of nodes is connected with probability p. We varied p
to generate graphs with different diameters to test the algorithms. The diameters of
the random graphs with different values of p are listed in Table 2.2. In Figure 2.5,
we used the normalized average distance between the estimator and its associated
original source, which is the average distance divided by the diameter of the network,
to measure the performance. From Figure 2.5a and 2.5b, we can see that both the CRI
algorithm and k-means algorithm performs much better than the random guessing
algorithm, while the CRI algorithm outperforms k-means. As p becomes larger, which
means the number of edges becomes larger, the normalized average distances of all
these algorithms increase, which means these algorithms perform better in sparse
networks than dense networks in terms of the normalized average distance.
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Figure 2.5: The average distance between estimators and original sources versus
random graph parameter probability p with 25 and 75 percentile.
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Figure 2.6: The average distance between estimators and original sources versus q
with 25 and 75 percentile.
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p 0.001 0.0015 0.002 0.0025
Diameter 26 17 11 10
Table 2.2: Diameters for random graphs with different p.
q 0 1 2 3
Diameter 98 26 19 15
Table 2.3: Diameters for the small-world networks with different q.
The small-world network
The small-world model proposed in Kleinberg (2000) is based on a two-dimensional
n × n grid, where the nodes are the lattice points. There are three parameters in
this model, p, q, and r. For each node in the grid, it has an edge to every other node
within lattice distance p. Then for each node u, q edges between u and other nodes
are constructed. For example, the ith edge from u has endpoint v with probability
proportional to (d(u, v))−r. When we generated the network, we chose 50 × 50 grid
with p = 1 and r = 3, while q was varied from 0 to 3. The diameters of these
networks used in section are listed in Table 2.3. The results are shown in Figure
2.6a and 2.6b, we can see that the CRI algorithm outperforms k-means algorithm
and random guessing algorithm. As q increases, the normalized average distances
increase under all three algorithms, similar to those in the ER random graphs.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we studied the multi-source detection problem in the SIR model
with the observation of states of nodes in the network. We provided an algorithm
for tree network to detect multiple information sources when the number of sources
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is known. And we also proved that with a fairly general condition, each estimator is
within a constant distance to its closest original source for tree networks, which can
guarantee our algorithm. Then we proposed another algorithm for general networks
and a heuristic algorithm to decide the number of sources, which make our CL and
CRI algorithms more general and applicable. The simulation results showed that our
algorithm performs well on multi-source detection problem.
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Chapter 3
MULTIPLE SOURCE DETECTION WITH PARTIAL OBSERVATION
In this chapter, we consider the information source detection problem in a setting
that generalizes the existing ones at several important directions.
• Multiple sources versus single source: In this chapter, the diffusion can be origi-
nated from multiple nodes simultaneously, instead of from a single source. When
the infection duration is sufficiently short, the infected subnetworks from dif-
ferent sources are disconnected components. In such cases, the single-source
localization algorithms can be applied to each of the infected subnetwork. We,
however, do not make such an assumption, and consider the scenario where the
infected subnetworks may overlap with each other, so the single-source local-
ization algorithms cannot be directly applied.
• A partial snapshot versus a complete snapshot: In this chapter, we assume a
partial snapshot in which each node reports its state with some probability,
which is in contrast to a complete snapshot assumed in the literature where all
nodes’ states are observed. Because of a partial snapshot, the sources may not
report their states and be observed as infected nodes; and the observed infected
nodes may not form a connected component. Both increase the uncertainty and
complexity of the problem. In fact, it turns out to be critical to have a candi-
date selection algorithm to select source candidates from unobserved nodes but
only use observed infected nodes in computing the infection eccentricity. The
selection step yields 27× reduction on the computing time in our simulations
while guaranteeing the same the detection rate, and yields 600× reduction on
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the computing time with a slight reduction of the detection rate.
• Heterogeneous diffusion versus homogeneous diffusion: Our algorithm applies
to the heterogeneous SIR diffusion model where links have different infection
probabilities and nodes have different recovery probabilities. The asymptotic
guarantees on the detection rate hold for the heterogeneous SIR model.
While some of these extensions have been investigated in the literature individ-
ually, our model includes all three extensions. We propose a novel algorithm for
locating multiple sources for such a general model and prove theoretical guarantees
on the detection rate for non-tree networks. The main results are summarized below.
(1) We introduce the concept of Jordan cover, which is an extension of Jordan
center. Loosely speaking, a Jordan cover with size m is a set of m nodes that
can reach all observed infected nodes with the minimum hop-distance. We
propose Optimal-Jordan-Cover (OJC), which consists of two steps: OJC first
selects a subset of nodes as the set of the candidates of the diffusion sources;
and then it finds a Jordan cover in the subgraph induced by the candidate nodes
and the observed infected nodes. We emphasize that only the hop-distance to
the observed infected nodes is considered in computing a Jordan cover.
(2) We analyze the performance of OJC on the ER random graph, and establish
the following performance guarantees.
(i) When the infection duration is shorter than 2
3
logn
µ
, where µ is the average
node degree and n is the number of nodes in the network, OJC identifies
the sources with probability one asymptotically as n increases.
(ii) When the infection duration is at least
⌈
logn
log µ+log q
⌉
+ 2 where q is the mini-
mum infection probability, under any source location algorithm, the detec-
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tion rate diminishes to zero as n increases under the Susceptible-Infected
(SI) and Independent-Cascade (IC) models, which are special cases of the
SIR model.
(3) The computational complexity of OJC is polynomial in n, but exponential in
m. We further propose a heuristic based on the K-Means for approximating the
Jordan cover, named Approximate-Jordan-Cover (AJC). Assuming a constant
number of iterations when using the K-Means, the computational complexity
of AJC is O(nE), where E is the number of edges. Our simulations on random
graphs and real networks demonstrate that both AJC and OJC significantly
outperform other heuristic algorithms.
3.1 Problem Formulation
We assume the network is represented by an undirected graph g. Denote by E(g)
the set of edges and V(g) the set of nodes in graph g. Let n denote the number of
nodes and E denote the number of edges. We further assume a heterogeneous SIR
model for diffusion. In this model, each node has three possible states: susceptible
(S), infected (I) and recovered (R). Time is slotted. At the beginning of each time
slot, each infected node (say node u) attempts to infect its neighbor (say node v)
with probability quv, independently across edges. We call quv the infection probability
of edge (u, v). At the end of each time slot, each infected node (say node u) recovers
with probability ru, independent of other infected nodes. We call ru the recovery
probability. We further assume quv ∈ (0, 1] for all edges (u, v) ∈ E(g) and rv ∈ [0, 1]
for all nodes v ∈ V(g).
Note that the SIR model includes two important special cases. When the recov-
ery probability is zero, the SIR model becomes the Susceptible-Infected (SI) model
32
Bailey (1975), where infected nodes cannot recover. When the recovery probability is
one, the SIR model becomes the Independent Cascade (IC) model Goldenberg et al.
(2001b) by regarding both infected nodes and recovered nodes as active nodes and
regarding the susceptible nodes as inactive nodes.
We assume the epidemic diffusion starts from m sources in the network. In other
words, at time slot 0, m nodes (sources) are in the infected state and all other nodes
are in the susceptible state. Denote by s1, s2, · · · , sm the sources and S the set of
sources, i.e., S = {s1, s2, · · · , sm}. We assume m is a constant independent of n.
Finally, we assume that a partial snapshot of the network state at time slot t is
given, with an unknown observation time t. In the snapshot, each infected or recovered
node reports its state with probability θv ∈ (0, 1), independent of other nodes. If a
node reports its state, we call it an observed node. Denote by I ′ the set of observed
infected and recovered nodes. In this chapter, we call infected nodes and recovered
nodes as “infected nodes” unless explicitly clarified.
Based on I ′, the source localization problem is to find S that solves the following
maximum likelihood (ML) problem
W∗ = argmax
W⊂V(g)
Pr(S =W|I ′).
Even with a single diffusion source, this problem is known to be a difficult prob-
lem Shah and Zaman (2010); Zhu and Ying (2013) on non-tree networks. Therefore,
instead of solving the ML problem above, we are interested in algorithms with asymp-
totic perfect detection, i.e., finding all sources with probability one as the network size
increases. We believe this alternative metric is reasonable because we often need to
solve the problem for large-size networks such as online social networks, and an algo-
rithm with asymptotic perfect detection can detect sources with a high probability
when the network size is large.
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3.2 Algorithms
Algorithm 3.1: The Candidate Selection Algorithm
Input: I ′, g, Y ;
Output: g− (the candidate subgraph)
Set K to be an empty set.
for v ∈ V(g) do
if |N (v) ∩ I ′| >= Y then
Add v to K, where N (v) is the set of neighbors of node v.
end
end
Set K+ to be K ∪ I ′.
Set g′ to be the graph induced by set K+.
Find all connected components in g′.
if g′ is connected then
Set g− = g′.
else
Randomly select one node in each components of g′. Denote by R the set
of the selected nodes.
Randomly select one node v ∈ R.
for u ∈ R\v do
Compute the shortest path P from v to u.
Set g′ = g′ ∪ P.
end
Set g− = g′
end
return g−,K.
In this section, we present OJC and AJC based on the concept of Jordan cover.
Define the hop-distance between a node v and a node set W to be the minimum
hop-distance between node v and any node in W , i.e.,
d(v,W) , min
u∈W
d(v, u).
We then define the infection eccentricity of node set W to be the maximum hop-
distance from an infected node in I ′ to set W , i.e.,
e(W , I ′) = max
v∈I′
d(v,W). (3.1)
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We further define m-Jordan-cover (m-JC) to be the set W∗(K, I ′,m) such that
W∗(K, I ′,m) = argmin
W∈{W||W|=m,W⊂K}
e(W , I ′). (3.2)
where I ′ is the set of observed infected nodes that m−JC needs to cover and K is the
candidate set for the sources. Therefore, m-JC is the set of m nodes in K with the
minimum infection eccentricity.
We now introduce the optimal Jordan cover (OJC) algorithm whose asymptotic
detection rate will be analyzed in Section 3.3.1.
The Optimal Jordan Cover (OJC) Algorithm
• Step 1: Candidate Selection: Let Y be a positive integer. The candidate
set K is the set of nodes with more than Y observed infected neighbors. In
addition, define K+ , K∪ I ′. Denote by g− a connected subgraph of g induced
by node set K+. An induced graph is a subset of nodes of a graph with all
edges whose endpoints are both in the node subset. If the induced graph is
not connected, we select a random node in each component, randomly pick one
selected node and add the shortest pathes from this node to all other selected
nodes to form a connected g−. We call Y the selection threshold. The pseudo
code of the candidate selection algorithm for selecting K and g− can be found
in Algorithm 3.1.
• Step 2: Jordan Cover: For any m combination of nodes in K in Step 1, we
compute the infection eccentricity of the node set as defined in (3.1) on subgraph
g−, and select the combination with the minimum infection eccentricity as the
set of sources. Ties are broken by the total distance from the observed infected
to the node set, i.e.,
∑
v∈I′ d(v,W).
With a properly chosen threshold Y, the candidate selection step includes all
sources in K with a high probability and excludes nodes that are more than t + 1
35
hops away from all sources. By limiting the computation on the induced subgraph g−,
the computational complexity is reduced significantly. From simulations, we will see
that it results in 27× reduction of the running time without affecting the detection
rate. The asymptotic detection rate of OJC will be studied in Theorem 3.2. Under
some conditions, OJC identifies all sources with probability one asymptotically.
OJC is a polynomial-time algorithm for given m, but the complexity increases
exponentially inm. To further reduce the complexity, we propose Approximate Jordan
Cover (AJC), which replaces Step 2 of OJC with the K-Means algorithm Hartigan and
Wong (1979). As shown in the simulations, the performance of the AJC algorithm, in
terms of both detection rate and the error distance, is close to OJC with much shorter
running time. The computational complexity of both algorithms are summarized in
the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. The computational complexity of OJC is
O
(
|I ′|
(
|E(g)|+m
(|V(g−)|
m
)))
,
and the computational complexity of AJC is
O
(|I ′| (|E(g)|+H|V(g−)|)) ,
where H is the number of iterations used in the K-Means algorithm in AJC.
Proof. We first analyze the complexity of the OJC algorithm. For simplicity, denote
by V = |V(g)| the number of nodes and E = |E(g)| the number of edges.
In the candidate selection stage, each node needs to compute its degree. Therefore,
each edge is counted twice and each node is processed once. The complexity is
O(V + E). Counting the number of the connected components using breadth first
search is of complexity O(V + E). When the induced graph is not connected, the
complexity to compute the shortest paths from one node to all other nodes in an
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unweighted graph is of complexity O(V + E). As a summary, the complexity of the
candidate selection algorithm is O(V + E).
The resulting subgraph has |V(g−)| nodes and at most E edges. Next, we compute
the complexity of the OJC.
We first compute the distances from nodes in g− to nodes in I ′. Note this is
equivalent to do a breadth-first search from each node in I ′. The complexity of the
BFS is O(|V(g−)|+E). Therefore, the complexity for this step is O(|I ′|(|V(g−)|+E)).
The results are saved in a two dimensions hashtable so that querying the distance
from one observed infected node and another node in graph g− is of complexity O(1).
After the above precomputation, for each set of nodes with size m, we want to ob-
tain its infection eccentricity. For each observed infected node, we query the hash table
to find the minimum distance to the set of nodes with size m. The complexity is O(m).
To compute the infection eccentricity of one set is of complexity O(m|I ′|). In addition,
there are
(|V(g−)|
m
)
possible node sets. Therefore, the complexity is O((m|I ′|)(|V(g−)|
m
)
)
As a summary, the complexity of the OJC algorithm is
O
(
V + E + |I ′|(|V(g−)|+ E) +m|I ′|
(|V(g−)|
m
))
=O
(
|I ′|
(
E +m
(|V(g−)|
m
)))
Next, we analyze the complexity of the AJC algorithm. Note the complexity of
the candidate selection and the precomputation are the same. The complexity of the
Kmeans algorithm is analyzed as follows.
The complexity of the membership assignment phase is O(m|I ′|). For each ob-
served infected node, we only need to query its distance to the preselected m sources
and each query is of complexity O(1) based on the results of the precomputation.
For the center update phase, for each cluster, we need to search all |V(g−)| nodes
to find a center. Therefore, the complexity is |V(g−)||I ′|.
37
As a summary, the complexity of one iteration of the Kmeans algorithm is
O
((
m+ |V(g−)|) |I ′|)
Denote by H the number of iterations, the complexity of the AJC algorithm is
O
(
V + E + |I ′|(|V(g−)|+ E) +N ((m+ |V(g−)|) |I ′|))
=O
(|I ′| (E +H|V(g−)|))
3.3 Asymptotic Analysis of OJC
In this section, we present the asymptotic analysis of the detection rate of OJC on
the ER random graph. The results include the conditions that guarantee probability
one detection and the conditions under which it is impossible to detect the source set
with nonzero probability under any source localization algorithm.
3.3.1 Asymptotic Perfect Detection on the ER Random Graph
We first present the positive result that shows that on the ER random graph, OJC
identifies the m sources with probability one asymptotically under some conditions.
Recall that n is the number of nodes in the graph, and m is the number of sources,
which is a constant independent of n. Denote by p the wiring probability of the ER
random graph, which is the probability that there exists a link between two nodes.
Let µ = np, which is the average node degree. Define q , minu,v∈V(g) qu,v, i.e., the
minimum infection probability over all edges and θ , minv∈V(g) θv i.e., the minimum
report probability over all nodes.
Theorem 3.2. OJC identifies all m sources with probability one as n→∞ when the
following conditions hold:
38
(c1): µqθ = Ω (log n) , 1
(c2): lim supn→∞
Y
µqθ
< 1 and lim infn→∞ Yµqθ > 0, and
(c3): t = ω(D) and lim supn→∞
t
logn
log µ
< 2
3
.
Proof. In this proof, we will show that one source si ∈ W∗(K, I ′,m) with a high
probability. Then with a union bound, we will show that
S =W∗(K, I ′,m).
with a high probability for sufficiently large n.
Recall that we regard the recovered nodes and infected nodes as ”infected” since
the recovery process is not related to the proof. Without loss of generality, we consider
s1. Throughout the proof, we consider the BFS tree rooted at s1. In particular, the
level of one node means the level of the node on the BFS tree rooted at s1.
We first introduce and recall some necessary notations terms.
For an ER random graph g.
• A node v is said to be on level i if ds1v = i. Denote by Li the set of nodes from
level 0 to level i and li = |Li|.
• Denote by L′i the set of nodes on level i. In addition, l′i is the number of nodes
on level i.
• The descendants of node v in a tree are all the nodes in the subtree rooted at
v. In addition, v is the ancestor of all its descendants.
• The offsprings of a node on level k (say v) are the nodes which are on level k+1
and have edges to v. Denote by Φ(v) the offspring set of v and φ(v) = |Φ(v)|.
1Throughput this chapter, the asymptotic order notation is defined for n→∞.
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• Denote by p the wiring probability in the ER random graph.
• Denote by n the total number of nodes.
• Denote by µ = np.
• Denote by Bi(n, p) the binomial distribution with n number of trials and each
trial succeeds with probability p.
• Denote by T † the BFS tree rooted at s1.
• Denote by Φ′(v) the set of offsprings of node v on T † and φ′(v) = |Φ′(v)|.
• Denote by gt the subgraph induced by all nodes within t hops from s on the
ER graph. The collision edges are the edges which are not in T † but in gt, i.e.,
e ∈ E(gt)\E(T †).
• A node who is an end node of a collision edge is called a collision node. Denote by
Rk the set of collision edges whose end nodes are within level k and Rk = |Rk|.
• Denote by Zi the set of nodes which are infected at time i.
• Denote by Z˜ ij(v) the set of nodes that are infected at time slot i, on level j,
when s1 is the only infection source in the graph and the descendants of node
v in the BFS tree rooted at s1 and Z˜ ′ij (v) are the observed infected nodes in
Z˜ ij(v). Z˜ij(v) and Z˜ ′ij (v) are defined as the cardinality respectively.
• Denote by ψ(v) the number of observed infected neighbors of node v.
• Denote by ψ′(v) the number of infected offsprings of node v (the offspring is
defined based on the BFS tree rooted at node s1).
• Denote by ψ′′(v) the number of observed infected offsprings of node v.
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To prove s1 ∈ W∗(K, I ′,m), we need to show that any set W such that s1 6∈ W
has a infection eccentricity larger than t on g−. We need the following asymptotic
high probability events.
• Offsprings of each node. Consider the BFS tree rooted at source s1. Define
E1 = {∀v ∈ Lt+D, φ′(v) ∈ ((1− δ)µ, (1 + δ)µ)}.
E1, when occurs, provides upper and lower bounds for the number of offsprings
of each node in Lt+D.
• Total number collision edges. Consider the BFS tree rooted at source s1.
We define event E2 when the following upper bound on the collision edges holds
Rj

= 0 if 0 < j ≤ bm−c,
≤ 8µ if bm−c < j < dm+e,
≤ 4[(1+δ)µ]2j+1
n
if dm+e ≤ j ≤ logn
(1+α) log µ
.
wherem+ = logn
2 log[(1+δ)µ]
andm− = logn−2 log µ−log 8
2 log[(1+δ)µ]
. E2 provides the upper bounds
for collision edges at different levels. Note that a subgraph with diameter ≤ m−
is a tree with high probability since there is no collision edges.
• Detailed collision edges in level > D + t. Define E3 to be the event that
∀v ∈ L′D+t+1, ψ(v) < (1− δ)3µqθ.
• Infected nodes. Define
E4 = {∀v ∈ ∪t−1i=0Zi, ψ′(v) > (1− δ)2µq.}
and
E5 = {∀v ∈ ∪t−1i=0Zi, ψ′′(v) > (1− δ)3µqθ.}
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Figure 3.1: A pictorial example for Theorem 2.
• Infected nodes from source s1. Define
E6 = {Z˜11 ≥ (1− δ)2µq} ∩ {∀v ∈ Z˜11 , Z˜ ′tt (v) ≥ [(1− δ)2µq]t−1(1− δ)θ}
To prove these event happens with a high probability, we have
Pr(E1 ∩ E2 ∩ E3 ∩ E4 ∩ E5 ∩ E6)
≥Pr(E1)(1− Pr(E¯2|E1)− Pr(E¯3|E1)− Pr(E¯6|E1))− Pr(E¯4 ∪ E¯5)
= Pr(E1)(1− Pr(E¯2|E1)− Pr(E¯3|E1)− Pr(E¯6|E1))− (1− Pr(E4 ∩ E5))
≥1− ,
for sufficiently large n. Based on Lemma B.1, B.2, B.4 and B.5, we have events E1,
E2, E3, E4, E5, E6 happen with a high probability as n is large enough. The proofs
can be found in the Appendices.
We summarize the important properties of the OJC algorithm based on the above
asymptotic events.
(a) Let Y = (1− δ)3µqθ. In Step 1 of the OJC algorithm, we have K ⊂ Lt+D, i.e.,
all nodes on the subgraph g− are within level t + D of the BFS tree rooted at
source s1. Based on E3, all nodes on level t+D + 1 have less than Y observed
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infected neighbors. In addition, all nodes one level l > t+D+1 have no infected
neighbors since all the infected nodes are within level t+D.
(b) Based on event E5, all nodes which are infected at or before time t − 1 have
at least Y observed infected neighbors. Therefore, we have ∪t−1i=0Zi ⊂ K which
implies I ⊂ K+ and g− is a connected graph.
Therefore, g− is a connected graph which contains all the infected nodes and is re-
stricted up to level t+D based on E3 and E5.
Next we will show that s1 ∈ W∗ by contradiction. Note, we have e(S, I ′) = t.
Therefore, e(W∗, I ′) ≤ t. We will show that e(W , I ′) > t for any set of nodes W
where |W| = m, s1 6∈ W . Note, all the infection eccentricity are considered based on
the subgraph g−. Specifically, we will show that no nodes in g− other than source s1
can reach all nodes which are infected by source s1 within t time slot based on events
E1, E2, E3, E4, E5 and E6.
Consider the BFS tree rooted at source s1. We discuss the proof in two cases.
(a) When t+D ≤ bm−c, according to the event E2, the t+D hops from s1 is a tree
because there is not collision edges. When event E6 occur, there are at least
(1−δ)2µq infected nodes at level 1 and ∀v ∈ Z11 , Z ′′tt (v) ≥ [(1−δ)2µq]t−1(1−δ)θ
which means there exists at least one observed infected node on level t for each
subtree rooted at level 1. Consider a set W where s1 6∈ W . There exists a node
u ∈ Z˜11 such that W ∩ V(T−s1u ) 6= ∅ where T−s1u is the tree rooted at node u
without the branch of node s1 (the subtree on level 1). Therefore, for one node
w ∈ Z˜ ′tt (u), we have d(w,W) > t. Hence for any set W with size m that does
not contain s1, e(W , I ′) > t. Therefore, we have s1 ∈ W∗ when t+D ≤ bm−c.
Figure 3.1 shows a pictorial example when m = 3. The red nodes are the nodes
in set W . The existence of node u is guaranteed since m nodes are insufficient
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to cover all level 1 branches of the BFS tree rooted in s1. The red areas are the t
hop neighborhood of nodes w1, w2 and w3. In this case, the t+D neighborhood
of node s1 is a tree. Therefore, any set W does not contain s1 can not reach
the yellow area Z˜ ′′tt (u) within t hops as shown in the figure.
(b) Consider the case when t+D > bm−c. Again, based on event E6, there exists a
node u ∈ Z˜11 such thatW∩V(T−s1u ) 6= ∅. The distance between a node in Z ′tt (u)
and setW on the BFS tree is larger than t. Therefore, ifW is a Jordan infection
cover, the shortest paths between Z ′tt (u) and set W must contain at least one
collision nodes. In the rest of the proof, we will show that the number of collision
nodes is insufficient to provides the “shortcuts” to all observed infected nodes.
Define H to be the total number of nodes each of which has the shortest path
to W within t hops and containing at least one collision node. If H < Z˜ ′tt (u), there
exists a node w ∈ Z tt (u) such that d(w,W) > t. Therefore, W can not be the Jordan
infection cover and the theorem is proved.
In the rest of the proof, we will show that H < Z˜ ′tt (u). We first have the lower
bound on Z˜ ′tt (u) according to E6,
Z˜ ′tt (u) ≥ [(1− δ)2µq]t−1(1− δ)θ (3.3)
For each node wi in W , define Hi to be the total number of nodes each of which has
the shortest path to wi within t hops and containing at least one collision node. The
upper bound of Hi can be obtained based on Lemma 6 in Zhu and Ying (2015b).
Hi ≤ c[(1 + δ)µ] 34 (t+D)+ 12 + c[(1 + δ)µ]( 54−α2 )(t+D)+2,
and we have
H ≤
m∑
i=2
Hi ≤ mc[(1 + δ)µ] 34 (t+D)+ 12 +mc[(1 + δ)µ]( 54−α2 )(t+D)+2,
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Since 1
2
< α < 1, we have α = 1
2
+ α′ where 0 < α′ < 1
2
is a constant, we have
H
Z˜ ′tt (u)
≤ mc[(1 + δ)µ]
3
4
(t+D)+ 1
2
[(1− δ)2µq]t−1(1− δ)θ +
mc[(1 + δ)µ](
5
4
−α
2
)(t+D)+2
[(1− δ)2µq]t−1(1− δ)θ (3.4)
=
mc
µ
(
(1 + δ)
3
4
+( 3D4 +
1
2)
1
t
[(1− δ)2q]1− 1t (1− δ)θµ 14−( 3D4 + 52) 1t
)t
(3.5)
+
mc
µ
 (1 + δ)1−α′2 +[(1−α′2 )D+2] 1t
[(1− δ)2q]1− 1t (1− δ)θµα′2 −(4+(1−α′2 )D) 1t
t (3.6)
Since t >> D, we have
t ≥ min
{
3D + 2,
(
2
α′
− 1
)
D +
4
α′
,
(
4
α′
− 2
)
D +
16
α′
}
Therefore, Inequality (3.6) becomes
H
Z˜ ′tt (u)
≤ 2mc
µ
(
(1 + δ)
[(1− δ)2q]µα′4
)t
.
Since µ > 1
Cqθ
log n and δ, q, α′ are constants, we have
(1 + δ)
[(1− δ)2q]µα′4
< 1
when
n > exp
(
1
2
(
(1 + δ)
(1− δ)2q
) 4
α′
)
.
Therefore, we have
H
Z˜ ′tt (u)
≤ 2mc
µ
≤ ′,
where ′ ∈ (0, 1) is a constant and the inequality holds for sufficiently large n. There
are at least (1 − ′)Z˜ ′tt (u) nodes which cannot be reached from W with t hops on
g−. Hence we have e(I ′,W) > t. Therefore, we proved that s1 ∈ W∗ with a high
probability when n is sufficiently large, i.e., we have
Pr(s1 ∈ W∗) ≥ 1− 
m
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since m is a constant. Then, by applying the union bound, we have, for sufficiently
large n,
Pr(si ∈ W∗, ∀i = 1, · · · ,m) ≥ 1− 
Note, we have |W∗| = m. Therefore, we have
Pr(S =W∗) ≥ 1− 
Hence, the Jordan infection cover equals the actual source set with a high probability.
We now briefly explain the conditions. Recall that µ is the average node degree,
q is the lower bound on the infection probability and θ is the lower bound on the
reporting probability, so µqθ is a lower bound on the average number of observed
infected neighbors of a node that was infected before time slot t. Therefore, condition
(c1) requires that this lower bound is Ω(log n), and condition (c2) requires that the
threshold used in the candidate selection algorithm is a constant fraction of the aver-
age number of observed infected neighors. Applying the Chernoff bound, conditions
(c1) and (c2) together yield the following conclusions:
(i) any node who was infected before or at time slot t − 1 (hence, including the
sources) will be selected into the candidate set with a high probability,
(ii) any node that is t+D+ 1 hops away from the set of sources will not have Y or
more observed infected neighbors with a high probability, and
(iii) any node that is more than t+D+ 1 hops away from the set of sources will not
have any observed infected neighbors.
Based the above facts, with a high probability, the candidate set includes all nodes
who were infected at t− 1 or earlier, and any node in g− is at most t+D hops away
from all sources.
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Condition (c3) is on the infection duration. We first restrict t = ω(D) so that
the infection subgraphs starting from different sources are likely to overlap and form
a connected component. This is a more interesting regime than the one in which
infection subgraphs are disconnected from each other. lim supn→∞
t
logn
log µ
< 2
3
is a
critical condition. The intuition why it is required is explained below. Figure 3.1
provides a pictorial explanation of the proof. The picture illustrates the breadth-
first-search (BFS) tree T † rooted at source s1 with height t + D, where s1 is one of
the m sources. The nodes in orange are the observed infected nodes whose infection
was originated from s1. The blue nodes are unobserved nodes. A node is said to
be on level i of the BFS if its hop-distance to s1 is i. Assume m = 3 and consider
a set of three nodes who are within t + D hops from s1 but not includes s1 (e.g.,
W = {w1, w2, w3} in Figure 3.1). Suppose the infection eccentricity of W is ≤ t.
Since s1 has a sufficient number of neighbors according to the definition of µ, with a
high probability, there exists a subtree of T † starting from an offspring of s1, which
does not include any node in W . Assume u is the root of such a subtree in Figure
3.1. The yellow area in Figure 3.1 includes the level-t observed infected nodes on
subtree T−s1u . Any path from w1, w2 or w3 to the yellow area, formed by edges on T
†,
must have hop-distance larger than t. Therefore, if the infection eccentricity of W is
at least t, there must exist a path from W to each of the nodes in the yellow area
with hop-distance ≤ t, and such a path must include at least one edge which is not in
T † (we call these edges collision edges). In the detailed analysis, we will prove that
with a high probability, the number of nodes within t hops from W via the collision
edges is order-wise smaller than the number of nodes in the yellow area when (c3)
holds. Therefore, the Jordan cover has to include s1. The same argument applies to
other sources.
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3.3.2 Impossibility Results
Theorem 5 in Zhu and Ying (2016) presents the conditions under which it is
impossible to identify the single source under the IC diffusion on the ER random
graph, which is a special case of the model in this chapter. Assuming SI or IC model,
based on Lemma 1 in Zhu and Ying (2016), we have that with a high probability, all
nodes of the ER graph become infected when the infection duration is at least
tu ,
⌈
log n
log µ+ log q
⌉
+ 2.
When this occurs, it is impossible to detect the sources since the nodes are indiffer-
entiable.
Theorem 3.3. Assume the multi-source diffusion follows the IC or SI model. If
24 log n < qµ <<
√
n and q is a constant independent of n, then
lim
n→∞
Pr(I = V(g)) = 1
when the observation time t ≥ tu. In other words, the entire network is infected
after tu with a high probability. In such a case, the probability of finding the sources
diminishes to zero as n→∞.
3.4 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluated the performance of our algorithms via simulations.
The performance metrics used in this chapter include:
• Error distance: The error distance is defined to be
min
P∈permutation(S′)
m∑
i=1
d(si, pi)
m
,
where s1, s2, . . . , sm are the real sources, S ′ is the set of detected sources and
P = (p1, p2, ..., pm) is a permutation of S ′.
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Figure 3.2: Performance of OJC with different threshold values on the ER random
graph.
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Figure 3.3: The performance of OJC, AJC, CC and DC on the ER random graph
with different sample rates and threshold values.
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Figure 3.4: The performance of OJC, AJC, CC and DC on the power grid network
with different sample rates and threshold values.
• Detection rate: The detection rate is defined as
|S ∩ S ′|
m
.
We compared our algorithms with two heuristic algorithms (DC and CC) based on
K-Means, which have been used for comparison in Luo et al. (2014). The algorithms
proposed in Luo et al. (2014) and Chen et al. (2014) are the same as AJC without
candidate selection. In both DC and CC, the initial centroids are randomly chosen.
During the clustering step of each iteration in K-Means, we selected distance centroid
of each cluster in DC and selected closeness centroid in CC, where distance centroid
is defined as arg minv∈C
∑
u∈C∩I′ d(v, u), where C is the set of nodes in the cluster.
Closeness centroid is defined as arg maxv∈C
∑
u∈C∩I′,u6=v
1
d(u,v)
. The following experi-
ments were conducted on an server with 8 Intel Xeon X3450 CPUs and 16G RAM
with Linux 64 bit system. All algorithms were implemented with Python 2.7.
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3.4.1 OJC with Different Thresholds
In Figure 3.2, we evaluated OJC on the ER random graph. In the experiments, we
generated an ER random graph with 5, 000 nodes and wiring probability 0.002. We
used the homogeneous SI model for diffusion with infection probability 0.8. In this
experiment, we limited the infection network size to be 100 ∼ 300 and the number of
sources to be 2 due to the computational complexity of the OJC algorithm. Figure
3.2 shows the performance of OJC with different thresholds. From the results, the
detection rate is close to one and the error distance is close to zero under OJC with
threshold 0 or 1. However, the running time is 1,817 seconds versus 68 seconds. So
the candidate selection algorithm with threshold one results in 27× reduction of the
running time. When the threshold increases 2, the running time reduces to 3 seconds,
which is a 600× reduction of the running time. Both the detection rate and the error
distance became slightly worse in this case. The detection rate in this case is 0.961
and the error distance is 0.056.
3.4.2 OJC, AJC and Other Heuristics
We further evaluated the performance of OJC and AJC on both the power grid
network Watts and Strogatz (1998) and ER random graph (size: 5000, wiring proba-
bility: 0.002) and compared them with DC and CC heuristics. We used the homoge-
neous SI model with infection probability 0.8 to generate the diffusion sequences. For
AJC/CC/DC, for each diffusion sequence, we repeated the algorithm 100 times from
different initial conditions and chose the source set with the smallest the smallest-
infection-eccentricity/largest-closeness-centrality/smallest-distance-centrality. In Fig-
ure 3.3 and 3.4, the x−axis represents the combinations of sample rate and threshold.
On the ER random graph, we increased the threshold as the sample rate increased to
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control the running time. For the power-grid network, since the average node degree is
only 2, we set threshold equal to 2 for experiments for all sample rates. As we can see
from the figures that when fixing the threshold, the performance of all algorithms (in
terms of both error distance and detection rate) improves as the sample rate increases
because we had more information about the diffusion. From Figure 3.3 and 3.4, we
can also see that AJC outperforms DC and CC, and has similar performance with
OJC. Note that with four sources, OJC became very slow on both the ER random
graph and the power grid network because its complexity increases exponentially in
the number of sources. So for the cases with four sources, we only simulated AJC.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we studied the problem of detecting multiple diffusion sources
under the heterogeneous SIR model with incomplete observations. We defined a
concept called Jordan cover and developed the OJC algorithm based on that. Our
theoretical analysis showed that OJC finds the set of sources in the ER random
graph with probability one asymptotically under mild conditions. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first theoretic performance guarantee for multiple information
sources detection in non-tree networks. Since the computational complexity of OJC
is polynomial in n but exponential in m, we proposed a heuristic algorithm — the
AJC algorithm. Our simulation results showed that OJC and AJC algorithms have
similar performance and both significantly outperform existing algorithms.
52
Chapter 4
DIFFUSION HISTORY RECONSTRUCTION
In this chapter, we go beyond identifying the source of diffusion and study the prob-
lem of reconstructing the entire history of a diffusion process, named as diffusion
history reconstruction, which has been studied only very recently Sefer and Kingsford
(2014). In large-scale networks, due to the cost and privacy concerns, it is almost im-
possible to monitor the entire network and collect the complete diffusion trace, which
makes reconstructing the diffusion history not trivial. For example, when a computer
virus propagates among different computer through the network, we cannot track the
infection of each computer because of the privacy limitation. And when some fake
news goes viral on the Internet, which means thousands of individuals or websites
are involved in the diffusion process, it is difficult to obtain the time when each in-
dividual or website that propagates the news. We assume that the diffusion process
starting from one or mulitple sources follows the Susceptible-Infected (SI) model, a
variant of the popular SIR model first proposed in Kermack and McKendrick (1927),
and a single partial snapshot of the network is given, which includes the set of “in-
fected” nodes, and the corresponding infection time of a subset of “infected” nodes.
The nodes with known “infection” time can be thought as monitor nodes that were
placed in the network. Each monitor node can record the time at which the node is
“infected” and report the infection time. The main contributions of this chapter are
summarized below.
• We formulate the diffusion history reconstruction problem as a maximum a
posteriori (MAP) estimate problem, and prove that the problem is NP-hard by
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reducing an arbitrary set cover problem to a diffusion history reconstruction
problem.
• We propose a greedy and step-by-step reconstruction algorithm to reconstruct
the most likely network state at time slot τ based on the network state at time
slot τ − 1 while guaranteeing the state is consistent with partial observation,
and further develop a greedy algorithm for a single-step construction. The key
idea of the single-step construction algorithm is to convert the problem to the
weighted set cover problem, for which a well-known greedy algorithm provides
a guarantee on the approximation ratio.
• The problem of reconstructing the diffusion history for single-source diffusion
processes has been studied in Chen et al. (2015). In this chapter, we studied
multi-source diffusion processes, which include single-source diffusion as a spe-
cial case. The problem is more difficult because the number of initial states
is proportional to V NI , where VI is the number of infected nodes and N is the
number of sources. It is almost impossible to use the single-source algorithm to
reconstruct the diffusion history for multi-source diffusion processes because of
the high complexity. Assuming the number of sources, N(N ≥ 1), is known, we
propose an algorithm to find all possible initial states of the diffusion to reduce
the complexity. It is shown that the initial states found by our algorithm are
always consistent with the partial observation.
• We prove that the diffusion history obtained by the step-by-step reconstruction
algorithm is always consistent with the partial observation, and the computa-
tional complexity of the algorithm is O(V N+1I EI), where VI is the number of
infected nodes observed in the snapshot, EI is the number of edges between the
observed infected nodes and N is the number of sources.
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• We evaluate the performance of the algorithm on the Western States Power
Grid of the United States Watts and Strogatz (1998) and Internet autonomous
systems (IAS) network Leskovec et al. (2005), with simulated diffusion processes
following the SI model. We also test our algorithm on the Weibo dataset (Weibo
is a famous Chinese microblogging website). In all scenarios, we observe signif-
icant improvements of the proposed algorithm compared with other heuristic
and existing algorithms.
4.1 Problem Formulation
In this section, we define the diffusion history reconstruction problem. We assume
the diffusion process starting from a set of sources in the network denoted by G(V , E),
where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of directed edges. Node u can infect node
v if there is an edge u→ v. Node u is called an incoming neighbor of node v, and node
v is called an outgoing neighbor of node u. We further assume the number of sources,
N, is known to us, the diffusion process starts from time slot 0, and a snapshot of the
network is taken at time slot T. The snapshot includes the state of every node in the
network at time T, as well as the infection time of a subset of infected nodes. The
goal is to infer the complete diffusion history from the partial observation.
In this chapter, we use the capital letter for constants (e.g, T ), calligraphic fonts
for sets (e.g., E), and bold upper-case for matrices or vectors (e.g., X). We use Xt
to represent the tth column of matrix X. For each set, we use its associated capital
letter for the cardinality of the set (e.g., V = |V|). A graph is defined by its node
set and edge set, e.g., a graph G with node set V and edge set E can be written as
G(V , E). We use tilde to represent the matrix, set or vector to be reconstructed (e.g.,
X˜). The key notation used throughout the chapter is summarized in Table 4.1.
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Symbol Definition & Description
G(V , E) a graph G with vertex set V and edge set E .
T the time when the snapshot of the network is taken
I
infected nodes vector, which describes the infected
nodes at time T
T
infection timing vector, which saves the observed
infection time of nodes
X the diffusion history matrix
X˜ the reconstructed diffusion history matrix
Xt (0 ≤
t ≤ T )
the network state vector at time t
X˜t (0 ≤
t ≤ T )
the reconstructed network state vector at time t
Xv,t
a binary variable, which is equal to 1 when node v
is in the infected state at time t, otherwise, it is 0
puv infection probability of edge (u, v)
S˜t (0 ≤
t ≤ T )
the set of susceptible nodes on G(V , E) which has
infected incoming neighbors according to Xt
I˜n the set of infected nodes in X˜n
I the set of infected nodes in the snapshot at time T
Nv
the set of incoming neighbors of node v in network
G(V , E)
Table 4.1: Notations
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4.1.1 Diffusion Model
We assume the diffusion process follows the discrete-time Susceptible-Infected (SI)
model. Each node in the network has two states: susceptible (S) and infected (I).
In each time slot, every susceptible node, v, can be infected by each of its infected
incoming neighbors, u, with probability puv. Once the susceptible node gets infected,
it will stay at the infected state forever. The diffusion starts at time t = 0 from a set
of initially infected nodes, which are the sources of diffusion.
4.1.2 Problem Statement
Given a network G(V , E), we assume the observation we have for reconstructing
the diffusion history is a pair (T, I), such that I, named infected nodes vector, is a
V -dimensional vector such that Iv = 1 if node v is infected and Iv = 0 otherwise;
and T, named infection timing vector, is also a V - dimensional vector such that Tv is
infection time of node v if node v’s infection time is observed and Tv = −1 otherwise.
Let I denote the set of infected nodes. Define a V × T matrix X to be the diffusion
history such that
Xv,t =

1 Node v is in the infected state at time t,
0 Node v is susceptible at time t.
(4.1)
Note that X defines the entire history of the diffusion process and under the SI model,
Xv,t = 1 if Xv,τ = 1 for τ < t.
We can use the column vector Xt of diffusion history X to represent the network
state at time t. Then the diffusion history matrix X can be written as
X = (X0,X1, . . . ,XT ).
The diffusion history reconstruction problem can be defined as follows:
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Figure 4.1: The graph built in the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Diffusion History Reconstruction Problem
Input: The underlying network for the diffusion, G(V , E), the time when the snapshot
is taken, T, the infected nodes vector I and the infection timing vector T.
Output: A diffusion history X˜ such that
X˜ = argmax
X
Pr(X|I,T). (4.2)

In order to find the X˜, the exclusive search needs to calculate Pr(X|I,T) for all
possible diffusion history X, which increases exponentially as the number of infected
nodes increases. The problem is NP-hard and the proof is presented in the appendix.
Theorem 4.1. The diffusion history reconstruction problem defined in (4.2) is NP-
hard.
Proof. By reduction from the set cover problem. In the set cover, we are given a set
of M elements U = {u1, u2, . . . , uM} and a set S = {S1,S2, . . . ,SN} of N sets whose
union equals to set U . The set cover problem is to identify the smallest subset of S
whose union equals to the universe. We consider each element in set U or set S as a
vertex on a graph and think there exists an directed edge from Sj (0 ≤ j ≤ N) to ui
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(0 ≤ j ≤ M ) if ui ∈ Sj. Then for each Sj ∈ S, we add a node cj to the graph and
create a directed edge from Sj to cj. After that, we add a node s to the graph and
create a directed edge from s to Sj for each Sj ∈ S. An example of the graph we built
is provided in Figure 4.1. We assume there is a diffusion process based on the graph
in Figure 4.1 and SI model. Assume the infection probability on each edge (s,Sj)
(0 ≤ j ≤ N) is p1, the infection probability on each edge between Sj (0 ≤ j ≤ N) and
ui (0 ≤ i ≤M) is 1, and the infection probability on each edge (Sj, cj) (0 ≤ j ≤ N) is
p2 (p2 > p1). The snapshot was taken at time T = 3 and all nodes are in the infected
state at time 3. We observed that the infection time of node ui (0 ≤ i ≤ M) is 2,
the infection time of node cj (0 ≤ j ≤ N) is 3, and the infection time of node s is
0. Thus, we have known the observation (I,T). To determine the diffusion history,
we need to decide when node Sj (0 ≤ j ≤ N) is infected. We try to find a diffusion
history by solving (4.2). Since cj (0 ≤ j ≤ N) is infected at time 3, node Sj can only
be infected at time 1 or 2. If Sj is infected at time 1, the probability brought by path
s→ Sj → cj is
p1(1− p2)p2.
Otherwise, the the probability brought by path s→ Sj → cj is
p1(1− p1)p2.
Since p2 > p1, we have
p1(1− p2)p2 < p1(1− p1)p2,
which means node Sj prefers to be infected at time 2. However, since ui (0 ≤ i ≤M)
is infected at time 2, for each ui, there must exist a node Sk infected at time 1 such
that ui ∈ Sk, which means ui can be infected at time 2. Therefore, the problem
described in (4.2) can be converted to a set cover problem of finding the smallest
subset S ′ of S to cover U . Then we may think the nodes in S ′ are infected at time 1,
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while others in S are infected at time 2. Since
Pr(X|I,T) ∝ Pr(X) Pr(I,T|X) (4.3)
and the value of Pr(I,T|X) can only be 1 or 0, this reconstructed diffusion history X˜
has the maximum probability Pr(X˜) while X˜ is consistent with (I,T), Pr(I,T|X) = 1.
Thus, the set cover problem can be reduced to a special case of our diffusion history
reconstruction problem, which means the diffusion history reconstruction problem is
NP-hard.
4.2 A Step-by-Step Reconstruction Algorithm
Since the diffusion history reconstruction problem defined in (4.2) is difficult to
solve, we propose a heuristic algorithm with polynomial complexity in this section.
According to Bayes’ theorem, we have
Pr(X|I,T) = Pr(X, I,T)
Pr(I,T)
∝ Pr(X, I,T)
= Pr(X) Pr(I,T|X)
(4.4)
When the diffusion history X is known, the infection time of nodes and the set of
infected nodes are fixed. Thus, in (4.4), the value of Pr(I,T|X) is either 0 or 1 :
Pr(I,T|X) =

1 X is consistent with (I,T),
0 X is inconsistent with (I,T).
(4.5)
where we say that the diffusion history X is consistent with observation (I,T) if the
following two conditions hold:
H1 Xv,T = 1 when node v is an infected node according to I and Xv,T = 0 otherwise,
and
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H2 Xv,t = 1 for t ≥ Tv if Tv 6= −1.
We further define the network state at time τ (Xτ ) to be consistent with (I,T)
if the following conditions hold:
S1 If Iv = 0, then Xv,τ = 0. In other words, node v should be in the susceptible
state if it is in the susceptible state at time T.
S2 If Iv = 1 and 0 ≤ Tv ≤ τ, then Xv,τ = 1. In other words, node v should be in
the infected state at time τ if it was infected at or before time slot τ.
S3 If Iv = 1 and Tv > τ, then Xv,τ = 0, and one of the following two conditions
must hold
c1 There exists node u with Tu > τ and
d(u, v) ≤ Tv − Tu.
c2 There exists node u with Xu,τ = 1 and
d(u, v) ≤ Tv − τ.
Here d(u, v) is defined to be the length of the shortest Infection-Time-Free path
(or ITF-path) between node u and node v, where an ITF-path is a path that
includes only infected nodes such that Xw,τ = 0 except the two end nodes. The
condition (c1) means node u, who was infected at time slot Tu, can infect node
v via an ITF-path at Tv. The condition (c2) means node u, who has already
been infected at time slot τ, can infect node v via an ITF-path at Tv.
S4 If Iv = 1 and Tv = −1, then either Xv,τ = 1, or Xv,τ = 0 and one of the following
two conditions must hold
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c1 There exists node u with Tu > τ and
d(u, v) ≤ T − Tu.
c2 There exists node u with Xu,τ = 1 and
d(u, v) ≤ T − τ.
Here the condition (c1) means node u, who was infected at time slot Tu, can
infected node v via an ITF-path before or at time T. The condition (c2) means
node u, who has already been infected at time slot τ, can infect node v via an
ITF-path before or at time T.
According to the discussion above, the problem of
max
X
Pr(X|I,T)
is equivalent to
max
X
Pr(X)
subject to: X is consistent with (I,T).
(4.6)
Since X0,X1, . . . ,XT form a Markov chain under the SI model, we have
Pr(X) = Pr(X0,X1, . . . ,XT )
= Pr(X0) Pr(X1|X0) . . .Pr(XT |XT−1)
= Pr(X0)
T∏
τ=1
Pr(Xτ |Xτ−1).
Now to solve (4.6), our greedy approach is to recursively solve the following single-
step reconstruction problem with a given Xτ−1
max
Xτ
Pr(Xτ |Xτ−1)
subject to: Xτ is consistent with (I,T).
(4.7)
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The first step of this greedy algorithm needs input X0, i.e., the identify of the sources.
Define 1(F) to be a V -dimensional vector, where F ⊂ V , such that 1(F)v = 1 for v ∈ F
and 1
(F)
m = 0 for m 6∈ F . The algorithm will set X˜(F)0 = 1(F) for each set of possible
sources F and then calculates X˜(F)τ by recursively solving (4.7) (again with a greedy
algorithm which will be presented in the next subsection). Then the diffusion history
is set to be the most likely X˜(F). The pseudo code is presented in Algorithm 4.1.
Algorithm 4.1: The Step-by-Step Reconstruction Algorithm (SSR)
for each possible set of sources, i.e., F ⊂ Vs do
Set X˜
(F)
0 = 1
(F);
for 1 ≤ τ ≤ T do
Set X˜
(F)
τ to be solution of problem (4.7) with Xτ−1 = X˜
(F)
τ−1.
Set γF =
∏
1≤τ≤T Pr
(
X˜
(F)
τ
∣∣∣ X˜(F)τ−1) .
Set F∗ ∈ arg maxF∈V∫ γF .
return X˜(F
∗)
Note that Vs is defined to be the set of feasible source combinations with each
element represents a set of sources that can generate the observation. Vs, can be
determined by Algorithm 4.3, which is introduced later.
4.2.1 Single-Step Reconstruction
We now focus on solving (4.7) when X˜τ−1 is given. In the following discussion,
we assume X˜τ−1 is given. Note that node v can become an infected node at time
τ if Iv = 1, X˜v,τ−1 = 0 and it has at least an infected incoming neighbor at time
τ − 1. Denote by S˜τ−1 the set of susceptible nodes with infected incoming neighbors
according to X˜τ−1, Nv the set of incoming neighbors of node v, and I˜τ−1 the set of
infected nodes at time τ − 1. For each node v ∈ S˜τ−1, the probability that v is not
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infected by its incoming infected neighbors at time τ is
∏
u∈Nv∩I˜τ−1
(1− puv).
Furthermore, the objective in (4.7) can be written as
Pr(Xτ |X˜τ−1) =
∏
v∈S˜τ−1
(
1−
∏
u∈Nv∩I˜τ−1
(1− puv)
)Xv,τ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)( ∏
u∈Nv∩I˜τ−1
(1− puv)
)1−Xv,τ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
,
(4.8)
where term (a) is the probability that v gets infected at time τ while term (b) rep-
resents the probability that v stays susceptible at time τ. The log-likelihood can be
written as
log Pr(Xτ |X˜τ−1)
=
∑
v∈S˜τ−1
(
Xv,τ log
(
1−
∏
u∈Nv∩I˜τ−1
(1− puv)
)
+ (1−Xv,τ ) log
∏
u∈Nv∩I˜τ−1
(1− puv)
)
=
∑
v∈S˜τ−1
Xv,τ log
1−∏u∈Nv∩I˜τ−1(1− puv)∏
u∈Nv∩I˜τ−1(1− puv)
+ log
∏
u∈Nv∩I˜τ−1
(1− puv)
=
∑
v∈S˜τ−1
ατvXv,τ + β
τ
v ,
(4.9)
where
ατv = log
1−∏u∈Nv∩I˜τ−1(1− puv)∏
u∈Nv∩I˜τ−1(1− puv)
(4.10)
and
βτv = log
∏
u∈Nv∩I˜τ−1
(1− puv)
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are two constants whose values depend only on X˜τ−1. Therefore, optimization problem
described in (4.7) can be written as
max
Xτ
∑
v∈S˜τ−1
ατvXv,τ + β
τ
v
subject to Xτ is consistent with I and T.
(4.11)
Note that only nodes in S˜τ−1 ∩ I can change from susceptible to infected at time
slot τ. The problem is combinatoric in nature since Xv,τ ∈ {0, 1}. Next we reduce the
problem above to a weighted set cover problem. Note that the consistency conditions
are to guarantee all infected nodes can be infected at the observed infection time or
by the time at which the snapshot was taken. It is not difficult to see that we only
need to check the consistency of nodes in I \ I˜τ−1 for Xτ because nodes in I˜τ−1 have
been successfully infected by time τ − 1 and nodes in V \ I should always stay as
susceptible. Problem (4.11) can be converted to a weighted set cover problem with
the following steps:
(1) Define the universe to be
U = I \ I˜τ−1,
i.e., the set of nodes whose consistency needs to be verified in Xτ .
(2) Set S = S˜τ−1 ∩ I. For each node in S, say node u, initiate a set Su = ∅.
(3) For each node in the universe (say node v), construct a modified-breadth-first-
search (MBFS) tree as follows: Reverse all edges of the infected subgraph. On
the reversed graph, starting from the node, we conduct the breadth-first search
(BFS). When BFS hits an infected node in I˜τ−1 or with observed infection
time, BFS at this node stops, i.e., the node becomes a leaf-node of the MBFS
tree. Note that a path from the root to any leaf-node of the MBFS-tree is an
ITF-path.
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– If one of leaf-nodes on the MBFS-tree, which is not in S, satisfies the
consistency condition S3 or S4 for root node v, then node v is removed
from the universe, i.e.,
U = U \ {v}
because node v is consistent in Xτ regardless of the states of nodes in S.
– Otherwise, for each node (say node u) in S with Tu > τ , remove u from
S, i.e.,
S = S \ {u}.
For each node u in S :
∗ If Tv 6= −1, check whether the depth of node u on the MBFS-tree is
≤ Tv − τ. If it is the case, node v is added to Su, i.e.,
Su = Su ∪ {v}.
∗ If Tv = −1, check whether the depth of node u on the MBFS-tree is
≤ T − τ. If it is the case, node v is added to Su.
(4) According to (4.10), we calculate the weight of set Su : wu = −ατu for u ∈ S.
For each u ∈ S with wu < 0, set Xu,τ = 1, change the universe U to U \Su, and
remove u from S.
Note that v ∈ Su implies that node v’s consistency is guaranteed if node u becomes
infected at time slot τ. The problem (4.11), therefore, is equivalent to identifying a
set of Su (u ∈ S) with the smallest summation of weights to cover the universe U .
Consider a simple network in Figure 4.2a. Assume the infection probability of any
edge is 0.3, the snapshot is taken at T = 4, and all nodes are in the infected state at
time 4. Furthermore, assume the infection time of nodes b, c and h is known (Tb = 2,
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(a) The network when the
time slot is 1.
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(b) The MBFS-tree
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root.
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(c) The reconstructed net-
work state for time 1.
Figure 4.2: The example of diffusion network state single-step reconstruction.
Tc = 2 and Th = 2). We next outline the key steps to solve (4.11) by starting from
node d, i.e., assuming X˜0 = [0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0]
tr where tr means the transpose. So
I˜0 = {d}
and
U = I \ I˜0 = {a, b, c, e, f, g, h}.
Furthermore,
S˜0 = {a, f, g, e}.
Now consider the MBFS rooted at node c. The algorithm first explores the outgo-
ing neighbors of c, which are nodes b, f and g. The edges (c, b), (c, f) and (c, g) are
added to the MBFS tree. Since b′s infection time is known, the outgoing neighbors
of b should not be explored in the next step. In the next step, the MBFS checks the
outgoing neighbors of f and g. Since node d is an outgoing neighbor of node f, edge
(f, d) is added to the MBFS-tree. And the outgoing neighbors of node g, which are f
and d, are already explored by the MBFS, the MBFS at g stops. Since node d does
not have any outgoing neighbors, the MBFS stops and the MBFS-tree at root c is in
Figure 4.2b.
67
On the MBFS-tree in Figure 4.2b, nodes b and d do not satisfy S3.c1 or S3.c2
for node c, so node c cannot be removed from the universe. We then check the
ITF-paths to nodes f and g on the MBFS-tree, and both ITF-paths have a length
≤ Tc − 1. So node c is added to Sf and Sg. After doing a similar procedure for
other MBFS-trees, we have U = {b, c, f, g, h}, Sa = {b}, Se = {e, h}, Sf = {c, b}, and
Sg = {c}. According to (4.10), the weights are wa = −α1a = 0.847, wf = −α1f = 0.847,
wg = −α1g = 0.847, and we = −α1e = 0.847. For this example, the solution to the
weighted set cover problem is easy to find, which are Sf and Se, i.e., nodes f and e
should become infected at time slot 1. The reconstructed network state at time slot
1 is shown in Figure 4.2c.
In the discussion above, we need the MBFS-tree of every remaining-infected-node
in X˜τ−1, while the MBFS-tree depends on the state of X˜τ−1. Running the MBFS
at every single step is very time-consuming. Instead, we run the MBFS starting
from every infected-node at the beginning of the algorithm and save the MBFS-trees.
Then in each iteration, when a remaining-infected-node is selected to be an already-
infected-node (say node u is selected), we prune the subtree starting from node u from
all MBFS-trees but keep node u. The reason the subtree starting from node u can be
pruned is because for any node on the subtree, say node y, we have d(v, y) > d(v, u),
where v is the root of the MBFS-tree, so node v can be infected by node y via an
ITF-path after τ only if it can be infected by node u via an ITF-path.
An single-step reconstruction algorithm based on weighted set cover is stated in
Algorithm 4.2, which is formed by four steps:
1. Prune each MBFS-tree rooted at a susceptible node v in previous network state
with Iv = 1;
2. Convert the problem to a weighted set cover problem by following the procedure
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in Page 4;
3. Solve the weighted set cover problem by using greedy set cover algorithm;
4. Obtain the network state according to the result of greedy set cover algorithm
and calculate the objective in (4.11).
As described in Algorithm 4.1, by using Algorithm 4.2 recursively, we can get a
diffusion history, which is consistent with the observation.
In general, the weighted set cover problem is NP-hard. However, we can use the
greedy set cover algorithm in Young (2008) to find a feasible solution with performance
guarantee. Define O to be the objective value of Algorithm 4.2 for equation (4.11)
and O? to be the objective value of the optimal solution. Let k denote the largest set
size for the set cover problem and Hk =
∑k
i=1 1/i.
Lemma 4.1. By using Algorithm 4.2, we have O ≥ HkO?.
Proof. The proof is straight forward according to Theorem 1 in Young (2008).
Define GI(VI , EI) to be the infected subgraph of G(V , E), which is formed by the
infected nodes observed at T. Then we have VI = |VI |. The next lemma shows the
feasibility of the SSR algorithm for generating a consistent diffusion history.
Lemma 4.2. X˜τ output by Algorithm 4.2 is consistent with the observation (I,T) if
X˜τ−1 is consistent with the observation.
Proof. According to our previous definition, the reconstruction state X˜τ is consistent
with the observation (I,T) if for each node, one of the conditions S1, S2, S3 and S4
holds.
In the Single-Step Reconstruction algorithm, only the observed infected nodes can
get infected in the reconstruction. Therefore, each observed susceptible node satisfies
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Algorithm 4.2: Single-Step Reconstruction
Input : Network G(V , E), the previous reconstructed network state X˜τ−1, the
observed information (I,T), current time τ and the MBFS-tree Tv
(v ∈ I \ I˜τ−1) rooted at node v from previous step.
Output: The network state X˜τ , the value of objective in (4.11), o, and the
MBFS-trees after pruning.
o← 0; U ← I \ I˜τ−1; X˜τ ← X˜τ−1; S ← S˜τ−1 ∩ I;
let Sv ← ∅ for each v ∈ S; M← {v|v ∈ I, Tv 6= −1};
for v ∈ I \ I˜τ−1 do
let tv ← Tv if v ∈M. Otherwise, tv ← T ;
for u ∈ {the nodes on Tv} do
if u ∈ I˜τ−1 then remove the subtree rooted at u on Tv except u;
if there exists a node u ∈ {the nodes on Tv} ∩ (M\ I˜τ−1) such that the
depth of u on Tv is ≤ tv − Tu and Tu > τ then remove v from U ;
else if there exists a node u ∈ {the nodes on Tv} ∩ I˜τ−1 such that the depth
of u on Tv is ≤ tv − τ then remove v from U ;
else
for u ∈ S do
if u ∈M and Tu > τ then continue;
else if u ∈ {the nodes on Tv} and the depth of u on tree Tv is
≤ tv − τ then Su ← Su ∪ {v};
remove any node v ∈ S with Tv > τ ;
if the union of Sv for any v ∈ S is not equal to U then o← −∞;
else
wv ← −ατv for any v ∈ S ;
for v ∈ S do
if wv < 0 or Tv = τ then
Xv,τ ← 1; U ← U \ Sv; S ← S \ {v};
let R to be the result of the greedy set cover algorithm Young (2008) on
the subset Sv for any v ∈ S and the universe U ;
if o 6= −∞ then
set Xv,τ ← 1 for any v ∈ S with Sv ∈ R;
calculate the objective value in (4.11), o;
return X˜τ , o and Tv for v ∈ V ;
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Algorithm 4.3: Build Feasible Initial States
Input : Network G(V , E), the observed information (I,T).
Output: The set of feasible initial states Vs.
M← {v|v ∈ I, Tv 6= −1};
P ← {v|v ∈ I, Tv = 0};
let tv ← T for v ∈ I with Tv = −1 and tv ← Tv for v ∈ I with Tv 6= −1;
for v ∈ I \ (M\P) do
for any u ∈ I \ {v} do
build the MBFS tree Tu;
let Iv = ∅;
for u ∈M do
if there exists a node w ∈ {the nodes on Tu} ∩ F such that the depth of
w on Tu is ≤ tu then Iv = Iv ∪ {u};
for u ∈ I \ Iv do
if there exists a node w ∈ {the nodes on Tu} ∩ F such that the depth of
w on Tu is ≤ tu then Iv = Iv ∪ {u};
else if there exists a node w ∈ {the nodes on Tu} ∩M such that w ∈ Iv
and the depth of w on Tu is ≤ tu − tw then Iv = Iv ∪ {u};
for any F ⊂ I \ (M\P) with |F| = N and P ⊂ F do
if ∪v∈FIv = I then Vs = Vs ∪ {F};
return Vs;
condition S1 in X˜τ . Since X˜τ−1 is consistent with the observation according to the
assumption, for each node v ∈ V with Iv = 1 and X˜v,τ−1 = 1, the condition S2 holds.
Thus, we only need to discuss the v ∈ I with X˜v,τ−1 = 0. For each of those nodes, v,
the consistency requirement can be converted to the following three conditions:
C1 There exists u ∈ I with Tu 6= −1, X˜u,τ−1 = 0 and Tu ≥ τ such that
d(u, v) ≤ tv − Tu;
C2 There exists u ∈ V with X˜u,τ−1 = 1 and
d(u, v) ≤ tv − τ ;
C3 There exists u ∈ S˜τ−1 ∩ I with Tu = −1 and
d(u, v) = tv − τ.
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Here d(u, v) represents the length of the shortest ITF-path between node u and v.
And tv = Tv if Tv 6= −1, otherwise, tv = T.
For any node v ∈ I with X˜v,τ−1 = 0, assume condition C1 holds at τ − 1, which
means for node v, there exists some u ∈ I with Tu 6= −1, X˜u,τ−2 = 0, and
d(u, v) ≤ tv − Tu.
If X˜u,τ−1 = 0, condition C1 is satisfied at τ. Otherwise, if X˜u,τ−1 = 1, which means
Tu = τ − 1, we have
d(u, v) ≤ tv − Tu = tv − t+ 1. (4.12)
Thus, there exists a node w with either X˜w,τ−1 = 1 or X˜w,τ−1 = 0 on the shortest
ITF-path between u and v such that d(w, v) ≤ tv − t, which means either C2 or C3
is satisfied at τ for node v.
Assume C2 holds for node v at τ − 1, which means there exists some node u with
X˜u,τ−2 = 1 and
d(u, v) ≤ tv − τ + 1.
Then there exists a node w, which is the neighbor of u on the shortest ITF-path
between u and v such that
d(w, v) ≤ tv − τ.
Thus, either C2 or C3 is satisfied at τ.
If C1 or C2 holds for node v at time τ −1, then we have node v is consistent with
the observation at τ from the previous discussion. Now, we assume only C3 holds at
τ − 1 for node v. Then, there exists some set D ⊂ S˜τ−2 ∩ I such that for any u ∈ D,
d(u, v) = tv − τ + 1
and Tu = −1. Then, according to Algorithm 4.2, at least one node, u ∈ D needs to
be infected at τ − 1, which means X˜u,τ−1 = 1. Then there exists a susceptible node w
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which is the neighbor of u on the ITF-path between u and v such that d(w, v) = tv−τ,
which means C3 holds at τ for node v.
Therefore, from the above, we can see if X˜τ−1 is consistent, X˜τ output by Algo-
rithm 4.2 is consistent.
4.2.2 Feasible Source Combinations
For infected node v with Tv = −1 or Tv = 0, define 1(v) to be a V -dimensional
vector such that 1
(v)
v = 1 and 1
(v)
m = 0 for m 6= v. Define P = {v|v ∈ I, Tv = 0}. Then,
we use 1(v) as the initial state to run the Single-Step Reconstruction algorithm, but
instead of generating the network state at time slot 1, we find a set of infected nodes,
Iv, such that for each u ∈ Iv, there exists a path from v to u such that node u can
be infected at its observed infection time. For any combination of N infected nodes
with unknown infection time or infection time 0, F , we define Vs such that 1F ∈ Vs
if only if ∪v∈FIv = I and P ⊂ F . Here Vs is a set of initial states. The pseudocode
can be found in Algorithm 4.3.
Lemma 4.3. X˜0 ∈ Vs if only if X˜0 is consistent with the observation.
Proof. Assume X˜0 = 1
(F), where |F| = N and F ⊂ V .
• X˜0 ∈ Vs implies X˜0 is consistent:
This can be shown by contradiction. Suppose X˜0 is not consistent with the
observation.
– If S1 does not hold for X˜0, which means for some node v with v 6∈ I,
we have X˜v,0 = 1. According to the construction of Vs, only the observed
infected nodes can be the sources. Thus, X˜0 6∈ Vs.
– If S2 does not hold for X˜0, which means for some node v with Tv = 0,
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Xv,0 = 0. Since the observed sources are included in each possible source
combination, we have X˜0 6∈ Vs.
– Assume for some node v with Tv > 0, S3 does not hold.
∗ Suppose X˜v,0 = 1. According to the algorithm to construct Vs, only
infected nodes without infection time observed can be set as initial
infected nodes, which means X˜0 6∈ Vs.
∗ Suppose X˜v,0 = 0 while both c1 and c2 do not hold, which means
there does not exist a path to make sure node v can be infected at
time Tv. Thus, we have v 6∈ ∪u∈FIu, which means X˜0 6∈ Vs.
– Suppose for some node v with Tv = −1, S4 does not hold. By using a
similar argument we use for S3, we have X˜0 6∈ Vs.
• X˜0 is consistent implies X˜0 ∈ Vs :
Suppose X˜0 is consistent, we need to show ∪v∈FIv = I. For any u ∈ I, X˜0 is
consistent means there exists a path from a node w ∈ F to u such that node u
can be infected at Tu (if Tu 6= −1) or by time T (if Tu = −1). Then, according
to the algorithm to construct Vs, we have u ∈ Iw. Thus, we have ∪v∈FIv = I.
Theorem 4.2. From the initial state X˜0, we can build a diffusion history consistent
with the observation if only if the X˜0 ∈ Vs.
Proof. • X˜0 ∈ Vs implies X˜ is consistent:
According Lemma 4.3, X˜0 is an initial state which is consistent with the obser-
vation. Then, by using Lemma 4.2, we can reconstruct a series of network state
at different times, X˜τ (1 ≤ τ ≤ T ) which are consistent with the observation.
Thus, we can reconstruct a consistent diffusion history.
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• X˜ is consistent implies X˜0 ∈ Vs:
This can be shown by contradiction. If X˜0 6∈ Vs, then according to Lemma 4.3,
X˜0 is not consistent with the observation. Thus, according to our definition,
the reconstructed diffusion history cannot be consistent with the observation.
Theorem 4.3. Algorithm 4.1 outputs a diffusion history consistent with the obser-
vation with a worst-case computational complexity of O(V N+1I EI), where N is the
number of sources.
Proof. The first half of the theorem holds according to Theorem 4.2. We next analyze
the complexity of our algorithm. Define GI(VI , EI) to be the infected subgraph of
G(V , E).
• At first, we need to run Algorithm 4.3 to generate the set of feasible initial states.
In Algorithm 4.3, the complexity of building MBFS trees is O(V 2I EI). Then, for
each combinations of N infected nodes without infection time observed, we need
to check whether it is a feasible source set. These operations have a complexity
of O(V N+1I ). Thus, the complexity of Algorithm 4.3 is O(V
2
I EI + V
N+1
I ).
• Then for each feasible source set, we build the MBFS trees, whose complexity
is O(VIEI). In each single step reconstruction, we need to prune the tree first.
For each MBFS-tree, after pruning, the nodes removed from the MBFS-tree at
the current step will not appear in the MBFS-tree for the future single step
reconstructions. Thus, for a specific MBFS-tree, the worse case complexity for
pruning in the diffusion history reconstruction is O(VI). Since there are at most
VI MBFS-trees, the worst case complexity of pruning the MBFS-trees for a
specific initial state is O(V 2I ). In a similar way, the worst case complexity of
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Figure 4.3: An example of diffusion. For v ∈ {a, b, c, d}, tIv is the infection time of
node v. In this example, a is the source.
the greedy set cover is also O(V 2I ) for a specific initial state. Thus, for each
feasible source set, the complexity of Algorithm 4.2 in SSR is O(VIEI + V
2
I ).
Since the number of feasible initial states is V NI in worst case, the complexity
of Algorithm 4.2 in Algorithm 4.1 is O(V N+1I EI).
Therefore, the complexity of Algorithm 4.1 is O(V 2I EI + V
N+1
I + V
N+1
I EI). Since
N ≥ 1, we have V N+1I EI ≥ V 2I EI and V N+1I EI ≥ V N+1I , which means the complexity
is O(V N+1I EI).
4.3 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we compare the performance of SSR with other heuristics using
following three performance measures.
• Kendall’s τb coefficient: Since the diffusion history includes the infection
time of each infected node in the network, we compare the infection order of
the obtained diffusion history with the true infection order. Since there could
be ties in the infection order because more than one nodes may be infected in
the same time slot, we use Kendall’s τb statistic Agresti (2010), which takes ties
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into consideration. The value of τb varies from −1 to 1, where τb = 1 means
the two orders are in perfect agreement and τb = −1 means the two orders are
perfect inversion to each other.
• Edge precision: From a diffusion history, we can further infer the set of edges
involved in the diffusion process. We call edge u → v a diffusion edge if node
v was infected by node u in information diffusion. Under the SI model, given
a diffusion history, each edge u → v satisfying tIu < tIv is a possible diffusion
edge. Define Ed to be the set of possible diffusion edges based on the true
diffusion history X and E˜d to be the set of possible diffusion edges based on the
reconstructed diffusion X˜. We consider the following performance metric:
P =
|Ed ∩ E˜d|
|Ed| .
There is few work on using partial infection time information to reconstruct the
diffusion history. The only one in the literature which can be used in our setting is
A ILP developed in Fajardo and Gardner (2013). Therefore, we compare our algo-
rithm with A ILP, and two other heuristics: the breadth-first-search (BFS) heuristic
and the infection-simulation (IS) heuristic.
• BFS: On the infected subgraph, we construct the breadth-first search (BFS)
tree from each source combination and set the infection time of a node to its
distance to the root. Then we consider the set of infected nodes with observed
infection time, and compare its infection order on the breadth-first search tree
with the actual infection order using Kendall’s τb coefficient. The BFS tree with
the largest τb is chosen to be the diffusion history.
• IS: For each source combination, we generate an infection sequence using the SI
model on the original network. The diffusion stops when the diffusion process
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“infects” all observed infected nodes. We again extract the infection order of
the nodes with observed infection time and compare the order of it with the
true infection order using Kendall’s τb coefficient. The infection sequence with
the largest τb is chosen as the diffusion history.
In Fajardo and Gardner (2013), the source is assumed to be known. However, in our
setting, the source of the diffusion process is unknown. Therefore, when we implement
the A ILP algorithm, we try to reconstruct the diffusion path for each possible source
and then choose the reconstructed diffusion path with the largest value of optimization
objective derived in Fajardo and Gardner (2013) as the result of A ILP.
We tested our algorithm on both synthetic diffusion data and real data. The
networks used in generating the synthetic diffusion data include
• The power network: This network is used to represent the topology of the
Western States Power Grid of the United States, which contains 4941 nodes
and 6594 edges Watts and Strogatz (1998).
• The BA network: This is a network generated by using the Baraba´si-Albert
model Barabasi and Albert (1999) with 300 nodes. Each new node is connected
to 3 existing nodes.
• The IAS network: This is the Internet Autonomous Systems network Leskovec
et al. (2005), which contains 10670 nodes and 22002 edges. This is a small-world
network.
In our experiment, we first generated a diffusion sequence by using the discrete
time SI model with an equal infection probability p for each edge and a set of randomly
chosen sources. At time T, we took a snapshot of the network. Define srate to be the
fraction of infected nodes with infection time observed. For example, if srate = 20%,
we randomly choose 20% of infected nodes and reveal their infection time.
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We further evaluated the performance of our algorithm on the Weibo dataset
provided by the WISE 2012 challenge 1 , which contains the data of Sina Weibo 2
, a famous microblogging website in China. The dataset consists of two parts: the
friendship graph and a set of tweets.
Since each tweet in the dataset contains the post time, user id, retweet path and
message id, we extracted the tweets for a specific message and considered the post
time of each tweet as the infection time of that user.
We pre-processed the dataset as follows:
1. We added links used in the retweet path into the friendship graph to form the
network of the diffusion.
2. We removed the nodes whose infection time is not consistent with the network.
3. We selected the weakly connected component formed by all the nodes with
infection time, and the first infected node on this component is viewed as the
source.
4. We calculated the average infection time according to
t¯ =
∑
(u,v)∈E,tIu<tIv
(tIv − tIu)
m
,
where E is defined to be the set of edges on the weakly connected component
and m is the number of directed edge (u, v) such that tIu < t
I
v. Here t
I
v is defined
to be the infection time of node v.
5. We discretized the infection time according to
t′u = d
tIu − tIs
t¯
e,
1http://www.wise2012.cs.ucy.ac.cy/challenge.html
2http://www.weibo.com
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Figure 4.4: Power Network with a single source, p = 0.3 and T = 10.
where s is the first infected node of the component.
6. We deleted the node whose adjusted infection time is not consistent with the
network structure.
After these steps, we obtained 357 diffusion traces generated by a single source with
an average size of 81.82 nodes/trace.
4.3.1 Performance Evaluation with Synthetic Diffusion Traces
Figure 4.4, Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 show the performance of Algorithm 4.1
and other algorithms based on the synthetic diffusion traces on different real-world
networks with a single source. A ILP has to solve a linear integer programming
multiple times, and becomes very time-consuming on large-size networks such as the
IAS network. So the performance of A ILP is not included in Figure 4.6. In Power
Network, BA Network and IAS Network, our algorithm has the best performance
under most of the sample rates in terms of all the metrics, which proves that our
algorithm is prominent under tree-like network and small-world network.
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Figure 4.5: BA Network with a single source, p = 0.3 and T = 10.
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Figure 4.6: IAS Network with a single source, p = 0.04 and T = 4.
Furthermore, we test our algorithm for diffusion traces generated by multiple
sources. For these diffusion traces, if the infected subnetwork generated by each
source is not connected with each other, we can simply run a single source SSR
algorithm on each component. Thus, we only used the diffusion traces where the
infected subnetwork is a single connected component, in other words, the infected
subnetworks from different sources are mixed. Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8 provide the
performance of SSR and other algorithms when the number of sources is 2. Similar
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to the results from the single source case, our algorithm still outperforms the others
under most of the sample rates. Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10 compares the performance
of SSR on the diffusion traces generated by 2 sources and 3 sources. We can see that,
the performance of SSR when the number of sources is 3 is close to the case when
the number of sources is 2, which means the performance of our algorithm is robust
with different number of sources. In the other algorithms, without determining the
feasible source combinations first, we need to test much more combinations of N
nodes as the sources compared to our algorithm, which makes the other algorithms
very time-consuming as N increases. Therefore, we did not include the results of the
other algorithms when the number of sources is 3. Algorithm 4.3 is to find the all
the feasible initial states that could generate a valid diffusion history. Without using
Algorithm 4.3, we can still use Algorithm 4.2 to build a diffusion history for each
source combination. However, the number of source combinations is proportional to
V NI , which makes the algorithm almost impossible to run for multi-source diffusion
processes. Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 shows the number of initial states with or without
using Algorithm 4.3 for Power Network with N = 2 and 3. From the tables, we can
see Algorithm 4.3 can reduce the number of initial states dramatically.
4.3.2 Performance Evaluation with the Weibo Dataset
In the experiment based on the Weibo dataset, since we do not have the infection
probability, we set the infection probability to be 0.8 for each edge. The performance
of our algorithm as well as other algorithms is shown in Figure 4.11. From Figure
4.11, we can see that our algorithm has the best performance under most sample
rates in terms of τb and P.
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Figure 4.7: Power Network with two sources, p = 0.4 and T = 10.
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Figure 4.8: BA Network with two sources, p = 0.1 and T = 10.
4.3.3 Optimality of the Single-Step Reconstruction
In the single-step reconstruction, we converted the problem to a weighted set
cover problem, which is well-known to be NP-hard. Thus, we adopted the greedy set
cover algorithm in Young (2008), which provides a worst-case approximation ratio
guarantee. In this set of simulations, we compared SSR using the greedy set cover
solution for single-step reconstruction with SSR using the optimal solution for single-
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Figure 4.9: Power Network p = 0.4 and T = 10.
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Figure 4.10: BA Network with p = 0.1 and T = 10.
step reconstruction. Here, we used a small-size network, Zachary’s Karate Club
Network Zachary (1977), which has 34 nodes and 78 edges. Figure 4.12 shows the
results of the comparison between the two algorithm. We can see that the results are
almost identical, which shows that the greedy solution performs reasonably well, at
least for small size networks.
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Figure 4.11: Weibo dataset.
Sample Rate Without Algorithm 4.3 With Algorithm 4.3
20% 15855.78 266.86
40% 9066.33 48.97
60% 3951.05 11.91
89% 1060.31 3.30
Table 4.2: The average number of initial states with or without Algorithm 4.3 on
Power Network with N = 2 .
Sample Rate Without Algorithm 4.3 With Algorithm 4.3
20% 4439775.98 7285.78
40% 1884810.87 528.19
60% 567404.51 64.69
89% 73913.57 9.19
Table 4.3: The average number of initial states with or without Algorithm 4.3 on
Power Network with N = 3 .
85
srate (%)
0 20 40 60 80 100
τ b
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1SSR
Optimal
(a) Average τb for different srate with 25-75
percentile.
s
rate (%)
0 20 40 60 80 100
P
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
(b) Average P1 for different srate.
Figure 4.12: Comparison with optimal on Zachery’s Karate Club Network with a
single source, p = 0.3 and T = 10.
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Figure 4.13: Wall-clock time vs infected network size.
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Figure 4.14: Power Network with p = 0.4 and T = 10.
4.3.4 Efficiency Results
Figure 4.13 shows the wall-clock time of our algorithm versus the network size.
In order to obtain Figure 4.13, at first, many diffusion traces were generated based
on the power network Watts and Strogatz (1998) with a single source and infection
time T varying from 5 to 90. Then we used the sample rate 40%. We tested the
wall-clock time of our algorithm on these diffusion traces and classified the wall-clock
time by the number infected nodes. For example, a diffusion trace with 150 infected
nodes was included into the calculation of size 200. Finally, Figure 4.13 was obtained
by calculating the average wall-clock time of each cluster and plotting the figure of
wall-clock time versus the cluster size. From Figure 4.13, we can see that the running
time increases in a near-linear trend with the size of infected subnetwork. Note that
the x-axis is the size of the infected subnetwork, which is much smaller than the size
of the power network Watts and Strogatz (1998).
Figure 4.14 provides the result of the wall-clock time versus the sample rate when
the number of sources is 2 and 3. From the figure, we can see that as the sample
rate increases, the running time of our algorithm decreases significantly and becomes
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much faster than the other heursitics.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we studied the problem of diffusion history reconstruction. We
formulated the problem as an optimization problem and developed a step-by-step
reconstruction algorithm, in which the single-step reconstruction can be converted to
a weight set cover problem. Our simulation results show the superior performance
over heuristic and existing algorithms.
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Chapter 5
INTERDEPENDENT NETWORK ROBUSTIFICATION: REAL-TIME
REWIRING
Interdependent networks are widely used to model and analyze many real-world com-
plex systems, such as the Internet, social networks, transportation systems, biochem-
ical reactions, etc Albert and Baraba´si (2002); Di Muro et al. (2016). Interdependent
networks consist of nodes and links where nodes represent different components of a
complex system and links characterize the interaction between the components. Many
researchers have studied interdependent networks to gain insights about features and
properties of complex systems, such as their robustness, stability, connectivity and
structure Yuan et al. (2015); Vespignani (2010); Buldyrev et al. (2010); Gao et al.
(2012); Di Muro et al. (2016); Watts and Strogatz (1998); Albert et al. (2000); Albert
and Baraba´si (2002); Callaway et al. (2000); Albert et al. (1999); Newman (2010);
Schneider et al. (2011); Zeng and Liu (2012). An important topic in this area is to
preserve the robustness of interdependent networks under site or link attacks. This
problem is important to many real-world networks, such as power networks, trans-
portation networks, fuel distribution networks and communication networks. Many
of these networks may have low tolerance to damages on their structures (e.g. the
diameter doubled after only 5% of the most connected nodes are removed on the
scale-free network Albert et al. (2000)).
In an interdependent network, different networks (layers) interact with each other.
For example, the nodes in the communication network need the power from the power
stations of the power network, while the power stations need to communicate via the
communication network.
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We consider the problem of improving the robustness of an interdependent network
under a localized attack. We focus on the development of algorithms that rewire
the links of the interdependent networks in real-time to minimize the impact of the
localized attack. In particular, we assume an interdependent network consists of two
subnetworks A and B, in which the functioning of each node can depend on a set of
nodes from the other layer. We study a localized attack model such that the nodes
around attacked nodes are removed hop by hop inspired by Shao et al. (2015). The
main contributions of this chapter are summarized below.
• Problem Formulation: We formulate the interdependent network link rewiring
problem as a Markov decision process (MDP) problem, and prove that the
problem is NP-hard by reducing the maximum coverage problem to our MDP
problem.
• Algorithm: We propose a greedy algorithm to rewire the links during the
attack. The key idea of the algorithm is to maximize the objective of the MDP
problem in a greedy manner.
• Analysis: We compare the performance of our algorithm with the exact so-
lution of the MDP problem on a small network. The results show that the
performance is close in terms of the objective of the MDP problem.
• Empirical Evaluations: We evaluate the performance of the algorithm on
interdependent networks formed by the real networks including the air traffic
network, the IAS network and the power grid network with simulated localized
attacks. In most cases, when a large fraction of nodes in the networks are
attacked, our algorithm outperforms others.
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5.1 Problem Formulation
5.1.1 Interdependent Networks
The chapter adopts the interdependent network model inspired by Buldyrev et al.
(2010), which consists two networks, network A and network B, and a set of directed
dependency links. Each dependency link is a directed link starting from a node
in network A (B) and ending at a node in network B (A), which represents the
influence of network A (B) on network B (A). Let Ga(Va, Ea) (Gb(Vb, Eb)) represent
the topological structure of network A (B), where Va (Vb) is the set of vertices and Ea
(Eb) is the set of edges of graph Ga (Gb). Define D to be the set of dependency links
that connect graph Ga and graph Gb. The interdependent network can be represented
by the tuple (Ga(Va, Ea), Gb(Vb, Eb),D). For each vertex v ∈ Vb (Va) we can define its
supporting node set to be
Rv = {u|∀(u, v) ∈ D}. (5.1)
Here Rv is a set of nodes from graph Ga (Gb), whose failures will impact the func-
tioning of node v from Gb (Ga). In this chapter, we consider the case where a node v
will stop functioning if all its supporting nodes in Rv from the other layer fail. Note
that if Rv is empty, the functioning of node v does not depend on any other node
from the other layer.
5.1.2 Localized Attack Model
We consider the localized attack model inspired by Yuan et al. (2015). The attack
occurs and spreads on network A. In particular, at the beginning, a single node from
network A is attacked and fails. Then, at each time slot, each attacked node at
network A can attack and cause the failures of all its neighbors on network A. We
assume the attack stops with probability p at each time slot before time T and stops
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Figure 5.1: An example of the localized attack with p = 0 and T = 2. The red
diamond represents failures. At time t = 0, a node in network A is attacked and fails.
Then, the attack starts to propagate. At time t = 1, the neighbors of the previous
attacked nodes in network A get attacked and fail. The similar procedure goes on at
time t = 2. Then, the attack stops and there are 4 more node failures caused by the
failures of their supporting nodes.
at time slot T if it does not stop before that. There are two kinds of failures during
this attack:
• The failure directly resulted from attacks: A node stops functioning because it
is attacked.
• The failures caused by failures: A node stops functioning because of the failures
of all nodes from its supporting node set.
We assume failures directly due to the attack propagates much faster than the failures
caused by other failures. Thus, the attack propagates on network A first and the
second type failures happen after the attack stops as shown in the example in Figure
5.1. Consider an interdependent network where the communication network is the
92
first layer and the power grid is the second layer. In general, the cyber attack occurring
on the communication network spreads very fast, while the failures ocurring in the
power grid may take some time. For example, in the sequence of events that led to
the cascading failures of the power grid in India 2012, the 2nd event ocurred one hour
and twenty minutes after the 1st event and the 3rd event was 58 minutes after the 2nd
event Bakshi et al. (2012). Motivated by this, we assume the propagation of failures
due to the attack is much faster than the failures due to the loss of supporting nodes.
5.1.3 Markov Decision Process (MDP) Formulation
Markov decision processes (MDPs) have been widely used to model the control of
stochastic systems. At each time step, the process in some state s moves to a new
state s′ given action a, which results in a certain reward. Now we try to explain the
intuition of our algorithm by using the Markov decision process (MDP). Denote the
interdependent network by the tuple
(Ga(Va, Ea), Gb(Vb, Eb),D).
Define Ct to be the set of nodes attacked and failed at time slot t on Ga, Ft = ∪ti=0Ci,
and Gta(V ta, E ta) (Gtb(V tb, E tb)) to be the topological graph of network A (B) before action
is taken at time slot t. Thus, we have G0a = Ga and G
0
b = Gb. Define the state at time
slot t as a tuple
st = (G
t
a(V ta, E ta), Gtb(V tb, E tb), Ct,Ft,D).
The action at on state st can be considered as edge rewiring happened on G
t
a, where
a number of
nt = min(br||Wt||c, z) (5.2)
edges are rewired, where
Wt = {(v, u) ∈ E ta|v ∈ Ft and u ∈ V ta \ Ft}
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is the set of edges that connect the current attacked nodes with unattacked nodes in
network A, and r, z are two constants while 0 < r < 1 and z ∈ Z. At each time slot,
the number of rewired links is the smaller value of a constant z and the number of
links connecting current attacked nodes and healthy nodes multiplying by a constant
r (0 < r < 1). We remark under the assumption above, the attacked nodes cannot
be isolated from the rest of the network by cutting all the edges between attacked
nodes and unattacked nodes. If it is possible, then a simple solution is to isolate the
attacked nodes immediately. Denote by T the attack propagation time. We further
assume at each time slot t (t ≥ 0), the diffusion of the attack stops with probability
p.
At time slot 0, we have
s0 = (Ga(Va, Ea), Gb(Vb, Eb), {source}, {source},D),
where source represents the single attacked node at time slot 0. Given state
st = (G
t
a(V ta, E ta), Gtb(V tb, E tb), Ct,Ft,D) (t ≥ 0),
and action at, define G
t′
a(V t′a , E t′a ) to be the graph at time t after action at has been
taken. Then, the state transitions can be described as the following:
1. If Ct = ∅, we have Ct+1 = ∅, Ft+1 = Ft, Gt+1a = Gt′a and Gt+1b = Gtb.
2. If Ct 6= ∅, we have Gt+1a = Gt′a and Gt+1b = Gtb. Since with probability p, the
attack stops at time slot t, and with probability 1− p, the attack continues, we
have
Ct+1 =

∅, with probability p,
{u|∀u ∈ V t′a \ Ft, (v, u) ∈ E t′a , v ∈ Ft},
with probability 1− p,
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and Ft+1 = Ft ∪ Ct+1.
Then we use S to represent the set of possible states and A to represent the set
of actions. Define a reward function f : S ×A → R such that:
1. If Ct 6= ∅, define
Pt = {u|∀u ∈ V t′a \ Ft, (v, u) ∈ E t′a , v ∈ Ft},
where Pt represents the set of nodes that can be attacked in the next time slot.
Define Ota to be the set of failed nodes caused by the failures of Ft ∪ Pt on
network A and Otb to be the set failed nodes caused by the failures of Ft ∪ Pt
on network B. Denote f ta as the size of the largest connected component of G
t′
a
after removing the nodes Ft∪Pt∪Ota. Similarly, denote f tb to be the size of the
largest connected component of Gtb after removing nodes in Otb. When Ct 6= ∅,
the reward function returns f ta + f
t
b .
2. Otherwise, it returns 0.
We remark that here we use the size of the largest connected component as the
robustness metric. The value function at time t is
Vt(st) = max
at
(f(st, at) + γ
∑
st+1
P(st+1|st, at)Vt+1(st+1(st, at)). (5.3)
In our case, we may set the discount factor γ = 1. Thus, we have
Vt(st) = max
at
(f(st, at) +
∑
st+1
P(st+1|st, at)Vt+1(st+1(st, at)). (5.4)
Calculating the value function V0(s0) is equivalent to solving the following problem
Powell (2007):
Problem 1 (MDP problem).
max
pi
E(
T∑
t=0
f(st, at)|s0) (5.5)
where pi is a policy that decides which action to take at each state.
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5.2 A Low-Complexity Algorithm
5.2.1 Challenges - NP-hardness
To solve the MDP problem, we have the following difficulties:
1. The cardinality of the state set and the action set are very large, which makes
it impossible to solve the problem by using dynamical programming.
2. There is no closed form expression of function f.
Theorem 5.1. The MDP problem defined in Problem 1 is NP-hard.
Proof. The proof can be done by reducing the maximum coverage problem to Problem
1. Detailed proof can be found in Appendix C.
5.2.2 Proposed Algorithm - REALWIRE
Since the MDP problem is hard to solve, we propose a heuristic algorithm, REAL
W IRE, based on the expected number of link failures. Define gta(V˜ ta, E˜ ta) to be a
directed subgraph of Gta at time t such that
V˜ ta = V ta \ Ft−1
and
E˜ ta = ∪v∈Ct,u∈Vta\Ft{(x, y)| (x, y) ∈ E ta, and (x, y) is on the
shortest path between node v and u
on graph Gta.}
Then, for ∀v ∈ V˜ ta, we define the expected number of link failures of node v at time t,
f tv to be
f tv =
∑
u∈N tv
f tu
dtin(u)
+ (1− p)ltv(dtout(v) + wtv +
dta(v)− dtin(v)− dtout(v)
2
). (5.6)
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Here p is the stopping probability for the localized attack at each time slot, N tv is the
set of successors of node v on graph gta, d
t
in(v) is the incoming degree of node v on
gta, d
t
out(v) is the outgoing degree of node v on g
t
a, d
t
a(v) is the degree of node v on
subgraph of Gta with node set V˜ ta, and ltv is the level of node v on graph gta, where
ltv = min
u∈Ct
distt(u, v),
and distt(u, v) is the distance from node u to v on graph gta. In the definition of the
expected number of link failures :
• dtout(v) represents the link failures of outgoing links brought by the attack of
node v on graph gta.
• dta(v)−dtin(v)−dtout(v)
2
is the number of link failures caused by the attack of node v
on the edges with endpoints from the same level ltv on graph G
t
a. Here we divide
it by 2 because we attribute half to each endpoint for each failed link.
• wtv represents the links failures caused by the second kind of node failures, which
can be calculated according to Algorithm 5.4.
• f tu
dtin(u)
is the expected link failures brought by node u which is from level ltv + 1
whose shortest paths from the current attack nodes pass through node v.
• (1− p)ltv is the probability that the attack continues at level ltv.
In REALW IRE, we use the total expected number of link failures,
Ft+1(st, at) =
∑
v∈Vta\Ft
(1− p)ltv(dtout(v) + wtv +
dta(v)− dtin(v)− dtout(v)
2
) (5.7)
to replace Vt+1(St+1(St, at)) in the equation (5.4), and the number of link failures
brought by the current attack,
ft(st, at) =
∑
v∈Ct
(dtout(v) + w
t
v + 1/2
∑
v∈Ct
(dta(v)− dtout(v)) (5.8)
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to replace f(st, at(nt)). Thus, equation (5.4) becomes
Ft(st) = min
at
ft(st, at) + Ft+1(st, at)
= min
at
∑
v∈Vta\Ft−1
(1− p)ltv(dtout(v) + wtv +
dta(v)− dtin(v)− dtout(v)
2
)
(5.9)
REALW IRE can be divided into four steps:
1. At each time slot t, we build the graph gta(V˜ ta, E˜ ta) by using Algorithm 5.1. Figure
5.2 provides an example of how the algorithm works. Figure 5.2.a shows the
network at time 0, while there is only one attacked node in network A. Then,
the result of gta(V˜ ta, E˜ ta) can be found in Figure 5.2.b.
2. We calculate the expected number of link failures for any node v ∈ V˜ ta according
to Equation 5.6. Figure 5.2.c shows the calculations of the expected number of
link failures for the example.
3. For each edge (u, v) ∈ E˜ ta, we assign a score wu,v = f
t
v
dtin(v)
. The result of link
scores for the example is presented in Figure 5.2.d.
4. Pick the top n links with the highest scores. For each one of those links (u, v),
reattach node v to another node on gta on the highest level with a probability
proportional to its degree according to Algorithm 5.2. Finally, the network after
rewiring is in Figure 5.2.e.
The pseudo code can be found in Algorithm 5.3. Higher the score an edge has,
more shortest paths will be affected by removing the edge. Thus, in Algorithm
5.3, by choosing the link with the highest score to remove, REALW IRE aims at
increasing the distances between the current attacked nodes and unattacked nodes.
Then, we reattach the node to the lowest level in gta so that the levels, l
t
v, for the
nodes whose shortest paths will be impacted by the edge can be increased the most.
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AB
(a) In this example, assume
at current time slot, in each
subnetwork, there is only
one attacked node, which
is marked by red diamond.
The dash lines between two
layers are bidirectional de-
pendency links.
A
B
1
1
2
2
3
3 4
(b) In the first step, we run
a breadth-first search from
the current attacked node
in subnetwork A. The num-
ber around each healthy
node in subnetwork A rep-
resents the distance from
current attack.
A
B
8.79
4.27
4.52
2.93
1.10
1.44 0.48
u
v
(c) Calculate the expected
number of link failures for
each healthy node in sub-
network A according to
(5.6). For example, with
assumption of p = 0.3, for
node v, we have f tv = 0.7
4×
2 = 0.48. Then, we have
f tu = f
t
v/2 + 0.7
3 × 2.5 =
1.10.
A
B
8.79
4.27
4.521.47
1.10
0.72
0.24u
v
1.47
0.72
0.24
(d) We assign the expected
number of link failures of
each node equally to the in-
coming links of these nodes.
A
B
(e) Finally, we choose links
with highest scores to cut
and reattach the endpoints
to the nodes with the
largest level number. In
this example, assume we
only can reattach one link.
The link with score 8.79 is
cut and the link in blue is
added.
Figure 5.2: An example of our algorithm.
99
Thus, according to equation (5.9), our algorithm aims to minimize Ft(st) in a greedy
manner.
5.2.3 Complexity Analysis
Lemma 5.1. The complexity of our algorithm is O(T |Va||D|+ T |Ea|).
Proof. At each time slot, the complexity comes from three parts:
1. Calculating wtv for each node v, which contributes a complexity O(|Va||D|).
2. Finding the BFS subnetwork, which has a complexity
O(|Va|+ |Ea|).
3. Selecting the top nt links with highest scores. This step has a complexity
O(|Ea| log nt).
Since nt is upper bounded by a constant, the complexity becomes O(|Va||D| + |Ea|).
Assume T is the duration of the attack, then the complexity of the algorithm is
O(T |Va||D|+ T |Ea|).
Figure 5.3 plots the wall-clock time vs network size for the BA-BA networks with
attack duration T = 4. From Figure 5.3, we can see the complexity has a near linear
trend.
5.3 Performance Evaluation
5.3.1 Performance Measures
We use the following performance metrics to measure the performance:
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Figure 5.3: The wall-clock time vs network size for BA networks when attack time
duration is 4.
Algorithm 5.1: BFS subnetwork
Input : Graph Gta(V ta, E ta), current attack Ct, Ft−1,
Output: gta(V˜ ta, E˜ ta), level ltv, ∀v ∈ V ta
ltv ← 0, ∀v ∈ Ct;
Current← Ct, T otal← Ct;
Let gta be a null graph;
Add nodes V ta \ Ft−1 to graph gta;
while Current 6= ∅ do
Next← ∅;
for v ∈ Current do
for u in neighbors of v on Gta do
if u 6∈ Total and gta has node u then
Add directed link v → u to graph gta;
Add u to the set Next;
ltu ← ltv + 1;
Current← Next;
Total← Total ∪ Current;
101
Algorithm 5.2: Probabilistic Reattach
Input : Node v, graph gta(V˜ ta, E˜ ta), Gta(V ta,V ta), Gtb(V tb,V tb), ltu ∀u ∈ V˜ ta.
Output: Gta(V ta, E ta).
ReattachSet← {u|u ∈ V˜ ta, ltu = maxu∈V˜ta ltu} \ {u|(u, v) ∈ E ta};
d←∑u∈ReattachSet dta(u) + ∑
w∈Vtb ,
where u∈Rtw
db(w)
||Rtw|| ;
Randomly pick a node u from ReattachSet with probability
(dta(u) +
∑
w∈Vtb ,
where u∈Rtw
db(w)
||Rtw||)/d and add an edge between v and u;
Algorithm 5.3: REALW IRE
Input : Graph Gta(V ta, E ta), Gtb(V tb, E tb), current attack Ct, number of rewired
links n, stopping probability p.
Output: Gta(V ta, E ta).
Construct graph gta(V˜ ta, E˜ ta) by using Algorithm 5.1;
Calculate f tv ∀v ∈ V˜ ta according to Equation (5.6);
wu,v ← f tv/dtin(v) for ∀(u, v) ∈ gta;
W ← the n edges with highest wu,v;
i← 1;
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n do
Remove edge (u, v) on Gta with (u, v) = W [i];
Reattach node v by using Algorithm 5.2;
Algorithm 5.4: Calculate wtv
Input : Graph Gta(V ta, E ta), current attack Ct, attacked nodes Ft, node v, the
set V isitedEdges, the score dictionary D
Output: A score
if v ∈ V ta then Dv ← dta(v);
else Dv ← db(v);
for (v, w) ∈ D do
if (v, w) 6∈ V isitedEdges and (w, v) 6∈ V isitedEdges;
then
V isitedEdges.add((v, w));
if D does not contain Dw then
Calculate Dw using Algorithm 5.4 based current V isitedEdges and
D;
Dv ← Dv + Dw||{(u,w)|∀(u,w)∈D}|| ;
Return Dv;
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1. Largest connected component fraction: The size of the largest connected com-
ponent of graph Ga (Gb) after removing all failed nodes divided by the original
size of the graph.
2. Natural connectivity: It is defined in Jun et al. (2010) as
λ¯ = ln(
1
N
N∑
i=1
eλi), (5.10)
where λi is the i
th largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of a graph. It
can be used to measure the number of closed walks on the graph. Since in the
interdependent networks, there are two networks Ga and Gb, after removing the
failed nodes, we calculate the natural connectivity for each network and add
them together.
3. Spectral radius: The spectral radius is defined as the largest absolution value
of the eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix.
4. Spectral gap: The spectral gap of a graph is the difference between the largest
and the second largest eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix. The spectral gap
is closely related to the expansion properties of the graph. It has been used as
a robustness metric in Malliaros et al. (2012).
5.3.2 Optimality on the Small Networks
For a small size network, we can calculate the optimal solution for the MDP prob-
lem defined in Problem 1. In this experiment, we used the Florentine families graph,
which only contains 15 nodes. Since there are two networks, A and B, involved in the
interdependent network model, we used the Florentine families graph to represent A
(B) and randomly assign the name 0, 1, . . . , 14 to each node. Then, the functioning
of one node in B depends on the node with the same name in A. Then, we let the
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Figure 5.4: Florentine families network.
attack start from each node in the network A and propagate for 2 time slots. The
result is listed in Figure 5.4. The bars of the optimal solution are generated based
on the maximum objective value defined in (5.5) over all possible rewiring traces.
For the other algorithms, we run 500 times for each source and take the average.
Based on Figure 5.4, we can see that the value of the MDP objective generated by
our algorithm is close to the optimal solution.
To calculate the optimal solution of the MDP problem, we need to consider every
possible rewiring of the networks, which means as the increase of the propagation time
, T , the computation time grows exponentially. For example, the average number of
possible rewiring combinations over all possible attack sources is 312 when T = 1,
103342 when T = 2, and 13718030 when T = 3.The average of the wall-clock time or
the number of possible rewirings versus attack duration is shown in Figure 5.5. From
Figure 5.5, we can see the computation time grows exponentially as the increase of T,
which makes the calculation of the optimal solution for large networks unpractical.
5.3.3 General Networks
We tested our algorithm on the following networks:
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Figure 5.5: The complexity of the optimal algorithm on the Florentine families net-
work.
1. BA network: The network is generated by using the Barabasi-Albert preferential
attachment model, in which the number of edges to attach from a new node to
the existing nodes is 3.
2. Air traffic network: The network is built based on one year (2016) of interval
USA air traffic data 1 composed of 1243 airports connected by 16106 links.
3. IAS network: The IAS network is based on the Internet Autonomous Systems
peering information inferred from oregon route-views Leskovec et al. (2005).
The network contains 6474 nodes and 13895 edges 2 .
4. Power grid network:This network is used to represent the topology of the West-
ern States Power Grid of the United States, which contains 4941 nodes and
6594 edges Watts and Strogatz (1998).
From each of the network mentioned above, we built the following interdependent
1https://www.transtats.bts.gov/TRAFFIC/
2http://snap.stanford.edu/data/as.htmls
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networks.
• The BA-BA network: Both the first layer and second layer are BA networks with
2000 nodes generated randomly. We generated a one-to-one mapping between
nodes from both layers as the dependency links.
• The IAS-PG network: For each node v in the IAS network or the power grid
network, we uniformly picked an integer number d from 0 to 2 and randomly
chose d nodes from the other layer as the supporting nodes of node v.
• The IAS-Air network: Since the communication network can impact the air
traffic network and not the other way around, we generated a single direction
interdependent network in this case. For each node v in the air traffic network,
we randomly picked 0 ∼ 2 nodes from the other layer as the supporting node
of node v.
We compared our algorithm with the following two heuristics:
• Single step rewiring: Instead of rewiring during the attack, it rewires the links
before the attack. This algorithm aims to balance the degree of two endpoints
connected by each edge.
– For each link (u, v) on Ga, we define the degree difference to be |da(u) −
da(v)|. We rank all the links according to their degree differences.
– We pick the top n links with largest degree differences and remove those
links.
– For each removed link, we rewire the endpoint with the smaller degree to
another node in the network with a small degree.
• Degree rewiring: This algorithm consists of the following steps:
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REALW IRE Degree rewiring Single step rewiring
BA-BA 126.81 130.34 299.55
IAS-PG 131.68 126.10 694.75
IAS-Air 134.78 119.63 694.74
Table 5.1: The average number of rewired links.
– At each time slot t, we only rank all the links that connect attacked nodes
and unattacked nodes and rank them according to a score based on the
degree of their unattacked endpoints. For example, assume there is an
edge (u, v) ∈ Gta, while u ∈ Ft and v ∈ V ta \ Ft. Then the score of edge
(u, v) is dta(v) +
∑
w∈Vb,
while v∈Rw
db(w)
|Rw| , where db(w) is the degree of node w on
Gb, and d
t
a(v) is the degree of node v on the subgraph of G
t
a with node set
V ta \ Ft−1.
– We pick nt links with highest scores to remove and then reattach the
unattacked endpoint of each link to another unattacked with a higher score.
Here nt is defined in Equation (5.2).
We evaluated our algorithm on a more general SI model, where at each time slot
each attacked node in network A can attack its unattacked neighbors with certain
probability pa. In the experiments for the BA-BA network, pa = 1, while for the
IAS-Air network and the IAS-PG network, pa = 0.7. The attack stops after a certain
fraction of nodes gets attacked. For the number of rewired links at each time slot,
we set r = 0.5 and z = 20 in Equation (5.2). For the single step rewiring algorithm,
we chose to rewire 5% of the total number of links on network A. Table 5.1 shows
the average number rewired links where for REALW IRE and degree rewiring, the
numbers were calculated when the attack fraction is 0.9. From Table 5.1, the number
107
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Attack fraction
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
La
rg
e
st
 c
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t 
fr
a
ct
io
n
No rewiring
Single step rewiring
Degree rewiring
REALWIRE
(a) Largest component fraction
of network A.
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Attack fraction
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
La
rg
e
st
 c
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t 
fr
a
ct
io
n
(b) Largest component fraction
of network B.
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Attack fraction
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
N
a
tu
ra
l 
C
o
n
n
e
ct
iv
it
y
(c) Natural connectivity of
network A.
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Attack fraction
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
N
a
tu
ra
l 
C
o
n
n
e
ct
iv
it
y
(d) Natural connectivity of
network B.
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Attack fraction
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
S
p
e
ct
ra
l 
G
a
p
(e) Spectral gap of network A.
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Attack fraction
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
S
p
e
ct
ra
l 
G
a
p
(f) Spectral gap of network B.
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Attack fraction
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
S
p
e
ct
ra
l 
R
a
d
iu
s
(g) Spectral radius of network
A.
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Attack fraction
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
S
p
e
ct
ra
l 
R
a
d
iu
s
(h) Spectral radius of network
B.
Figure 5.6: The BA-BA network.
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Figure 5.7: The IAS-Air network.
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Figure 5.8: The IAS-PG network.
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Figure 5.9: The IAS-Air network with backup links.
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of rewired links resulted by REALW IRE is close to the number of rewired links
from the degree rewiring, which is much smaller than the number of links rewired
by the single step rewiring algorithm. From Figure 5.3, we can see that the wall-
clock time is almost linear to the size of the network. From Figure 5.6,5.7,5.8, we
can see that in terms of the largest connected component fraction, our algorithm
performs the best. For example, in the IAS-Air network, when the attack fraction
is 0.3, the largest connected component fraction under REALW IRE is 0.39, which
is much higher than that under the degree rewiring, 0.28. In the BA-BA network,
our algorithm outperforms others in terms on network B, while in network A, as
the attack fraction increases, our algorithm starts to perform better than the degree
heuristic. In the IAS-Air network, our algorithm outperforms the others for most
metrics. In the IAS-PG network, the performance of our algorithm and the degree
heuristic is close.
In reality, there exist circumstances, in which we cannot add a link between any
two nodes in the network. This means we may not be able to rewire the links according
to our algorithm. Thus, we considered another scenario, in which we assume each
node has some backup links we can activate during the attack. In this experiment, for
each node we randomly generated a number of backup links equal to 20% multiplying
by its degree. So during the attack, for each link we cut, we can activate a backup
link of one of its endpoints. The other parameters are the same as the rewiring case.
From Figure 5.9, we can see our algorithm still outperforms the others.
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we studied the problem of improving robustness of interdependent
networks against the localized attack. We proposed a novel algorithm, named REAL
W IRE, to improve the robustness of the interdependent networks and to limit the
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impact of the attack by rewiring the links of the networks in real-time. We formu-
lated the problem as an MDP problem, which has been proved to be NP-hard, and
then proposed a greedy algorithm. The simulation results showed the performance
of REALW IRE is close to the exact solution of the MDP problem in a small net-
work and REALW IRE outperforms the others in different networks when the attack
fraction is high.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, we covered three problems related to information diffusion pro-
cesses on networks: information source detection, diffusion history reconstruction,
and network robustification with real-time rewiring.
In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, we studied the information source detection prob-
lem. In Chapter 2, we investigated the information source detection problem with a
complete snapshot under SIR model. We presented an algorithm, named clustering
and localization, for tree networks. We proved that for a regular tree, the distance
between any estimator and its closest real source is bounded by a constant with a
high probability under some conditions. Then we extended our algorithm to general
networks. In Chapter 3, we considered the information source detection problem un-
der a more general setting, including a partial observation instead of the complete
snapshot and the heterogeneous SIR model instead of the homogeneous one. We
proposed a novel algorithm, named Optimal-Jordan-Cover (OJC), for locating mul-
tiple sources and showed theoretical guarantees on the detection rate for non-tree
networks. Furthermore, we developed a heuristic based on the K−means, called
Approximate-Jordan-Cover (AJC), to reduce the complexity of OJC.
In Chapter 4, we studied the problem of reconstructing the history of a diffusion
process. Under SI model as the diffusion model and a partial snapshot as observation,
we formulated the diffusion history reconstruction problem as a maximum a posteriori
(MAP) estimate problem, and showed its NP-hardness. We proposed a greedy and
step-by-step reconstruction algorithm to reconstruct the most likely network state
at time slot based on the network state at time slot while guaranteeing the state
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is consistent with the partial observation, and further developed a greedy algorithm
for a single-step construction. We proved that the diffusion history obtained by the
step-by-step reconstruction algorithm is always consistent with the observation.
In Chapter 5, we considered the problem of improving the robustness of an in-
terdependent network under a localized attack. We formulated the interdependent
network link rewiring problem as a Markov decision process (MDP) problem, which
is NP-hard. Then, we proposed a greedy algorithm to rewire the links during the
attack.
For each algorithm we proposed, an extensive amount of experiments on both syn-
thetic networks and real-world networks have been done, which shows our algorithms
outperform other algorithms.
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(a) Time t = 0. (b) Time t = 1. (c) Time t = 2.
Figure A.1: An example of one-time-slot branching process starting from node 1. For
simplicity, we assume the time when node 1 gets infected is 0. From Figure A.1b, at
t = 1, the current level is 0 and there are two nodes, 2 and 4, from level 1 infected
by node 1 from level 0. Figure A.1c shows that at t = 2, node 5 from next level 2 is
infected by node 2 from the current level 1. Therefore, at each time slot, there is at
least one node infected at level, l + 1,by infected node from level l.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2.1
Consider a (g+1)-regular tree G(V , E) with S different information sources, named
ζ1, ζ2, ..., ζS. These S original sources and the paths between each pair form a tree,
named Gs = (VGs , EGs). Define event A =
S⋂
i=1
Aζi , where Aζi(i = 1, ..., S) is the event
that includes the following cases:
• Case 1: At least (S+1) one-time-slot branching processes from source ζi survive
after time t0, where these (S + 1) one-time-slot branching processes do not
overlap.
• Case 2: The infection spreading tree starting from ζi terminates at or before
time t0. We describe this as the infection process from source ζi dies out at time
t0 on tree G.
We remark that t0 is a constant. The one-time-slot branching process is defined to be
the process that starting from an infected node, at each time slot, at least one node
at the the next level, l+ 1, gets infected by an infected node from the current level l.
The level of a node is defined to be the distance between that node and the starting
node of the process, while the current level is defined to be the largest level among
all infected nodes associated with the starting node of the one-time-slot branching
process at the beginning of the current time slot. In Figure A.1, an example is used
to explain the definition of the one-time-slot branching process.
Then, we define a node set
Vα = {α| α ∈ VGs and min
i=1,...,S
d(α, ζi) 6 C1},
in which each node is the on tree Gs and within C1 (C1 > 0 and C1 ∈ N) distance
from at least one source, and Vβ = VGs\Vα, in which each node is on the tree Gs
and in a distance larger than C1 from any source. Define set VS = {ζ1, ζ2, ..., ζS} to
be the set of original sources and we have VS ⊂ Vα. After that, define m = |Vα|
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(a) G. (b) Gs. (c) T1.
Figure A.2: An example of tree G, tree Gs and tree T1. In this example, the original
tree is the tree in Figure A.2a. Assume the original sources are ζ1 = 4 and ζ2 = 5.
Then tree Gs formed by the orginal sources and paths between each pair of them is
shown in Figure A.2b. And Tree T1, which starts from root 1 without edges on Gs,
is shown in Figure A.2c.
and n = |Vβ|. Without loss of generality, we assume Vα = {α1, α2, ..., αm} and define
Vβ = {β1, β2, ..., βn}.
Define Ta to be a subtree on G, which starts from root a without edges on Gs. To
better understand the definition of tree Gs and Ta, an example is provided in Figure
A.2. We further define Aa to be the event that on the tree Ta there are at least (S+1)
one-time-slot branching processes survived after time t0 or all infection processes die
out at time t0. Then we have
P (A)
= P (
S⋂
i=1
Aζi)
≥ P (Aα1 ...AαmAβ1 ...Aβn)
=
∑
tI ,tR
P (Aα1 ...AαmAβ1 ...Aβn|tI , tR)P (tI , tR)
>
∑
(tI ,tR)∈M1
P (Aα1 ...AαmAβ1 ...Aβn|tI , tR)P (tI , tR),
(A.1)
where
tI = (tIα1 , ..., t
I
αm , t
I
β1
, ..., tIβn),
tR = (tRα1 , ..., t
R
αm , t
R
β1
, ..., tRβn)
and M1 = {(tI , tR)| ∀a ∈ VGs , tIa ≤ C1 or tIa =∞}. Define event
A˜ =
⋂
a∈VGs
Aa
⋂
{(tI , tR) ∈M1},
which is the event of A restricted to M1.
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Lemma A.1. For any  > 0, there exist some constants C1 and t0 such that P (A˜) >
1− , if the distance between any two sources is larger than 2C1.
Proof. According to the definition of A˜, we have
P (A˜) =
∑
(tI ,tR)∈M1
P (Aα1 ...AαmAβ1 ...Aβn|tI , tR)P (tI , tR). (A.2)
To obtain a lower bound on P (A˜), we need to analyze P (Aα1 ...AαmAβ1 ...Aβn|tI , tR)
when (tI , tR) ∈M1 and P ((tI , tR) ∈M1) separately.
For P ((tI , tR) ∈M1), we have
P ((tI , tR) ∈M1) = 1− P ((tI , tR) ∈M c1), (A.3)
where M c1 is the complementary set of M1. Define event C = {(tI , tR)| ∃β ∈ Vβ, tIβ >
0 and tIβ 6= ∞}. Since the probability of event M is difficult to analyze directly, we
define M1 = M c1 ∩ C and M2 = M c1 ∩ Cc, i.e.,
P (M c1) = P (M1) + P (M2) (A.4)
Before discussing P (M c1), we analyze when the infection process on a path is going
to stop. From Figure A.3, we know that during each time slot the infection process
on a path stops only when the recently infected node is recovered before the node
next to it becomes infected. The probability for this event to happen is p(1 − q).
Use (ζj → a) to represent the event that node a is associated with ζj and a{t=k,ζj} to
represent the event that infection process from source ζj to a does not stop at time
slot k. Define ps = 1− p(1− q) and we have
P (tIa > C1 and t
I
a 6=∞|ζj → a)
≤ P (a{t=1,ζj} ∩ a{t=2,ζj} ∩ · · · ∩ a{t=C1,ζj}|ζj → a)
= P (a{t=1,ζj}|ζj → a)P (a{t=2,ζj}|a{t=1,ζj}, ζj → a) . . .
P (a{t=C1,ζj}|a{t=C1−1,ζj}, ζj → a)
= (ps)
C1 .
(A.5)
Therefore, we have
P (tIa > C1 and t
I
a 6=∞)
=
S∑
i=1
P (tIa > C1 and t
I
a 6=∞|ζi → a)P (ζi → a)
≤
S∑
i=1
(ps)
C1P (ζi → a)
≤ (ps)C1 . (A.6)
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Figure A.3: The situation of the stop of infection process.
Next, we analyze P (M1). Define set
Vb = {b|b ∈ Vβ and ∃j, s.t. d(ζj, b) = C1 + 1},
and for any β ∈ Vβ, since d(β, ζi) > C1 for any i = 1, ..., S, we have tIβ > C1 as long
as tIβ 6=∞. Thus, C ⊂M c1 , and we have
P (M1) = P (M c1 ∩ C)
= P (C)
(a)
= P (
⋃
b∈Vb
{tIb > C1 and tIb 6=∞})
≤
∑
b∈Vb
P (tIb > C1 and t
I
b 6=∞)
≤ |Vb|(ps)C1
≤ S(S − 1)(ps)C1 ,
(A.7)
where (a) holds because β ∈ Vβ infected by the information from source ζi along the
path that contains node b and satisfies d(b, ζi) = C1 + 1.
For P (M2), we have
P (M2) = P (M c1 ∩ Cc)
< P ({(tI , tR)|∃α ∈ Vα, tIα > C1 and tIα 6=∞})
= P (
⋃
α∈Vα
{tIα > C1 and tIα 6=∞})
≤
∑
α∈Vα
P (tIα > C1 and t
I
α 6=∞)
(a)
<
∑
α∈Vα
(ps)
C1
= m(ps)
C1 ,
(A.8)
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where (a) comes from (A.6). Based on inequalities (A.7) and (A.8), we conclude
P ((tI , tR) ∈M1)
= 1− P ((tI , tR) ∈M c1)
= 1− P (M1)− P (M2)
> 1−m(ps)C1 − S(S − 1)(ps)C1
(a)
> 1− S(S − 1)C1(ps)C1 − S(S − 1)(ps)C1
= 1− S(S − 1)(C1 + 1)(ps)C1 .
(A.9)
where (a) holds because of m ≤ S(S − 1)C1. Then we can choose a constant C1 such
that for any 1 > 0,
P ((tI , tR) ∈M1) > 1− 1. (A.10)
Now, we need to discuss P (Aα1 ...AαmAβ1 ...Aβn|tI , tR) when (tI , tR) ∈ M1. In this
case, we have
P (Aα1 ...AαmAβ1 ...Aβn|tI , tR)
=
∏
α∈Vα
P (Aα|tIα, tRα )
∏
β∈Vβ
P (Aβ|tIβ, tRβ ).
(A.11)
According to the definition of Vβ, we have for any β ∈ Vβ and 1 ≤ i ≤ S, d(β, ζi) > C1,
which implies that for any (tI , tR) ∈ M1 and any β ∈ Vβ, we have tIβ = ∞. So
P (Aβ|tIβ, tRβ ) = 1.
For P (Aα|tIα, tRα ) when α ∈ Vα, we define u1, ..., uk to be the child nodes of root α
on the tree Tα when α ∈ Vα and Aui (i = 1, ..., k) to be the event that on the tree
T−αui (T
−α
ui
is a subtree of Tα rooted at ui but without the branch from α), there are at
least (S + 1) one-time-slot branching processes survived after time t0 or all infection
processes die out before or at time t0. On a (g+ 1)-regular tree, we have k 6 g. Then
we have
P (Aα|tIα, tRα ) > P (Au1 ...Auk |tIα, tRα )
=
∑
tIu
P (Au1 ...Auk |tIu, tIα, tRa )P (tIu|tIα, tRα )
>
∑
tIu∈M2
P (Au1 ...Auk |tIu)P (tIu|tIα, tRα ),
(A.12)
where tIu = {tIu1 , ..., tIuk} and M2 = {~tIu| for i = 1, ..., k, tIui − tIα ≤ C2, or tIui = ∞},
and C2 ∈ N is a constant.
To compute P (tIu ∈M2|tIα, tRα ), we consider the following three cases:
1. When tIα = ∞, we have tIui = ∞ for i = 1, ..., k, which means P (tIu ∈
M2|tIα, tRα ) = 1.
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2. When tRα − tIα ≤ C2 and tIα 6= ∞, we always have tIui − tIα ≤ C2 or tIui = ∞ for
i = 1, .., k, which means tIu ∈M2. Thus, we have P (tIu ∈M2|tIα, tRα ) = 1.
3. When tRα − tIα > C2 and tIα 6=∞, we have
P (tIu ∈M2|tIα, tRα )
=
k∏
i=1
P (tIui − tIα ≤ C2 or tIui =∞|tIα, tRα )
=
k∏
i=1
(
C2+tIα∑
tIui=1+t
I
α
q(1− q)tIui−tIα−1 + (1− q)tRα−tIα)
=
k∏
i=1
(1− (1− q)C2 + (1− q)tRα−tIα)
>
k∏
i=1
(1− (1− q)C2)
= (1− (1− q)C2)k.
(A.13)
In summary, we always have
P (tIu ∈M2|tIα, tRα ) > (1− (1− q)C2)k. (A.14)
We also have
P (Au1 ...Auk |tIu, tIα, tRα ) =
k∏
i=1
P (Aui |tIui)
(a)
> (1− 2)k, (A.15)
where (a) can be proved by following the proof of Lemma 6 in Zhu and Ying (2013).
By substituting (A.14) and (A.15) into (A.12), we have
P (Aα|tIα, tRα )
>
∑
tIu∈M2
P (Au1 ...Auk |tIu, tIα, tRα )P (tIu|tIα, tRα )
> (1− 2)k(1− (1− q)C2)k.
(A.16)
Since k ≤ g, we can choose a constant C2 such that for any 3 > 0, (1− (1− q)C2)k >
1− 3. Then we have
P (Aα|tIα, tRα ) > (1− 2)k(1− 3),
and
P (Aα1 ...AαmAβ1 ...Aβn|tI , tR) >
∏
α∈Vα
(1− 2)k(1− 3)
= ((1− 2)k(1− 3))m.
(A.17)
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(a) e and f are infected by two
sources.
(b) e and f are infected by the same
source.
Figure A.4: Different cases of distances between two infected nodes. In Figure A.4a,
we consider the infection process of two sources, ζi and ζj. Assume bi and bj are
the nodes on path (ζi, ζj) that satisfy d(bi, ζi) = C1 and d(bj, ζj) = C1. Under event
A˜, on path (ζi, ζj) only nodes on (ζi, bi) and (ζj, bj) can be infected. If e and f are
endpoints of survived one-time-slot branching processes, we have d(ζi, e) ≥ t − t0
and d(ζj, f) ≥ t − t0. Therefore, d(e, f) ≥ d(ζi, ζj) − d(ζi, bi) − d(ζj, bj) + d(ζi, e) −
d(ζi, bi) + d(ζj, f) − d(ζj, bj), which means d(e, f) ≥ d(ζi, ζj) + 2(t − t0) − 4C1. In
Figure A.4b, we consider the situation that e and f are infected by the same source,
ζi. If e and f are endpoints of survived one-time-slot branching process, we have
d(e, f) = d(ζi, e) + d(ζi, f) − 2d(ζi, g). Since the survived one-time-slot branching
processes do not overlap after t0, we have d(ζi, g) ≤ t0. Therefore, we have d(e, f) ≥
2(t− t0)− 2t0 = 2t− 4t0
Substituting (A.17) and (A.10) into (A.1), we have
P (A) > P (A˜)
=
∑
tI ,tR∈M1
P (Aα1 ...AαmAβ1 ...Aβn|tI , tR)P (tI , tR)
> ((1− 2)k(1− 3))m(1− 1)
> 1− .
(A.18)
Assuming that the time when the snapshot is taken, t, satisfies t t0 and t di,j
for any i, j = 1, ..., S, where di,j is defined to be d(ζi, ζj), and d > 3St0 + 4SC1, where
d = min
1≤i,j≤S
di,j. We need to prove that the distance between each estimator and its
closest original source is bounded by some constants under event A˜. We say a source
ζi has infected nodes if there are some infected nodes associated with ζi when the
snapshot was taken. Since in the following proof, we will use the distance between
two infected nodes in the graph frequently, here in Figure A.4, we discuss some cases
of distances between two infected nodes commonly used later.
We divide event A˜ into three subevents:
1. Infection processes from all original sources die out at time t0.
There are two cases under this condition:
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• The number of infected nodes is less than or equal to S. All those infected
nodes will be treated as our estimators according to Algorithm 2.1. Be-
cause there is no node getting infected after time t0, each of these nodes
is within the distance of t0 from the source that infects it. Therefore, the
distance between each estimator and its closest source is bounded by t0,
which is a constant.
• The number of infected nodes is greater than S.
Claim A.1. After step 2, the set B contains infected nodes associated with
all sources who have infected nodes when the snapshot is taken.
Proof of Claim A.1: Assume set B does not contain any infected node
associated with some source ζk that has infected nodes observed in the
snapshot, which means B contains at least two nodes associated with same
source. Assume a, b ∈ B are associated with source ζj and c /∈ B to be an
infected node associated with ζk.
Then we have d(a, b) ≤ 2t0. For any e ∈ B, we have
d(e, c) ≥ d− 2C1
> 3St0 + 4SC1 − 2C1
> 2t0
> d(a, b),
(A.19)
which contradicts the step 2 in Algorithm 2.1.
Claim A.2. After step 3, in each set V(i)I (i = 1, ..., S), the nodes are
infected by the same source.
Proof of Claim A.2: Without loss of generality, we assume B = {e1, ..., eS}
and ei ∈ V(i)I . Assume node a in set V(i)I is associated with a source which
is different from the source that ei is associated with. Then we have
d(a, ei)
(a)
≥ d− 2C1
> 3St0 + (4S − 2)C1,
(A.20)
where (a) is true because of the definition of event A˜ and set M1. According
to Claim A.1, set B contains nodes associated with the sources that have
infected nodes associated with them in the snapshot. Therefore, we can
assume in another set V(j)I , node ej is associated with the same source as
node a. Then we have d(ej, a) < 2t0. Therefore, we have d(ej, a) < d(ei, a),
which is in contradiction with step 3. Thus, Claim A.2 holds.
According to Claim A.2, in each set V(i)I , all the nodes are infected by the
same source. Therefore, the maximum infection radius rmax after step 4
should satisfy that rmax ≤ t0. Assume γi to be the estimator generated
by V(i)I that contains ei and ζi to be the actual source who infected the
nodes in V(i)I . Then we have d(γi, ei) = rmax and d(ei, ζi) ≤ t0. Therefore,
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d(γi, ζi) ≤ 2t0, which means the distance between each estimator and its
closest source is bounded by 2t0, which is a constant.
2. There are at least two sources surviving (S+1) one-time-slot branching processes
after time t0.
Assume the number of sources who survive at least (S+1) one-time-slot branch-
ing processes is n0. And we have n0 ≥ 2. We will then prove the following
conclusions:
(a) e1, e2, ..., en0 are infected by different sources that survive at least (S+ 1)
one-time-slot branching processes after t0.
(b) For any i ≥ 2,
d(ei, ζˆi) ≥ t− it0 − 4(i− 1)C1, (A.21)
and when i = 1,
d(e1, ζˆ1) ≥ t− 2t0 − 4C1, (A.22)
where ζˆi represents the source that ei is associated with.
(c) For any 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n0, we have
d(ei, ej) > 2t. (A.23)
Proof of the conclusions:
• e1, e2(i = 1, 2): Assume η1 and η2 are two leaf-nodes of one-time-slot
processes associated with two different sources. Since for any a, b ∈ VI ,
d(e1, e2) ≥ d(a, b), we have
d(e1, e2) ≥ d(η1, η2)
(a)
≥ d+ 2(t− t0)− 4C1 > 2t,
where (a) is true because of Figure A.4a. Thus, e1 and e2 have to be
infected by two different sources. Without loss of generality, we assume ζ1
and ζ2 are the two sources who infect e1 and e2. Then we have
d(e1, ζ1) + d1,2 + d(e2, ζ2) ≥ d(e1, e2)
≥ d1,2 + 2(t− t0)− 4C1, (A.24)
where di,j = d(ζi, ζj) for any i, j = 1, ..., S and because d(e1, ζ1) ≤ t and
d(e2, ζ2) ≤ t, we have d(e1, ζ1) ≥ t−2t0−4C1 and d(e2, ζ2) ≥ t−2t0−4C1.
Because t t0 and t C1, we may consider d(e1, ζ1) > t0 and d(e2, ζ2) >
t0, which implies ζ1 and ζ2 must be two surviving sources. Therefore, e1
and e2 satisfy these three conclusions.
• ek(2 ≤ k ≤ n0 − 1): Assume that ek satisfies the three conclusions, which
means that ek is infected by another source ζk, who survives at least (S+1)
one-time-slot branching processes at time t0, d(ei, ζk) ≥ t−kt0−4(k−1)C1,
and for any 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k, d(ei, ej) > 2t.
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• ek+1: If ek+1 is infected by ζ1, ..., ζk or any source that dies out at time
t0, we have
k
min
i=1
d(ei, ek+1) ≤ 2t. If ek+1 is infected by another source ζk+1,
who survives at least (S + 1) one-time-slot branching processes at time
t0, assume ηk+1 is the leaf-node of one survived one-time-slot branching
process infected by ζk+1 and we have
d(ηk+1, e1) ≥ (t− 2t0 − 4C1) + d1,k+1 + t− t0 − 4C1
(a)
> 2t,
(A.25)
where (a) holds according to d1,k+1 ≥ d > 3St0 + 4SC1, and
d(ηk+1, ei) ≥ (t− it0 − 4(i− 1)C1)
+di,k+1 + t− t0 − 4C1
> 2t,
(A.26)
for i = 2, ..., k. Thus, we have
d(ek+1, ei) ≥
k
min
i=1
d(ηk, ei)
> 2t.
(A.27)
Therefore, we know that when ek+1 is infected by ζk+1, we have
k
min
i=1
d(ek+1, ei) > 2t.
Then, ek+1 has to be infected by another source who survives at least (S+1)
one-time-slot branching processes at time t0 according to Algorithm 2.1.
Assuming j = arg min
i∈{1,...,k}
d(ηk+1, ei), we have
d(ek+1, ζk+1) + dj,k+1 + d(ej, ζj)
≥ d(ek+1, ej)
≥ d(ηk+1, ej)
≥ d(ej, ζj) + dj,k+1 + t− t0 − 4C1
≥ t− kt0 − 4(k − 1)C1 + dj,k+1 − 4C1 + t− t0
= 2t− (k + 1)t0 − 4kC1 + dj,k+1.
(A.28)
Because d(ej, ζj) ≤ t, we have d(ek+1, ζk+1) ≥ t−(k+1)0−4kC1. Therefore,
ek+1 satisfies the three conclusions mentioned before.
Then we complete the proof the conclusions.
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Since e1, . . . , en0 are infected by different sources who survive at least (S + 1)
one-time-slot branching processes, we can assume ei(i = 1, ..., n0) is infected by
ζi, while ζi survives at least (S+1) one-time-slot branching processes after time
t0. According to inequalities (A.21), (A.22) and (A.23), we have
d(ei, ζi) ≥ t− n0t0 − 4(n0 − 1)C1 (A.29)
and for any 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n0, d(ei, ej) > 2t.
Define ζˆi to be the source whom ei (i = n0 + 1, ..., S) is associated with. Then
we will prove the following conclusion:
(a) For ei(i = n0 + 1, ..., S), we have
d(ei, ζˆi) ≥ t− (3i− 2n0)t0 − 4(n0 − 1)C1, (A.30)
where ζˆi is one of ζ1, ..., ζn0 .
(b) For j = 1, ..., i− 1, we have
d(ei, ej) ≥ 2t− (3i− 2n0)t0 − 4(n0 − 1)C1. (A.31)
Proof of the conclusions:
• en0+1: If en0+1 is infected by a source ζn0+1, whose infection process dies
out at time t0, for any i = 1, ..., n0, we have d(en0+1, ei) ≤ dn0+1,i + t + t0,
which means
min
i∈{1,...,n0}
d(en0+1, ei) ≤ d′ + t+ t0, (A.32)
where d′ = min
i∈{1,...,n0}
dn0+1,i.
If en0+1 is infected by ζj, where j = 1, 2, ..., n0, we have
d(en0+1, ei)
≥ d(ei, ζi) + di,j − 4C1 + d(en0+1, ζj)
≥ t− n0t0 + 4(n0 − 1)C1 + di,j − 4C1 + d(en0+1, ζj)
= t− n0t0 − 4n0C1 + di,j + d(en0+1, ζj)
> t+ d(en0+1, ζj),
(A.33)
where i 6= j, i = 1, ..., n0, and
d(en0+1, ej) ≤ t+ d(en0+1, ζj). (A.34)
Therefore, assuming ηn0+1 is the leaf-node of a survived one-time-slot
branching process generated by ζj, we have
min
i∈{1,...,n0}
d(en0+1, ei) = d(en0+1, ej)
≥ d(ηn0+1, ej).
(A.35)
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Since every surviving source has at least (S + 1) one-time-slot branching
processes survived after time t0, we can always find a leaf-node ζn0+1, whose
one-time-slot branching process doesn’t overlap with path (en0+1, ζj). There-
fore, we have
d(en0+1, ej) ≥ d(ηn0+1, ej)
≥ d(ej, ζj) + d(ηn0+1, ζj)− 2t0
≥ t− n0t0 − 4(n0 − 1)C1 + t− t0 − 2t0
= 2t− (n0 + 3)t0 − 4(n0 − 1),
(A.36)
which is bigger than d′ + t+ t0 of (A.32) according to t t0 and t di,j
for any i, j = 1, ..., S. This means en0+1 has to be infected by a source that
survives at least (S + 1) one-time-slot branching processes at time t0.
According to (A.33), (A.34) and (A.36), we have d(en0+1, ei) ≥ 2t− (n0 +
3)t0 − 4(n0 − 1), where i = 1, ..., n0. Because d(en0+1, ζj) + d(ej, ζj) ≥
d(en0+1, ej) and d(ej, ζj) ≤ t, we have
d(en0+1, ζj) ≥ t− (n0 + 3)t0 − 4(n0 − 1)C1.
Therefore, the conclusions holds for en0+1.
• ek(n0 + 1 ≤ k < S): Assume that it’s infected by one of ζi(i = 1, ..., n0)
and we have
d(ek, ζˆk) ≥ t− (3k − 2n0)t0 − 4(n0 − 1)C1 (A.37)
and for i = 1, ..., k − 1,
d(ek, ei) ≥ 2t− (3k − 2n0)t0 − 4(n0 − 1)C1. (A.38)
• ek+1: If ek+1 is infected by a source ζk+1, whose infection process dies out
at time t0, for any i = 1, ..., k, we have d(ek+1, ei) ≤ d(ζk+1, ζˆi) + t + t0,
which means
min
i∈{1,...,k}
d(ek+1, ei) ≤ d′′ + t+ t0, (A.39)
where d′′ = min
i={1,...,k}
d(ζk+1, ζˆi).
According to the assumption for ek and inequality (A.29), we have
d(ei, ζˆi) ≥ t− (3k − 2n0)t0 − 4(n0 − 1)C1, (A.40)
for i ∈ {1, ..., k}.
If ek+1 is associated with ζj, where j ∈ {1, ..., n0}, for ζj 6= ζˆi, we have
d(ek+1, ei) ≥ d(ek+1, ζj) + d(ζˆi, ei) + d(ζj, ζˆi)− 4C1
≥ t− (3k − 2n0)t0 − 4(n0 − 1)C1
+d(ζj, ζˆi) + d(ek+1, ζj)− 4C1
> t+ d(ek+1, ζj).
(A.41)
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When ζj = ζˆi, we have d(ek+1, ei) ≤ t+ d(ek+1, ζj). Assume
e′ = argmin
{e1,...,ek}
d(ek+1, ei),
where e′ is one of e1, ..., ek and is associated with ζj, and ηk+1 is the leaf-
node of a survived one-time-slot branching process infected by ζj. Simi-
larly, we assume e′′ = arg minei d(ηk+1, ei), where e
′′ is one of e1, ..., ek and
is associated with ζj.
According to Algorithm 2.1, we have
k
min
i=1
d(ek+1, ei) = d(ek+1, e
′)
≥ d(ηk+1, e′′).
(A.42)
Since every survived source has at least (S + 1) one-time-slot branching
processes survived at time t0, we can always find an leaf-node ηk+1, whose
one-time-slot branching process doesn’t overlap with (ek+1, ζj). Therefore,
we have
d(ek+1, e
′)
≥ d(ηk+1, e′′)
≥ d(ηk+1, ζj) + d(e′′, ζj)− 2t0
≥ t− t0 + t− (3k − 2n0)t0 − 4(n0 − 1)C1 − 2t0
= 2t− (3k + 3− 2n0)t0 − 4(n0 − 1)C1,
(A.43)
which is bigger than d′′+ t+ t0 of (A.39) because of t t0 and t di,j for
any i, j = 1, ..., k + 1. This means ek+1 has to be infected by a surviving
source. Since for i = 1, ..., k, the inequalities
d(ek+1, ei) ≥ 2t− (3k + 3− 2n0)t0 − 4(n0 − 1)C1,
d(ek+1, ζj) + d(e
′, ζj) ≥ d(ek+1, e′),
and d(e′, ζj) ≤ t, hold, we have
d(ek+1, ζj) ≥ t− (3k + 3− 2n0)n0t0 − 4(n0 − 1)C1, (A.44)
which satisfies the condition d(ei, ζˆi) ≥ t− (3k+ 3− 2n0)t0− 4(n0− 1)C1,
when i = k + 1.
Then we complete the proof of the conclusions.
According to inequalities (A.29) and (A.40), we have that for i = 1, ..., n0,
d(ei, ζˆi) ≥ t − it0 − 4(i − 1)C1 and for i = n0 + 1, ..., S, d(ei, ζˆi) ≥ t − (3i −
2n0)t0 − 4(n0 − 1)C1 (i = n0 + 1, ..., S). Thus, when n0 ≥ 2, if we set C3 =
(3S−2n0)t0 +4(n0−1)C1, then we have d(ei, ζˆi) ≥ t−C3. And for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ S,
we have
d(ei, ej) ≥ 2t− (3S − 2n0)t0 − 4(n0 − 1)C1, (A.45)
which means d(ei, ej) ≥ 2t− C3.
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Claim A.3. If d > 3St0+4SC1 and there are at least two sources having (S+1)
one-time-slot branching processes survived, the leaf-nodes of all survived one-
time-slot branching processes in the same set V(i)I (i = 1, ..., S) are associated
with the same source that ei is associated with.
Proof of Claim A.3: Assume ei ∈ V(i)I is associated with source ζi and a ∈ V(i)I
is the leaf-node of an survived one-time-slot branching process generated by
another source ζj, which means in set V(i)I , ei and a are associated with different
sources.
Assume ej ∈ V(i)I is associated with source ζj. Then we have
d(a, ei) ≥ d(ei, ζi) + d(a, ζj) + di,j − 4C1
≥ (t− C3) + (t− t0) + di,j − 4C1.
= 2t+ di,j − C3 − t0 − 4C1
(A.46)
Because C3 = (3S − 2n0)t0 + 4(n0 − 1)C1 and di,j > 3St0 + 4SC1, we have
di,j − C3 − t0 − 4C1
≥ (2n0 − 1)t0 + 4(S − n0)C1
> 0
(A.47)
which means d(a, ei) > 2t. However, we have d(a, ej) ≤ 2t, which means
d(a, ei) > d(a, ej), which is in contradiction to step 3. This completes the
proof Claim A.3.
Next, we need to prove that the distance between each estimator and its closest
source is bounded by a constant. Since there are S clusters and each surviving
source has at least (S + 1) one-time-slot branching processes, there is at least
one cluster containing two leaf-nodes of one-time-slot branching processes from
one source. Then in step 4, the infection radius ri of set V(i)I that contains at
least two leaf-nodes of survived one-time-slot branching processes from a single
source satisfies that t − t0 6 ri 6 t. Then rmax = max {ri} in step 4 should
satisfy that t− t0 6 rmax 6 t.
Then, we need to prove that, in step 5, on the tree T , the node, which is in
distance rmax from ei, is in a constant distance to the surviving original source
with which ei is associated. Define node hi to be the node on path (ζˆi, ei) that
satisfies d(ζˆi, hi) = C3. Then we the following claim.
Claim A.4. Node hi is on the tree T for all i = 1, ..., S.
Proof of Claim A.4: There are two cases:
(a) ei, ej ∈ B are associated with the same source:
Without loss of generality, we assume ei and ej are associated with ζi.
Then we know that Kζiei,ej (the definition is in Table 2.1) is on the path
(ei, ej) and we have
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Figure A.5: The positions of ζi, ζj, ei and ej when ei and ej are associated with
different sources, where d(bi, ζi) = C1 and d(bj, ζj) = C1.
d(ei, ej) = d(ei, ζi) + d(ej, ζi)− 2d(ζi, Kζiei,ej) (A.48)
and
d(ei, ej) ≥ 2t− C3, (A.49)
which means
2d(ζi, K
ζi
ei,ej
) ≤ d(ei, ζi) + d(ej, ζi)− 2t+ C3
≤ C3,
(A.50)
Therefore, we have
d(ζi, K
ζi
ei,ej
) ≤ C3/2. (A.51)
(b) ei, ej ∈ B are associated with different sources:
Without loss of generality, we assume ei is associated with ζi, while ej is as-
sociated with ζj. Figure A.5 is the description of the relations among nodes
ei, ej, ζi and ζj. According to the definition, both K
ζi
ei,ej
and (K
ζj
ej ,ζi
, ej)
are on the path (ζi, ej). More precisely, K
ζi
ei,ej
is on the path (ζi, K
ζj
ej ,ζi
).
Since path (ζi, K
ζj
ej ,ζi
) is part of path (ζi, ζj), which means K
ζi
ei,ej
is on
path (ζi, ζj). Because K
ζi
ei,ej
is associated with ζi, under event A˜, we have
d(ζi, K
ζi
ei,ej
) ≤ C1
Therefore, for all ei, ej ∈ B, we have
d(ζˆi, K
ζˆi
ei,ej
) ≤ max{C3/2, C1}
= C3/2.
(A.52)
Then for each ei, if we choose hi which satisfies hi ∈ (ζˆi, ei) and d(hi, ζˆi) = C3.
We have hi ∈ (K ζˆiei,ej , ei). Since path (K ζˆiei,ej , ei) is on the tree T , hi is on the
tree T . This completes the proof of Claim A.4.
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Therefore, we have d(ei, ζˆi) = d(ei, hi) + d(hi, ζˆi) and d(ζˆi, hi) = C3. Assume γi
to be the estimator to ζˆi generated by ei. Because rmax ≥ t−t0, (ei, hi) ⊂ (ei, ej)
for all ej ∈ B and
d(ei, hi) = d(ei, ζˆi)− d(hi, ζˆi)
≤ t− C3
< t− t0
≤ rmax,
(A.53)
we have rmax = d(ei, γi) = d(ei, hi) + d(hi, γi).
Therefore,
d(γi, ζˆi) 6 d(γi, hi) + d(ζˆi, hi)
= d(ei, γi)− d(ei, hi) + d(ζˆi, hi)
= d(ei, γi)− (d(ei, ζˆi)− d(hi, ζˆi)) + d(ζˆi, hi)
≤ t− (t− C3 − C3) + C3
≤ 3C3.
(A.54)
Finally, we have d(γi, ζˆi) 6 3C3, which means the estimator we find is in a
constant distance with the surviving original source.
3. There is only one source surviving (S + 1) one-time-slot branching processes
after time t0.
Assuming ζˆi to be the source that infects ei, we will prove the following conclu-
sions:
(a) For i = 1, ..., S, ζˆi must be the same source that survives at least (S + 1)
one-time-slot branching processes at time t0.
(b) For e1, we have
d(e1, ζˆ1) ≥ t− 4t0 (A.55)
(c) For ei(i = 2, ..., S), we have
d(ei, ζˆi) ≥ t− (3i− 2)t0. (A.56)
(d) For any i = 1, ..., S and j = 1, ..., i− 1, we have
d(ei, ej) ≥ 2t− (3i− 2)t0. (A.57)
Proof of the conclusions: At first we assume that the only source who
survives at least (S + 1) one-time-slot branching processes at time t0 is ζj.
• e1, e2: If e1 and e2 are associated with two other sources, let’s say ζi1 and
ζi2 , except ζj, we have d(e1, e2) ≤ 2t0 + di1,i2 .
If e1 and e2 are associated with the same source except ζj, we have d(e1, e2) ≤
2t0.
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If e1 and e2 are associated with ζj, assuming η1 and η2 are two leaf-nodes
of survived one-time-slot branching processes of ζj, we have
d(e1, e2) ≥ d(η1, η2)
≥ d(η1, ζj) + d(η2, ζj)− 2t0
≥ t− t0 + t− t0 − 2t0
= 2t− 4t0.
(A.58)
Because t t0, we know that when e1 and e2 are associated with the same
source ζj, we can get d(e1, e2) maximized. According to Algorithm 2.1, e1
and e2 are associated with ζj. Since d(e2, ζj) ≤ t and
d(e1, ζj) + d(e2, ζj) ≥ d(e1, e2)
≥ 2t− 4t0, (A.59)
we have d(e1, ζj) ≥ t− 4t0. In a similar way, we have d(e2, ζj) ≥ t− 4t0.
Therefore, these conclusions hold for e1 and e2.
• ek(2 < k ≤ S − 1): Assume that ek is infected by ζj and it satisfies
d(ek, ζj) ≥ t−(3k−2)t0 and d(ek, ei) ≥ 2t−(3k−2)t0, where i = 1, . . . , k−1.
• ek+1(2 ≤ k ≤ S − 1): If ek+1 is associated with another source ζik+1 , we
have d(ek+1, ei) ≤ d(ζik+1 , ζj) + t+ t0.
If ek+1 is associated with ζj, assuming ηk+1 is the leaf-node of a survived
one-time-slot branching process of ζj who dose not overlap with (ζj, ei) for
i = 1, ..., k after time t0, we have
d(ei, ηk+1) ≥ d(ei, ζj) + d(ηk+1, ζj)− 2t0
≥ t− (3i− 2)t0 + t− t0 − 2t0
≥ t− (3k − 2)t0 + t− t0 − 2t0
= 2t− (3k + 1)t0,
(A.60)
which means for any i = 1, ..., k, we have
d(ei, ek+1) ≥
k
min
i=1
d(ei, ηk+1)
≥ 2t− (3k + 1)t0.
(A.61)
Since we hypothesize t >> t0 and t >> di,j for any i, j = 1, ..., k + 1, we
have 2t − (3k + 1)t0 > d(ζiS+1 , ζj) + t + t0, which means ek+1 has to be
associated with ζj.
Assuming
e′ = arg min
ei,i=1,...k
d(ei, eS+1),
because d(e′, ζj) ≤ t and
d(e′, ζj) + d(ek+1, ζj) ≥ d(e′, ek+1)
≥ 2t− (3k + 1)t0, (A.62)
we have d(ek+1, ζj) ≥ t− (3k + 1)t0.
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The we have finished the proof of these conclusions.
Therefore, according to inequalities (A.55), (A.56) and (A.57), for any i =
1, ..., S, we have
d(ei, ζˆi) ≥ t− C4, (A.63)
d(ei, ej) ≥ 2t− C4,∀1 ≤ i, j ≤ S, (A.64)
where we define C4 = (3S − 2)t0, and e1, ..., eS are infected by the only source
who survives at least (S + 1) one-time-slot branching processes at time t0.
Because there are S clusters and each surviving source has at least (S + 1)
one-time-slot branching processes, we have at least one cluster containing two
leaf-nodes of one-time-slot branching processes. Then in step 4, the infection
radius ri of the set V(i)I , which contains at least two leaf-nodes of survived one-
time-slot branching processes from a single source satisfies that t− t0 6 ri 6 t.
Then rmax = max {ri} in step 4 should also satisfy that t− t0 6 rmax 6 t.
Next, we need to consider the tree T , which is formed by nodes in B and paths
between every two nodes in B. According to the conclusions we have proved
before, the nodes in B are associated with the same source. Without loss of
generality, we assume that nodes in set B are infected by the source ζ1. Then
for any two nodes ei, ej in B we have
d(ei, ej)
= d(ei, ζ1) + d(ej, ζ1)− 2d(ζ1, Kζ1ei,ej)
≥ 2t− C4,
(A.65)
which means
2d(ζ1, K
ζ1
ei,ej
)
≤ d(ei, ζ1) + d(ej, ζ1)− 2t+ C4
≤ C4.
(A.66)
Therefore, we have d(ζ1, K
ζ1
ei,ej
) ≤ C4/2.
According to the definition of T , we know that path (ei, Kζ1ei,ej) is on the tree
T . Therefore, for node ei, if we define another node hi, which is on the path
(ζ1, ei) and satisfies d(hi, ζ1) = C4, hi is on the tree T . In a similar way, we can
define hj.
Thus, for each ei ∈ B(i = 1, . . . , S), we can define another node hi which is on
the path (ζ1, ei) and satisfies d(ζ1, hi) = C4 so that it is on the tree T . And we
have d(ei, ζ1) = d(ei, hi) + d(hi, ζ1) and d(ζ1, hi) = C4.
Assume γi to be the estimator to ζ1 generated by ei. Because rmax ≥ t− t0, we
have
rmax = d(ei, γi) = d(ei, hi) + d(hi, γi).
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We have
d(γi, ζ1)
6 d(γi, hi) + d(ζ1, hi)
= d(ei, γi)− d(ei, hi) + d(ζ1, hi)
= d(ei, γi)− (d(ei, ζ1)− d(hi, ζj)) + d(ζ1, hi)
≤ t− (t− C4 − C4) + C4
≤ 3C4.
(A.67)
Finally, we have d(γi, ζ1) ≤ 3C4, which means the estimator we find is in a
constant distance to the surviving original source.
A.2 Reverse Infection Algorithm
The key idea of the reverse infection algorithm in Zhu and Ying (2013) is to let
each observed infected node to broadcast its identity (ID) to its neighbors. The set
of nodes who first receive all IDs of the infected nodes are declared to be Jordan
infection centers. The pseudocode is described in Algorithm A.1.
Algorithm A.1 Reverse Infection Algorithm
1: for i ∈ VI do
2: i sends its ID wi to its neighbors.
3: end for
4: while t ≥ 1 and STOP=0 do
5: for u ∈ V do
6: if u receives wi for the first time then
7: set tui = t, where t is the current time slot, and then broadcast the message
wi to its neighbors.
8: if there exists a node who received VI distinct messages then
9: set STOP=1.
10: end if
11: end if
12: end for
13: end while
14: return u? = arg mins∈S
∑
i∈VI tui, where S is the set of nodes who receive VI
distinct messages when the algorithm terminates. Ties are broken at random.
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B.1 Proof of E1 and E2
Lemma B.1. Assume the conditions in Theorem 2 hold, for any  > 0, we have
Pr(E1) ≥ 1− ,
and
Pr(E2|E1) ≥ 1− ,
for suffciently large n.
The proof follows directly from the proof of Lemma 3 and 4 in Zhu and Ying
(2015b).
B.2 Proof of E3
Lemma B.2. Assume the conditions in Theorem 2 hold, for any  > 0, we have
Pr(E3|E1) ≥ 1− ,
for suffciently large n.
Proof. Since all sources are within D hops from s1 and the snapshot is taken at time
t, all the infected nodes are within t + D hops from s1. To prove the conclusion, we
only need to show that any node on level t+D+1 does not have more than (1−δ)3µqθ
neighbors. Since all infected nodes are within level t + D, instead of considering the
observed infected neighbors, we only need to show that any node on level t + D + 1
does not have more than (1− δ)3µqθ neighbors in level t+D.Therefore, in this proof,
we consider a more restrictive event which is only a topological feature of the ER
random and does not depend on the infection process.
Based on E1, there are at most [(1 + δ)µ]
t+D nodes in level t + D and at most
[(1+δ)µ]t+D+1 nodes in level t+D+1. For any node v in level t+D+1, the neighbors
of node v in t+D are either the node which introduce node v into level t+D+1 (i.e.,
the parent of v in the BFS tree) or the collision edges between node v and nodes in
level t + D. The total number of possible collision edges depends on the order that
the parent of node v is introduced to the BFS tree.
In general, if the parent of node v is the ith node, the number of possible neighbors
on level t+D follows Bi([(1 + δ)µ]D+t − i, µ/n) + 1. As a summary, for any node on
level t+D+ 1 the number of neighbors in level t+D is stochastically upper bounded
by Bi([(1 + δ)µ]D+t, µn) + 1. Define
X , (1− δ)3µqθ − 1.
Define δ′ to be
δ′ , Xn
[(1 + δ)µ]tµ
− 1.
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Denote by Nv the number of neighbors in level t + D for one node v on level
t+D + 1.
Pr(Nv ≥ X + 1|E1) (B.1)
≤ exp
(
−δ
′2[(1 + δ)µ]t+Dµ/n
2 + δ′
)
(B.2)
= exp
(
− δ
′
2 + δ′
× δ′[(1 + δ)µ]t+Dµ/n
)
(B.3)
= exp
(
− δ
′
2 + δ′
×
(
Xn
[(1 + δ)µ]t+Dµ
− 1
)
[(1 + δ)µ]t+Dµ/n
)
(B.4)
= exp
(
− δ
′
2 + δ′
×
(
X
[(1 + δ)µ]t+Dµ
[(1 + δ)µ]t+Dµ− [(1 + δ)µ]t+Dµ/n
))
(B.5)
= exp
(
− δ
′
2 + δ′
× (X − [(1 + δ)µ]t+Dµ/n)) (B.6)
= exp
(
− δ
′
2 + δ′
× ((1− δ)3µqθ − 1− [(1 + δ)µ]t+Dµ/n)) (B.7)
= exp
(
− δ
′µ
2 + δ′
(
(1− δ)3qθ − 1/µ− [(1 + δ)µ]t+D/n)) (B.8)
≤ exp
(
−δ
′(1− δ)3qθµ
2(2 + δ′)
)
(B.9)
≤ exp
(
−(1− δ)
3qθ
6
µ
)
(B.10)
Since t+D < logn
(1+α) log µ
, we have
t+D ≤ log n
log µ
× 1−
logµ
logn
1 + log(1+δ)
logµ
. (B.11)
Hence,
[(1 + δ)µ]t+D
n
≤ 1
µ
(B.12)
Hence, Inequality (B.9) is based on Inequality (B.12) and Inequality (B.10) is based
on δ′ ≥ 1 for sufficiently large n. For any node in level t+D + 1, we have
Pr (∩vNv < X + 1|E1)
=1− Pr (∪vNv ≥ X + 1|E1)
≥1−
∑
v
Pr (Nv ≥ X + 1|E1)
≥1− [(1 + δ)µ]t+D+1 exp (−Ω(µ))
≥1− exp
(
(t+D + 1) log[(1 + δ)µ]− (1− δ)
3qθ
6
µ
)
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Note we have t+D ≤ logn
(1+α) log µ
. Therefore,
Pr (∩vNv < X + 1|E1)
≥1− exp
(
((t+D) log[(1 + δ)] + (t+D) log µ+ log[(1 + δ)µ])− (1− δ)
3qθ
6
µ
)
≥1− exp
(
log n
(1 + α) log µ
log[(1 + δ)] +
log n
(1 + α)
+ log[(1 + δ)µ]− (1− δ)
3qθ
6
µ
)
Let C ≤ 6
(1−δ)3(1+α) and since µ >
1
Cqθ
log n, we have
Pr (∩vNv < X + 1) ≥ 1− exp (−Ω(µ))
for sufficiently large n. By substituting X, we proved the lemma.
B.3 Proof of E4 and E5
B.3.1 Neighboring structure of all sources
To prove E4 and E5 happen with a high probability, we first analyze the neigh-
borhood of all sources in the ER random graph. In this section, we derived upper
and lower bounds of the t neighborhood of all sources. Define Lil the set of nodes
from level 0 to level l of the BFS tree rooted in source si. In addition, define φ
′
i(v)
the number of offsprings of node v on the BFS tree rooted in source si. Define
Ei1 = {∀v ∈ Lit−1, φ′i(v) ∈ ((1− δ)µ, (1 + δ)µ)
Denote by the event
E˜ = ∩mi=2Ei1 ∩ E1.
We have the following lemma.
Lemma B.3. If the conditions in Theorem 2 hold, for any  > 0,
Pr(E˜) ≥ 1− 
for sufficiently large n.
Proof. For each infection source si, follow the similar argument of Lemma 3 in Zhu
and Ying (2015b), we have
Pr(Ei1) ≥ exp
(
−8 exp
(
− δ
2µ
2 + δ
+ (t− 1) log[(1 + δ)µ]
))
≥ 1− 8 (µ (1 + δ))
t−1
exp
(
δ2µ
2+δ
)
Hence, we have
Pr(E¯i1) ≤
8 (µ (1 + δ))t−1
exp
(
δ2µ
2+δ
)
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Therefore, with an union bound, we have
Pr(∩mi=2Ei1) ≥ 1−
m∑
i=1
Pr(E¯i1)
≥ 1− 8(m− 1) (µ (1 + δ))
t−1
exp
(
δ2µ
2+δ
)
≥ 1− exp
(
log 8(m− 1) + (t− 1) log (µ(1 + δ))− δ
2µ
2 + δ
)
To make the probability larger than 1− , we have
t ≤
log 
8(m−1) +
δ2µ
2+δ
log(µ(1 + δ))
+ 1
Again, we have t + D < logn
(1+α) log µ
and µ > 1
Cqθ
log n > 3 log n which guarantees the
probability goes to 1 asymptotically.
Note the events ∩mi=2Ei1 do not contain the neighborhood of source s1. Based on
Lemma B.1, with a union bound, it is straightforward to show that
Pr
(∩mi=2Ei1 ∩ E1) > 1− .
for sufficiently large n. Hence the lemma is proved.
B.3.2 Proof of E4 and E5
Lemma B.4. If the conditions in Theorem 2 hold, for any  > 0,
Pr(E4, E5) ≥ 1− 
for sufficiently large n.
Proof. We still consider the BFS tree rooted at source s1 and we can rewrite the
events E4 and E5 in a combined fashion
E4 ∩ E5 = {∀v ∈ ∪t−1i=0Zi, ψ′(v) ≥ (1− δ)2µq, ψ′′(v) ≥ (1− δ)3µqθ}.
Define
Fi = {Zi|∀v ∈ Zi, ψ′(v) ≥ (1− δ)2µq, ψ′′(v) ≥ (1− δ)3µqθ}
Then, we have
Pr(E4, E5)
≥Pr(E4, E5|E˜) Pr(E˜)
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Pr(E4, E5|E˜)
= Pr(∀v ∈ ∪t−1i=0Zi, ψ′(v) ≥ (1− δ)2µq, ψ′′(v) ≥ (1− δ)3µqθ|E˜)
=
∑
Z1∈F1
· · ·
∑
Zt−1∈Ft−1
Pr(∀v ∈ Zt−1, ψ′(v) > (1− δ)2µq, ψ′′(v) ≥ (1− δ)3µqθ
|Zt−1,Zt−2, · · · ,Z1, E˜) Pr(Zt−1,Zt−2, · · · ,Z1|E˜)
We have
Pr(∀v ∈ Zt−1, ψ′(v) > (1− δ)2µq|Zt−1,Zt−2, · · · ,Z1, E˜)
≥1−
∑
v∈Zt−1
Pr(ψ′(v) ≤ (1− δ)2µq, ψ′′(v) ≥ (1− δ)3µqθ|Zt−1,Zt−2, · · · ,Z1, E˜)
Note conditioned on Zt−1,Zt−2, · · · ,Z1, consider an offspring u of node v on the BFS
tree rooted at source s1. Node u has two possible states: infected or susceptible. If u is
not infected, v will infect node u with probability q in the next time slot. On the other
hand, if u is infected, it counts as an infected offspring of node v deterministically.
Therefore, ψ′(v) is stochastically lower bounded by binomial distribution B((1 −
δ)µ, q). Therefore, with Chernoff bound in Zhu and Ying (2015b), we have
Pr(ψ′(v) ≤ (1− δ)2µq|Zt−1,Zt−2, · · · ,Z1, E˜) ≤ exp
(
−δ
2(1− δ)µq
2
)
Each infected nodes are observed with probability θ independently. Conditioned
on ψ′(v) ≥ (1 − δ)2µq, ψ′′(v) is stochastically lower bounded by B((1 − δ)2µq, θ).
Therefore,
Pr(ψ′′(v) ≤ (1− δ)3µqθ|ψ′(v) ≥ (1− δ)2µq,Zt−1,Zt−2, · · · ,Z1, E˜)
≤ exp
(
−δ
2(1− δ)2µqθ
2
)
(B.13)
Therefore, we have
Pr(ψ′′(v) ≥ (1− δ)3µqθ, ψ′(v) ≥ (1− δ)2µq|Zt−1,Zt−2, · · · ,Z1, E˜)
=
(
1− exp
(
−δ
2(1− δ)µq
2
))(
1− exp
(
−δ
2(1− δ)2µqθ
2
))
≥1− exp
(
−δ
2(1− δ)µq
2
)
− exp
(
−δ
2(1− δ)2µqθ
2
)
≥1− 2 exp
(
−δ
2(1− δ)2µqθ
2
)
Again with union bound, we have
Pr(∀v ∈ Zt−1, ψ′(v) > (1− δ)2µq, ψ′′(v) ≥ (1− δ)3µqθ|Zt−1,Zt−2, · · · ,Z1, E˜)
≥1− 2|Zt−1| exp
(
−δ
2(1− δ)2µqθ
2
)
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Note, based on event E˜, we have
|Zt−1| ≤ m
t−1∑
i=0
[(1 + δ)µ]i ≤ 2m[(1 + δ)µ]t−1
Hence, we have
Pr(∀v ∈ Zt−1, ψ′(v) > (1− δ)2µq, ψ′′(v) ≥ (1− δ)3µqθ|Zt−1,Zt−2, · · · ,Z1, E˜)
≥1− 4m[(1 + δ)µ]t−1 exp
(
−δ
2(1− δ)2µqθ
2
)
Therefore, we have
Pr(E4, E5|E˜)
=
∑
Z1∈F1
· · ·
∑
Zt−1∈Ft−1
Pr(∀v ∈ Zt−1, ψ′(v) > (1− δ)2µq, ψ′′(v) ≥ (1− δ)3µqθ
|Zt−1,Zt−2, · · · ,Z1, E˜) Pr(Zt−1,Zt−2, · · · ,Z1|E˜)
≥
∑
Z1∈F1
· · ·
∑
Zt−1∈Ft−1
(
1− 4m[(1 + δ)µ]t−1 exp
(
−δ
2(1− δ)2µqθ
2
))
×Pr(Zt−1,Zt−2, · · · ,Z1|E˜)
=
(
1− 4m[(1 + δ)µ]t−1 exp
(
−δ
2(1− δ)2µqθ
2
))
×
∑
Z1∈F1
· · ·
∑
Zt−2∈Ft−2
Pr(∀v ∈ Zt−2, ψ′(v) > (1− δ)2µq, ψ′′(v) ≥ (1− δ)3µqθ
|Zt−2,Zt−3, · · · ,Z1, E˜) Pr(Zt−2,Zt−3, · · · ,Z1|E˜)
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Then, iteratively apply the similar arguments, we obtain,
Pr(E4, E5|E˜) (B.14)
≥
t∏
i=2
(
1− 4m[(1 + δ)µ]i−1 exp
(
−δ
2(1− δ)2µqθ
2
))
(B.15)
=
t∏
i=2
(
1− exp
(
log 4m+ (i− 1) log[(1 + δ)µ]− δ
2(1− δ)2µqθ
2
))
(B.16)
≥
t∏
i=2
exp
(
−2 exp
(
log 4m+ (i− 1) log[(1 + δ)µ]− δ
2(1− δ)2µqθ
2
))
(B.17)
= exp
(
−2
t∑
i=2
exp
(
log 4m+ (i− 1) log[(1 + δ)µ]− δ
2(1− δ)2µqθ
2
))
(B.18)
= exp
(
−2 exp
(
log 4m− δ
2(1− δ)2µqθ
2
) t−1∑
i=1
exp (i log[(1 + δ)µ])
)
(B.19)
≥ exp
(
−4 exp
(
log 4m− δ
2(1− δ)2µqθ
2
+ (t− 1) log[(1 + δ)µ]
))
(B.20)
To make the probability greater than 1− , we need,
t ≤ 1 + log log(1− )
−1/4 − log 2m+ δ2(1−δ)2µqθ
2
log((1 + δ)µ)
(B.21)
Since we have t + D < logn
(1+α) log µ
and µ > 1
Cqθ
log n > 2
δ2(1−δ)2qθ log n, Inequality B.21
is satisfied when n is large enough.
Therefore, based on Lemma B.3 and Inequality B.20, we showed that
Pr(E4, E5) ≥ Pr(E4, E5|E˜) Pr(E˜) ≥ 1− 
for any  > 0 when n is sufficiently large.
B.4 Proof of E6
Lemma B.5. If the conditions in Theorem 2 hold, for any  > 0,
Pr(E6|E1) ≥ 1− 
for sufficiently large n.
Proof. Define
E7 = {Z˜11 ≥ (1− δ)2µq} ∩ {∀v ∈ Z˜11 ,∩ti=2Z˜ii(v) ≥ (1− δ)2µqZ˜i−1i−1(v)}
Following the similar arguments in Lemma 5 in Zhu and Ying (2015b), we have
Pr(E7|E1) ≥ 1− .
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Note, for each node v ∈ Z˜11 , based on event E7, we have Z˜tt(v) ≥ [(1 − δ)2µq]t−1.
Recall each infected node report its status independently. Therefore, Z˜ ′tt (v) is stochas-
tically lower bounded by Bi([(1− δ)2µq]t−1, θ). By Chernoff bound, we have
Pr(Z˜ ′tt (v) ≥ [(1− δ)2µq]t−1(1− δ)θ|E7, E1) ≤ exp
(
−δ
2[(1− δ)2µq]t−1θ
2
)
Note Z˜11 ≤ (1 + δ)µ based on event E1, with a union bound, we have
Pr(∀v ∈ Z˜11 , Z˜ ′tt (v) ≥ [(1− δ)2µq]t−1(1− δ)θ|E7, E1)
≥1− (1 + δ)µ exp
(
−δ
2[(1− δ)2µq]t−1θ
2
)
≥1− exp
(
log[(1 + δ)µ]− δ
2[(1− δ)2µq]t−1θ
2
)
≥1− ,
for sufficiently large n since µ > 1
Cqθ
log n.
Therefore, we have
Pr(E6|E1) ≥ Pr(E6|E7, E1) Pr(E7|E1) ≥ 1− .
The lemma is proved.
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C.1 Proof of Theorem 5.1
Proof. We prove this theorem by considering a special case of the MDP problem with
p = 1, which means the attack stops at time slot 0 and only the initial attack source
gets attacked. Thus, we have
E
T∑
t=0
f(st, at(nt)) = f(s0, a0) (C.1)
We define this as the single step MDP problem. If we can show the single step MDP
problem is NP-hard, the MDP problem is also NP-hard. The NP-hardness is shown
by reducing the maximum coverage problem to the single step MDP problem. The
decision versions of the maximum coverage problem and the single step MDP problem
are as follows:
Problem 2 (The maximum coverage problem decision version).
INSTANCE: A collection of sets U = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sm}, and integers k, h.
QUESTION: Is there a subset U ′ ⊆ U such that |U ′| ≤ k and | ∪Si∈U ′ Si| ≥ h?
Problem 3. (The single step MDP problem decision version)
INSTANCE: Ga(Va, Ea), Gb(Vb, Eb), C0,F0, D, and integers n0, q.
QUESTION: Is there a rewiring such that f(s0, a0) ≥ q?
Given any instance of the maximum coverage problem 〈U , k, h〉, where
U = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sm},
S = ∪Si∈USi and n = |S|. We first build a graph Ga(Va, Ea) as follows:
1. For each Si ∈ U , there is a node vi on Ga.
2. For each si ∈ S, there is a node ui on Ga.
3. For any si ∈ S, Sj ∈ U , there is an edge between ui and vj if si ∈ Sj.
4. For any vi, vj (1 ≤ i, j ≤ m), add edge between vi and vj.
5. Add node zij (1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n) to graph Ga and add edge between zij
and zik for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j, k ≤ n.
6. For each node vi (1 ≤ i ≤ m), add nodes xij (1 ≤ j ≤ nm − 1) and add edge
between vi and xij for 1 ≤ j ≤ mn− 1.
7. Add node r and add edge between r and vi for 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
An example of Ga can be found in Figure C.1. We then construct a graph Gb(Vb, Eb)
as a graph of isolated nodes, with |Vb| = |Va|. The set of dependency links is a one-
to-one mapping between nodes from Ga and Gb. Then, we set C0 = {r}, n0 = k and
q = kmn+kn+h+1. Since Gb is a graph of isolated nodes in our construction, there
is no connected component on Gb with size greater than 1 no matter how we rewire
Ga.
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Figure C.1: An example of Ga.
If we can find a subset U ′ with |U ′| = k such that | ∪Si∈U ′ Si| ≥ h, then for anySi ∈ U ′, we remove the edge between vi and r and add an edge between vi and zi1.
Since n0 = k, this is a rewiring of n0 edges on graph Ga. According to the construction
of Ga, it is easy to find out f(s0, a0) ≥ kmn+ kn+ h+ 1.
Suppose we can find a rewiring of k links on Ga such that
f(s0, a0) ≥ kmn+ kn+ h+ 1. (C.2)
Since the contribution of graph Gb to f(s0, a0) is 1, the contribution of graph Ga to
f(s0, a0) has to be greater than or equal to kmn+kn+h. We can divide the rewiring
of an edge into two steps:
• Remove an edge between two nodes;
• Reattach one endpoint of the previous removed edge to another node in the
graph.
The removed edges have to be among the edges (r, vi) (1 ≤ i ≤ m). Otherwise, nodes
xij (1 ≤ j ≤ n) connected to vi will not contribute to the size of the largest connected
component, f(s0, a0(n0)), which means the term kmn in inequality (C.2) can not be
satisfied. Define V ′ to be the set of node vi with link (r, vi) removed. To satisfy term
kn in inequality (C.2), after removing k links between r and vi, for each vi ∈ V ′, we
have to add another edge between vi to any node zij (1 ≤ j ≤ mn). Then according
to inequality (C.2), we have
|{uj|(uj, vi) ∈ Ea ∀1 ≤ j ≤ n, vi ∈ V ′}| ≥ h, (C.3)
which means
| ∪Si∈U ′ Si| ≥ h, (C.4)
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where U ′ = {Si|vi ∈ V ′}.
Therefore, we have the maximum coverage problem is polynomial-time reducible
to our problem, which means the single step MDP problem is NP-hard. Thus, the
MDP problem is NP-hard.
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